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The Evolving Nature of Warfare



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JCOA Journal Survey

The Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) is currently running a survey to determine the relevance and impact of the Journal to our readers. The survey questions involve the timeliness of subject areas and their relevance to those who receive the Journal. The Journal Survey is available at the external link below. At the external site, you can also access all previous editions of the JCOA Journal in a pdf format that is available for downloading.

Journal Survey link: *<http://jecs.jfcom.mil/jcoa/>*



Message From the Director

*BG Anthony G. Crutchfield, USA
Director, JCOA*

This is my first Journal article as the Director of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA). It is exciting to be on board with this organization and to continue the fine work begun by my predecessor, MG James Barclay. I wish him well in his new assignment as Commanding General Army Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

JCOA has been very busy with numerous studies involving various aspects of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the War on Terror, and in briefing the results of these studies to a diverse audience around the world. In addition, we have been tasked to provide support to other priorities as they occur; for example, the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the conflict in Georgia. Our aim is to gather, analyze, and disseminate the lessons and information into the hands of the people who can use it to improve DOD's capability to support our nation. Provided at the end of this Journal is a list of the current products released by JCOA and available on the SIPRNET for review by other organizations.

In this Journal we are presenting a series of articles that deal with the evolving nature of warfare. From information operations, strategic communications, command and control, and to a comparison of the lessons between US Marine Corps advisors in Nicaragua in 1927 and those in Iraq today, our goal is



to show how 4th generation warfare and evolving technology have influenced the modern battlefield.

Also presented here are two other articles of interest. The first discusses the steps the senior enlisted leaders are taking in the US Pacific Command area of responsibility to cement relationships and joint operations among the partner nations. Through interaction and cooperation, they are enhancing the capabilities for a strong defense.

This is followed by an article dealing with the shortage of military chaplains and some innovative steps being taken to alleviate this problem. Of particular note is the conflict between Jewish law and military regulations and how this can be overcome to meet the spiritual needs of the soldiers.

Again, the final portion is a listing and synopsis of the current products from JCOA studies that are available for review at JCOA's SIPRNET website. Additionally, JCOA's products are available on the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) website.

Anthony G. Crutchfield
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis



JCOA UPDATE

In the last journal I focused on completion of our Counterinsurgency, Targeting, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) study called “CTI”; the beginning of our new major study, Joint Tactical Environment (JTE); and the arrival of our new Director, BG Tony Crutchfield. CTI is in fact complete, disseminated, and is currently in staffing across United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and the services to impact and change doctrine, training, and in some cases experimentation. The collection and analysis for JTE is complete, integration and dissemination is on-going and the final report is being written. BG Crutchfield is now solidly in command and taking the organization forward with very specific guidance from the USJFCOM Commander.

JTE was a huge success. After three weeks of collection in Iraq and Qatar, in-depth analysis, and a final briefing to GEN Petraeus, the results of the study are making near and long term improvements to joint capabilities. As background, the study was in direct response to a GEN Petraeus request to capture best practices and lessons learned from recent joint tactical operations. Specifically, how do coalition forces successfully command and control (C2) ISR, airspace management, and fires in a joint tactical environment? During the 8 August outbrief to GEN Petraeus, JCOA received specific guidance on what organizations and individuals need to see the brief and incorporate the findings into their respective operations. Currently, the study results have been briefed to many Department of Defense (DOD) organizations, and the list continues to grow. Although the findings will eventually enter a more formal staffing process to influence change, the immediate goal is to reach the warfighter quickly so as to make immediate change that will impact the fight now.

Another study that is gaining traction across DOD and other agencies is our Super Empowered Guerilla (SEG) study. Recently briefed to Secretary McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the SEG study examines the evolving asymmetric threat and evaluates its emergence using a law enforcement model analyzing behavioral resolve, operational practicality, and technical feasibility. Recent

advances in basic sciences provide the tools necessary for small groups to attain destructive power that, until now, has been associated only with nation-states. In addition to their access to advanced technologies, these “super empowered” guerillas can gain knowledge of sophisticated tactics and draw operational strength from *ad hoc* associations with states, legitimate businesses, other terrorists, and transnational crime.

JCOA’s most recent study was an analysis of the Georgia-Russia conflict from Aug 2008. Tasked by the Joint Staff, JCOA worked with EUCOM and a variety of US government agencies to examine the background, conduct of the conflict, and the resulting regional/strategic implications. The analysis highlights direct military action in conventional approaches while at the same time using irregular warfare approaches that shaped this conflict for well over a decade. The study also offers an opportunity to see the strengths and weaknesses of a re-emergent Russia and the impact of the evolving nature of hybrid warfare with its impact on policy, plans, and preparations for future conflict.

Finally, for all of our work, we continue to develop and refine our processes and procedures that both speed up the delivery and impact of our work, while developing ways to measure that impact. We must continue to show value added for what we produce, measure it, and if we are not getting the right impact, at the right place, and at the right time we have to adjust our way of doing business. Due to the high quality of our dedicated analysts and all those that support the process, we are getting more and more successful at accomplishing those tasks. We need to get better!

“War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well.”
-- Frederick the Great

Mr. Bruce Beville
Deputy Director JCOA

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4th Generation War on Terror Information Operations in South Asia: THE 21ST CENTURY'S "NEW GREAT GAME" FOR THE MODERN OPERATOR

ROD PROPST, Vice President for Global Strategies The Praemittias Group

Executive Summary

South Asia has for centuries been a strategic crossroads, an experience which continues today with the on-going struggle in Afghanistan. This fight was at one time known as the "Great Game"; we are now engaged in a "New Great Game" in the region. Moreover, the Game is being waged as an emerging, new form of warfare, often referred to as 4th Generation Warfare. Given this complex set of relevant elements, collection of timely, accurate information by all operators is essential; collection using local assets who know the region, the language, and who act as facilitators is advisable, and has a long history in the region. This paper paints a set of developing pictures for the reader: 1) how a real intelligence arm [of the British] developed, concentrating on the South Asian intelligence mechanism; 2) the importance of South Asia, its people and strategic location; 3) historical parallels of importance today; 4) the nature of 4th Generation Warfare; 5) the nature of the "New Great Game"; and finally, 6) how the modern operator can learn from the provided information and apply it to today's war in Afghanistan and the region, using native assets to assist in complex information collection.



Afghanistan--The Heart of the Great Game

Introduction

The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged.

—George Washington, July, 1777

The 21st century's war on terror extends the fight waged almost continuously over the last 2500 years. Given this lengthy historical backdrop, clearly many lessons learned exist for the current Special Operations Forces and Foreign Area Officer operators--and other potential information collectors in the field and on staff. Yet the history must be adapted to the realities of Fourth Generation Warfare to be successful--an extension of the "Great Game" paradigm (waged between the British and Russian empires throughout the 19th and early 20th Centuries). As field experts, often deployed in low-density situations, the SOF or FAO (and in the homeland, the law enforcement or other intelligence officer) operator is ideally placed--and hopefully prepared--to collect information vital to the success of our nation's over-arching war on terror missions. Thus, an excellent starting point to capture these lessons learned is the British experience [in "information operations"] in Central and South Asia in the Great Game, as the region extending from Iraq, through Iran, and into Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India provides a common operational backdrop [over several centuries] relevant to today's US operator as 1st-line information collector.

In order to properly develop this historical snapshot, this article begins with a brief historical overview of British intelligence. This overview is then brought into sharper focus for Great Britain's South Asia operations. Continuing, the article then draws historical parallels with that [English] historical backdrop combined with a regional overview applicable for today's fight. From that process, the author draws lessons for today's special and foreign area operators. Throughout, the author uses endnotes--not for referential purposes, but rather to provide the reader with a short list of recommended reading to enhance the article's introductory, baseline knowledge. To begin, an understanding of the development of British intelligence is useful, so that one has a starting point for further [historical] discussion on intelligence operations in the region, which ultimately sets the stage for discussion and applications concerning the current situation.

A Snapshot of British Intelligence

As this paper draws parallels between the long-term British intelligence experience in the region to the 21st century US experience, it is necessary to provide a brief historical backdrop of that British experience. The three sections which follow: a) first establish a long-view of the British information collection experience across the world and centuries; b) then draws a picture of the importance of South and Central Asia; and then 3) narrows that broader [British intelligence] view into one focused on the region. These three overviews are not intended to be a thorough introduction; they merely serves as a foundation for the concluding sections by taking a snapshot view of the state of British intelligence by century, using key historical figures over time. The author counts on the reader of these century-centric “dots” to then connect them—allowing for the image which emerges for what one sees in the 21st century for the war on terror to become clear.

16th Century—Walsingham and Elizabeth

One of the first professional intelligence services was that of Francis Walsingham, the 16th century “spymaster” for Queen Elizabeth I. Walsingham combined the roles of both espionage and domestic security, along with a smattering of code-breaking—the three elements which remain pervasive in the organization of the Realm’s current intelligence line-and-block chart. Moreover, he had a direct role in the “Irish Problem,” a role avoided by the Services in the more recent past. Shortly after Elizabeth ascended to the throne in 1558, Walsingham was elected to the House of Commons and then became England’s Ambassador to France in 1570. He was named to that position after he had successfully curbed the Ridolfi Plot. After the failure of the Northern Rebellion, a Catholic Florentine banker, Roberto Rodolfi, conspired with the Duke of Alba to invade England; seeking support, Ridolfi engaged Mary, Queen of Scots; the Duke of Norfolk; Pope Pious V (who had earlier excommunicated Elizabeth); the Duke of Alba, who was the Governor of the Netherlands; and King Philip II of Spain. When this plot failed, he was rewarded with the ambassadorship. His efforts led Walsingham to be named as Elizabeth’s “Principal Secretary” (think Secretary of State).

Walsingham later uncovered the Throckmorton Plot, similar to the Ridolfi scheme, in that it involved the assassination of Elizabeth along with a Catholic uprising in England, and an invasion by Henry I the Duke of Guise. A third major plot against the Queen was the William Parry Plot. Parry was employed as a spy for Walsingham, but had gone into debt, his reason

for becoming a double agent. He confessed to the Queen and was pardoned. Later, however, he hatched a similar ploy, uncovered by Walsingham, and was executed in March, 1585. The last significant plot was named the “Babington Plot,” and resulted in the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots. Anthony Babington, a noble from Derbyshire, had involved himself with a plot to murder the Queen. Walsingham discovered and turned a fellow conspirator, Gilbert Gifford. Gifford was a courier between Thomas Morgan, who was a go-between for Mary and the Netherlands. These messages, encoded by Morgan, were deciphered by Walsingham’s code-breakers, and ultimately used to identify and punish all of the conspirators, to include Mary.

These four examples show the strategic importance of intelligence. From a broader perspective, Walsingham’s service is also noteworthy for several other reasons. As stated previously, his use of a code-breaking service extends into the efforts in the 20th Century—where ENIGMA and ULTRA changed the course of the Second World War. He collected information from a much wider community than his predecessors; one example is that of Anthony Standen, who as a member of the merchant class, was able to collect much high-value information concerning the Spanish Armada. He also engaged Great Britain on a much broader world stage—with agents, or “intelligencers,” in Spain, Italy, Constantinople, and Aleppo. Just as importantly, Walsingham set the precedent for the linkage between the diplomatic world and that of intelligence, seeing the unbroken chain between emerging threats, global alliances, and markets. He set a high bar for the unofficial secret intelligence services which followed in the next two centuries.

17th Century –Thurloe and Cromwell

John Thurloe, the son of a Protestant rector, was not involved in the English Civil War, but was named Oliver Cromwell’s Secretary of State in 1652. A year later he officially became Cromwell’s head of intelligence. He quickly established a wide web of international spies. He also established a formal code-breaking department, headed by the mathematician John Wallis. Wallis’ efforts led to the unraveling of the “Sealed Knot.”



Oliver Cromwell

The “Sealed Knot” conspirators were Royalist conspirators, who sought the restoration of the monarchy from Cromwell’s Interregnum. The group’s efforts included no less than eight attempts to restore the King between 1652 and 1659; the largest of these, uncovered and thwarted by Thurloe was the “Penruddock Uprising” in 1655.

Later Thurloe was made the chief of the post office. This enabled his security services to intercept and read the mails, another enabler of his wide-spread spy net to curb intervention in his government. After the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, Thurloe was arrested for high treason, but never tried. The restoration, of course, ended his period of control of the intelligence services.

19th Century—The Second Boer War: Intelligence Failures

The Boer War--by this we mean the second war of 1899-1902--revealed serious flaws in the British approach to the war and the country in which it operated. These lessons, as the article’s paper on intelligence operations in South Asia highlights, ran counter to the experience in Central Asia. More importantly, the mismanagement from a cultural and intelligence collection perspective offers numerous lessons learned for current war on terror operations in both Iraq and particularly Afghanistan. Boers had drifted away from British control first in Natal, then in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.

With the discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1896, many foreigners entered. Under the guise of “foreigner rights,” the British mounted an expedition, the Jameson Raid, which failed. The British still insisted that foreigners be treated properly, which the Boers thought

would ultimately lead to absorption into the British Empire. An ultimatum was issued by Lord Chamberlain and the Boers issued a counter-ultimatum. When both sides ignored both political efforts, war followed. Initially, the Boers routed the British. In a following phase, massive British troop increases led to numerous tactical victories. The third phase, an extended guerrilla war began. The British, now led by Kitchener, began a brutal scorched earth policy. They simultaneously: 1) placed Boers in concentration camps, where death rates were atrocious, and; 2) isolated themselves in fixed blockhouse positions out of native contact.



Boer Concentration Camp

Several factors contributed to the lack of British military (and intelligence collection) success. First, the British counted on neither local support, nor on “**knowledgability**” of the land, peoples, and culture. For that reason, native information collection operations were few and far between and notoriously ineffective. Second, the British isolated themselves from the natives. They maintained themselves in strategic blockhouses, which were easily avoided by the Boer commandos. This had the effect on ensuring the British had no placement, no access--thus no intelligence of value. Third, the British drew Boer civilians into the fight; then they placed them in concentration camps where many died. So, British abuses of the local population further estranged them from the natives. While the British may have contained the enemy, denied some degree of mobility to him, and won some tactical battles through harassment action, the net result was the division of the British from the people of the country they had “invaded.” The parallels (and lessons learned) from this experience are clear. Success here led to similar operations in Asia, during the British experience in Malaysia; however, as a positive model for the collection of native information in an occupied land, the Boer War failed miserably.

Early 20th Century—The End of the Great Game

By the turn of the century, British intelligence operations were becoming increasingly systemized. The military had established the Intelligence Department in 1886. To counter its most worrisome threat--Russian movement toward India in Central Asia--it has organized the D Branch, which focused on Central Asian information operations, using a frontier screen of intelligence collection capabilities, often based on native assets. The Navy opened its Naval Intelligence Division in 1886. These human intelligence efforts paralleled those conducted by the War Office Library, which collected and collated information in the foreign press, much as the FBIS tool does today. The Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) at the turn of the century, Sir John Ardagh used this collated material and his network of on-the-ground informers to significant advantage as the Great Game wound down. In 1901 the DMI reorganized again, replacing Section H with Subdivision 13; Section A within Subdivision 13 was responsible for "Secret Service." Section 13's head, Colonel J.K. Trotter, stated his belief that a permanent intelligence staff was needed to "run agents." Even so the intelligence apparatus was formally dismantled shortly after, only to be reborn in the 1903 establishment of the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. It is of interest to note the organizational sharing and co-importance of operations and intelligence, a struggle that continues today, and one highly important in 4th Generation Warfare and the New Great Game.

By 1907 the military had established its "Special Section" to run sources, out of MO5. As problems with Germany increased, a nation-wide intelligence organization was needed. Many difficult lessons learned came from the Boer War at the turn of the century. The former Commissioner of Police in Johannesburg during the War, Colonel Fraser J. Davies, prepared a summary on intelligence failures in South Africa for the Committee of Imperial Defense. This led to the establishment of a new body, divided into a home and a foreign section. The home section was quickly designated MI5, and led by Captain Vernon Kell. The Foreign entity, designated MI6, was led by Commander Mansfield Smith-Cumming.

Smith-Cumming's early efforts concentrated on the growing problem with Germany. He sent agents to German dockyards and zeppelin hangars. He ran the long-term agent Sigmund Georgievich Rosenblum, better known to many readers as Sidney Reilly, "Ace of Spies," codenamed ST-1. Cumming continued the use of native agents, notably Otto Krueger, Codenamed TR-16, who spied for decades in Germany. Before Cumming gave up the helm at MI6 in 1924, he had native agents in Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Russia, Egypt, Greece, Romania, Salonika, Malta, the

United States, Switzerland, France, Italy, South Africa, Spain, Portugal, and several South American countries. Simultaneously he fought with native and British agents to control German destabilization efforts in Persia, India, and Afghanistan--bringing the two Great Game players, Russia and England, onto the same side for a period of time. As Captain Reginald Teague-Jones extended his pre-war intelligence work, he led native agents who collected against both the Germans and Russians in Central Asia. After the war, a renewed focus on Central Asia led the Delhi Intelligence Bureau Chief, Colonel Cecil Kaye, to re-establish the use of many native assets, this time also focusing on native Indian insurgents, in addition to the Bolshevik threat in the region. These efforts were to continue until the loss of India to the Crown in 1947.¹



South Asia

Strategic

Importance of South Asia: Topographical and Human


South Asia is a resource-rich area, which has made it an historically relevant target for great powers with conflicting interests. Its *strategic geography* has been historically important--the steppes from the North allowed Huns, Mongols, Cossacks, and Russians fast access to warm water ports in the South. From the East, the demographic and cultural power of successive Chinese empires pushed into South-Central Asia. Similarly, the demographic and cultural influence of India [and Great Britain] pushed into Central Asia's Tibet, the Hindu Kush from the Southeast. And from the Southwest the Middle East applied expansionist pressure--especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

It is divided from Central Asia by some of the highest, most difficult mountain ranges in the world. Crossing these complex geographic features were numerous *strategic passes*, allowing for effective lines of trade,

expansionist, and military lines of communication. The Wakhan Corridor allowed passage through the Baroghil Pass between Tajikistan/Turkistan and Pakistan on the sub-continent. The Khyber Pass linked important cities in Afghanistan (Kabul) and Pakistan (Peshawar)--into India. The Dorah and Shandar Passes allowed the same Afghanistan-to-Pakistan penetration farther north. The Torugart Pass allowed movement between Turkistan and Xinjiang. The Nathula and Jelep Passes linked India and Tibet. The Khunjerab Pass tied Pakistan and China. And southwest Khajak and Bolan Passes allowed passage from Kandahar into India south of Lahore.

Its lines of communication include, further segmenting the region, several *strategic river systems*--the Indus, Ganges, and Oxus. The region combines high, barren valleys; oases in vast deserts; and tropical environments. It is, thus crisscrossed by numerous caravan and other land-based trade routes--most notably the "Silk Road." At the base of the region lies India--Great Britain's "Jewel in the Crown," which offered warm water port access to the region's riches.

Its people offer the same *strategic and tactical human complexity*. Familial, clan, and tribal relationships are clear; loyalties to those entities are strong. Regional, Nation, and State ties are each progressively weaker in the region. That in turn has a profound--and often



of struggle still--as it has been for centuries. The region, especially the area now known as Afghanistan, is perfectly situated as a *buffer state*. As the Monroe Doctrine of the United States sought to provide buffers to our nation, the Russians saw Afghanistan as a buffer to its south, as well as a road to India and its sea lanes of communication. Similarly, Britain's "Jewel" also needed a buffer to its north; again, that was Afghanistan. When one then adds the final piece to this puzzle--the numerous passes in Afghanistan connect

to north and south, and even the east and west, the potential for struggle in the region is magnified. That occurred in a region stretching from Turkey, past Iraq and Persia (Iran) with the Caucasus and Caspian Sea on the north through to Afghanistan--with the Punjab butting up against India on the northwest, and with China, Tibet, and its routes penetrating into India on the northeast.

Picture this strategic region with Russian dominance north of the 40th parallel, with British dominance south of the 30th parallel, and with a vast, 2,000-mile-long buffer zone running in a debated region between the 30th and 40th parallels. That set the stage for the British struggles in the region--struggles which are in many ways reflected in the 21st century.

British Intelligence in South Asia

At this point we have reviewed British information collection operations conducted globally over several centuries, and followed that with an overview of the region--Central Asia--where much of the 21st century's war on terror is fought. Narrowing the scope from global information operations to a regional view constitutes the next step. Once the historical backdrop of both information operations and information collection in South Asia is provided, that leads to the heart of the paper--and understanding of 4th Generation Warfare, the past's lessons learned for info ops, and suggested ideas for the operator who must "fight" [writ large] and win in the New Great Game.

British information operations in the 19th and early 20th Century were marked by the quest for "*knowledge*." Fresh off of their triumph in the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain sought to solidify its realm, especially in the Orient, with its prized possession, the "Jewel in the Crown" of India. That was complicated by the buffer between India and Russia, the site of the Great Game. These vague frontiers frightened the British Realm, and they sought to solidify their knowledge of the area over the next century.

Knowledge operations--the buzz word of the Realm--depended upon native sources. England needed human assets able to move seamlessly between the two worlds of the sahibs and the natives. That spurred an intelligence capability with men and women from the target region, fluent in local languages, who knew the region, its culture, and could easily penetrate any circle required--whether it was of merchants, surveyors, or the representative offices of foreign, competing powers. This early system in South Asia [successfully] used political and diplomatic bribes, and a wide range of listening and screening posts for over a hundred years.

In the immediate wake of the win in the Napoleonic period, the military dwindled in size, and the intelligence apparatus followed that trend. In 1803, the small military intelligence operation on the Imperial War Staff was the Depot of Military Knowledge. By 1815 that had been replaced by the Topography Department; under that aegis, the standard cover for status and action was established--that of British survey teams, which was ideal as the mapping of the blurred region was paramount in gaining the knowledge needed to control Central Asia between the 30th and 40th parallels. The key, principal aides to these survey expeditions were natives, collaborators of the British military topographers.

Aside from the travelling spies, the military also manned posts in key frontier towns and cities. British political officers, often military men, were present in places such as Teheran, Kabul, and Kandahar. These officers used local spies with incredible natural placement and access to collect and provide information for the Crown. These early native spies were known as *newswriters*, and were successful and key information providers for the entire century.

In addition to those permanently-placed information providers, the military used travelling agents. They listened, mapped, and conducted general reconnaissance as they became knowledgeable about the vast terrain which divided the two major powers involved in the Great Game. These assistant surveyors and disguised travelers--often acting as holy men or merchants--were known as *pundits*. Their use was equally successful for the British in the Great Game of South Asia.

Adding to this network of collectors were native *intelligencers*, at many numerous listening posts throughout the frontier--in places such as Peshawar, Gilgit, Chitral, Kandahar, and Meshed. These sources provided forward-based capability, providing a screen, often acting as boundary commissions' native representatives. Combined the newswriters, pundits, and intelligencers spread the limited capabilities of British officer collectors in ways the British could never hope to achieve without the native assistance. The excellent small wars academic, C.E. Caldwell noted of these native spies, "The people are far more observant than the dwellers in civilized lands." This was perhaps due to the isolation and endemic distrust of outsiders common in the region, then and now. Caldwell continues, "Intelligence flies from mouth to mouth... The enemy has no organized intelligence department.. yet he knows perfectly well what is going on." ² Thus, the native source was commonly and successfully used throughout the Great Game in South Asia due to his anthropological and sociological understanding of the region of his birth, due to his ease of communications

and observation, due to his ability to move most places in a manner less apparent and vulnerable than his British master. The knowledge gained via British collaboration with the population of the region, using native sources, was invaluable to the Crown during the period. Specific examples taken from the century of the Great Game in South Asia illuminate these general observations.

The British used the established, historically efficient Mughal system to spread its influence. Asians provided services in their roles as envoys, couriers, negotiators, interpreters, and linguists--most of which readily translate into 21st century roles and capabilities. In addition, they acted as *dak* carriers, the ancient postal system which allowed access and fairly wide travel in the blurred region separating the two great powers.



Where the Great Game Is Played-- The Hindu Kush

Early Efforts: Political Officers N.P. Grant, Henry Pottinger, and Charles Christie

One of the earliest knowledge operation, or intelligence collection, efforts was by a "political officer," Captain N.P. Grant. He began extending the understanding of the region with an assessment in Persia. In 1809 he was tasked to discover if a border route was available to the French or Russians along the coast to reach Karachi. He discovered that this was possible. In a follow-on assessment, designed to extend from Isfahan to Baghdad, Grant was murdered.

Two other officers continued these early effort. Lieutenant Henry Pottinger and Captain Charles Christie travelled to Baluchistan--disguised as Muslim horse traders working for a Hindu merchant--tasked to: 1) determine the strengths of the tribes; 2) determine the nature of the terrain; 3) find and assess potential invasion routes; and, 4) find, cultivate and determine the strengths and weaknesses of local rulers with whom they came in contact. For the careful reader, this looks much like the modern special forces operational directive. In

these endeavors, Pottinger and Christie were greatly assisted by their native contingent, for access, language skills, cultural understanding, and natural cover. These officers' efforts were published in 1813 by Captain John MacDonald-Kinneir, in which he concluded that a landward invasion of India would have to be made via Central Asia and Afghanistan; this would flavor the following efforts of British intelligence for decades--and is reflected in the importance of Afghanistan that remains in 2008.

The Early Native Spy for the Crown: William Moorcroft and Mir Izzet Ullah

A Persian *munshi*, or translator, Mir Izzet Ullah, was instrumental in the efforts of another British agent, William Moorcroft. Moorcroft, with Ullah's assistance, determined that if the French or Russians established an embassy at Bokhara, that would reveal their intentions of a potential invasion through the Hindu Kush into India.

Mir Izzet Ullah then was the key native asset for a second mission, led by Hyder Young Hearsey. This pair entered Tibet, disguised as religious pilgrims, using the advice of the expedition's pundit, Harbalam. Based on their expedition, the British established a security screen with a Moorcroft associate, George Tribeck, establishing a post as a commercial agent in Teheran, with Moorcroft establishing himself in Yarkand, and Hearsey assisting the local emir's anti-Russian efforts from his post at Bokhara. This was the first British screen of listening posts along ancient caravan routes, routes which could be used by Russian forces entering the buffer area between the 30th and 40th parallel. Moorcroft expanded these three posts with strategically-placed newswriters to fill out the screen.

Early Efforts in Afghanistan: Arthur Connolly and Syed Karamut Ali

Captain Arthur Connolly, who coined the "Great Game" expression, ran a long-term mission in Afghanistan from Kandahar. He thought that the Russians would continue to push south into the blurred zone that separated the British in the south from the Russians in the north--using the endemic lawlessness of the khanates as an excuse to occupy the border regions. Connolly had initially been charged with a survey over land from Russia into the region. He travelled through the Caucasus and into northern Persia into the Karakum Desert to measure Russian influence there. He moved from Persia into northern Afghanistan, using his new guide and interpreter, Syed Karamut Ali, a reportedly tireless collector of trade, people, passes, and rout

information for Connolly. Connolly and Karamut Ali completed a reconnaissance of over 4,000 miles along the route most likely for any Russian advance, both a remarkable feat and an essential intelligence collection task. This task would not have been possible without the use of native assets, Syed Karamut Ali key among them in this endeavor. Based on Connolly's observations, the British established further posts, extending their screen into Peshawar and Afghanistan. These posts would provide early warning of Russian troop movements, as suggested by a Connolly contemporary, Colonel George de Lacy Evans. This actualized the policy proposed by the President of the Board of Control In India, Lord Ellenborough, a proponent of the British "forward policy."

These several listening posts soon proved advantageous, in the British view. Sir John MacNeill, the British minister at Teheran sent Lieutenant Henry Rawlinson to recon along the northern Persian border, where Rawlinson encountered Cossack forces, who the lieutenant thought were enroute to attack Herat. Another officer, Eldred Pottinger, was inside Herat, and reported Russian activities there. Their observations led to the first Afghan War of 1838. The British took Kandahar and Kabul. While the British ultimately left these two cities, their native intelligence networks were most important in the War's intelligence efforts.

Intelligence Operations in the Mid-1800s: India and the Native Newswriters.

By mid-century the British intelligence system in South Asia was growing in numbers and successes. The British had placed their *newswriters* strategically inside the Mughal rulers. The British adapted these established intelligence mechanisms to their benefit. These were supplemented by the *dak chaukis* (postmen), who could travel and collect without suspicion. This was a significant enabler for the British, who found it continually difficult to unravel the complex social structure they found in the disputed region. These native assistants became essential cogs in the *knowledge operations* (read intelligence collection) of the Crown.

One example of this organization is that of Warren Hastings. He used a contact of the East India Company's Bengal administrator Robert Clive, Mohammed Reza Khan to gain knowledge of commerce, revenue systems, and the internal workings of the Indian diplomatic system. Hastings used a landed magnate, Krishna Kanta Nandy, for information. An entrepreneur, Ramchandra Pandit, added his skills to the network of sources. Courtiers with continued access, such as Taffazul Hussain Khan and Ali Ibrahim Khan assisted

in the gains in “knowledge” in India and the north.

Now the knowledge system for intelligence operations became even more formal, even though details remain few and sketchy. For example, Colonel William Fullarton developed an asset validation system, in which he tested the information his sources provided by asking them about fictitious places they might have visited during a collection operation. Those who failed an operations test, by providing details about such fictitious locales were revealed and often booted. Recruitment began, often now concentrating on certain tribes--identified during [informal] target assessment as being susceptible, knowledgeable, and useful to British information needs. One such example is the secretary, George Cherry, to the governor general--who skillfully used native pilgrims, merchants, exiles, and other travelers as sources along the border and through the disputed regions in Central Asia.

Focused, Native-Based Intelligence Operations: William Henry Sleeman and the *Thugees*

The primary intent of this paper is to encourage and focus the information collection efforts of the on-the-ground operator in the 21st Century. Providing clear examples of how this worked in the past, its effectiveness, and its applicability to the present day means providing a specific example of a specific, native-based collection operation. The selected example is that of William Henry Sleeman and his native assets who compromised the activities of the Thuggee adversary.

Thugs were notorious in India as highway stranglers (*phansighar*). *Thug* was the literal translation of “deceiver.” These two words defined the activities of the Thugees. They would encounter travelers on isolated roads, deceive them, acting as fellow travelers, then ritually strangle them, most often with the Thug scarf. The similarities of language, culture, family and clan ties, and the ritualized religious aspect of the Thugs stymied the British, who desperately wanted to rid the roads of this menace. It was to Sleeman that the task fell.



William Henry Sleeman

William Henry Sleeman was the magistrate of Nursingpur. He determined that Thugs were responsible for over 40,000 deaths a year in the Jewel. The ranks were tightly-knit family groups, protected by landed persons bribed to provide protection, and often included former military men. Sleeman began a careful intelligence operation, using many volunteer natives. He also used confidential informants pressed into service. With the assistance of these native sources, he began to draw a picture of the gangs and their familial linkages. His first informant, Kalyan Singh, helped in the conviction of 98 Thugs.

Using sources he called *approvers*, Sleeman extended his initial network, compiling extensive lists of gang movements, names, and other identifying data. Armed with this information capability, Sleeman managed to bring to weight the martial and law enforcement capability of the Crown against the Thugs. By 1837, Sleeman recorded the use of 483 sources; they provided information that resulted in 412 Thuggee hangings between 1829 and 1837. Later, Sleeman used the same methodology--including the use of native sources--to curb *dacoit* gangs (highway robbers). In his papers Sleeman identified these native sources as intelligencers and, for the first time, spies. Sleeman's work for the Crown against the Thugs and the dacoits demonstrates the value-added of using native sources.

Native Intelligence in the Great Mutiny of 1857

As many European officers failed to maintain the close relationships with the natives as they had before, they began to live apart and look at the natives with disdain. The ultimate result of this loss of knowledge and cultural sensitivity was to serve as an underlying contributor to the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857.



The Great Mutiny of 1857

Instead of using native sources as they had before, they began to look down on the use of “local gossip.” As the British distanced themselves from the Raj, they missed the signals of impending crumbling of the Indian-British relationship. The *chapattis* heralds who moved from town to town spread the insurgency faster than the British could contain it, often carrying the news and directions 200 miles per day.

As the insurrection spread, native intelligence helped turn the tide in the British direction. The Agra magistrate, William Muir, used well-paid agents to observe the rebel lines and report and maintain open lines of communication. He used the Gwalior newswriter to great effect, as he did with his asset Mukdum Bash, his commercial spy in Delhi. A similar effort was conducted by Lieutenant Herbert Bruce, an Inspector of police, who used native assets, Man Raj among them, in the same successful manner.

Interestingly both of these two British officials, and joined by Major William Hodson, the Assistant Quartermaster-General and official chief of intelligence, used careful reading, summaries, and well-crafted journals reflecting article of interest in the local press. This effort is similar to the efforts that current intelligence officer use by reading and using insights gained in the international press, as reflected in the daily Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).

Pundits and Intelligence

In the wild, often unknown [from a European perspective] area between the 30th and 40th parallels in Central Asia, exploration and mapping parties applied the use of topographical parties to develop knowledge and intelligence. Inherent in these adventures were the use of Asian surveyors, known in the enterprise as pundits. The pundits and their British masters were not merely geographers, but information collectors for the Crown.

Captain Thomas G. Montgomerie was one such early geographer. He began his task in the region with a survey of Kashmir from 1855-1864; at its conclusion it had mapped over 7,700 square miles. One of Montgomerie’s first native spies was Adbul Majid. He collected information on Russian influence in the Peshawar and around Khokand, where Russian influence had [reportedly] begun to infiltrate.

As British surveyors, often disguised as pilgrims and traders, began their work, they mapped the region as they concurrently collected on Russian imperial expansion. One such mission was the pundit mission to Yarkand. A native, Abdul Hamid, actually led that survey and collected much associated intelligence on the Russians, assisted by another native source, Mohammed Amin. Although Hamid died on the expedition, his efforts produced much-needed information for the British. Similar efforts by Major Smyth in Tibet used a pair of cousins, Nain and Mani Singh, to extend knowledge operations into Tibet along the northeast border region, where information had yet to be developed.

Filling in the knowledge blanks continued with the operational work of “The Mirza” on the northeast frontier, Mirza Shuja, who mapped the Pamirs beginning in 1868. He discerned that all routes along the Russian frontier were fortified, among his other notable intelligence observations. The northwest frontier was scoped out by Hyder Shah, known as “The Havildar” (Sergeant). Shah provided needed information, primarily on unknown passages in the Hindu Kush—passes of significant historical relevance linking Afghanistan, through Pakistan, and into India. He was ably assisted by another code-named native asset, “The Mullah,” Ata Mohamed. This team constructed an accurate route survey map of the northern provinces, again demonstrating the efficacy of the native source in British intelligence operations. The pundits were a highly successful native asset base, who added much-needed knowledge in the “Blank Zone” as the Russians and British edged ever closer to each other throughout the 19th century.

Formalization of Central Asian Intelligence Using Native Assets

By the late years of the 19th century, the British clearly saw the need for a more formal intelligence establishment, largely based on their experiences in Central Asia. The collection efforts of this expanding system would again depend upon native sources. They could move extensively to find information on food and water resources, political infrastructure and intrigues, location of strategic passes, strength and efficacy of native forces, and Russian movement in and around the buffer areas.




Sidney Reilly, Russian Great Game Ace of Spies

The establishment of a more extensive intelligence screen fronting the Russian menace, as the British perceived it to be, began a formalization process. Several agents for the first time received formal written collection objectives, similar to the Special Forces Operational Directive or the Foreign Area Officer in the Defense Attaché's role with Intelligence Requirements. Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy of India, personally drew up these requirements.

Three agents merit mention as exemplars. Faiz Baksh went to Bokhara, where he gained access to much-needed information. The *Pundit* Munphool completed similar tasks in Badakshan; he also acted as the *newswriter*. Another asset, known as a *political* named Bozdar, assisted Sir Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan.

Native Pundit, Nain Singh



As the intelligence apparatus of the British continued to mature it took on new forms and names. By 1870, it was known as the Topographical and Statistical Department, a bow to the primary [cover] mission of its operatives, both British and native. The new Intelligence Department was formed in May, 1873. The ID quickly continued its operations in Central Asia, refining the intelligence screen it used to gain knowledge on all strategic, geographical and political matters in Central Asia.

Intelligence Division and the Northern Screen

The Intelligence Division's formalization provided a continuing opportunity to refine the information operations along the Asian frontier of the Crown in the late 1880s.



T h a t
Khyber Pass,
Strategic
Crossroads



principally meant the continued use and refinement of the intelligence screen extant along the northern border of the South Asian possessions. A solid exemplar of this effort is that of Biddulph and the Himalayan Screen.

Captain John Biddulph extended knowledge of the Himalayas for the British. He re-explored from Sinkiang to Karakorum, through Kashgar, into the Taklamakan Desert, the first to do so since Marco Polo. Later, Biddulph was sent to confirm the status of the northern flank inside Afghanistan, where he determined the vulnerability of attack through the Khyber Pass.

Intelligence operations continued in the Pamirs with the efforts of Ney Elias in 1886. His intelligence mission included the improvement of trade and political contacts with the Chinese in Sinkiang, exploration of the upper Oxus River, search for other usable routes through the Pamirs, and monitor Russian movement in the region.

At the same time General Stewart expanded the spy network and solidified the intelligence screen on the West at Meshed, using a native asset, Abbas Khan. Interestingly, Abbas Khan actually acted in the general's stead for intelligence matters when the British officer was unavailable, a significant expansion of the use of a native intelligence asset. On this end of the screen, the objectives were to establish and maintain good relations with the locals, gather information, and keep a close watch on the local rulers. Native assets were critical to meeting these intelligence requirements. Of interest, the Meshed intelligence operation also conducted frequent operations tests of its assets and their information, a validation system which remains advisable today.

Pushing into the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush

As the 19th Century edged toward closure, so had the distance between the two powers involved in the Great Game in Central Asia. The first Chief of Military Intelligence, Henry Brackenbury, began his tenure in 1886, and quickly began the process of writing formal "assessments," a process which transfers to today's modern information reporting—with Intelligence Assessments and the SOF Area Assessment key among them. One of the early assessments revealed Russian plans to conquer India in three phases. In the first phase, the Russians would move to the northern Afghan border. The second phase was the Afghan penetration phase, with Russia's movement to Kashgar, Kabul, and Kandahar. The penetration to India's north would be coupled with Russian advanced toward Constantinople, matched with advances into northern Persia. Little by little, it appeared in Brackenbury's professional intelligence office assessments, India would be surrounded—from Turkey, through Iraq then Persia coupled with penetrations from Afghanistan, and completing the landward encirclement with movement through the Pamirs. Further assessments revealed Russian agents in Persia, Afghanistan, and China—as suspected in the earlier assessments.

Shortly after Brackenbury began his work, new trouble rose with the French, who sent a [successful] expedition through their Baroghil Pass; while the French party was troublesome, the real concern was that it showed the ability to move from Russia to India through the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush. In 1888 the feat was repeated by the Cossacks. Of interest in the context of this paper

is the effectiveness of the local Indian agents forward-deployed in the intelligence screen for the Empire.



The Hindu Kush

In order to find other potential passes allowing the same penetration toward India, Captain Francis Younghusband began his Intelligence Department survey. He crossed the Gobi Desert in 1887. While exploring the Mustagh Pass late in that year, he crossed paths with a Russian completing a parallel survey. By 1889 Younghusband and his local sepoy, Balti guides, interpreter, cook, and native surveyor (a human menagerie of spies for the Crown). By mapping the area and its passes, and also tracking Russian penetration as it occurred simultaneously, Younghusband and his native contingent had extended the Great Game—gaining knowledge of the land, its leaders, and its peoples as Russia continued to close the gap between the opposing players in the Game. Later, in a Pamir expedition of 1891, Younghusband used a similar native asset, the half-Chinese George Macartney, with the pair also acting as traditional political and acting as official envoys as they simultaneously collected the intelligence mission they had been tasked with. Younghusband then moved into the Kush, using a screen of his spies to observe continued Russian penetration.

Ultimately the British government sought to seek an agreement, an accommodation with the Russians. That required space between the two actors in the Great Game. Unfortunately, the region remained only partially explored, and centralized authority was impossible to develop in Afghanistan. That meant that Afghanistan as a formal, diplomatically agreed-upon solution eluded England and Russia as the century turned.

While some historians minimize or entirely dismiss the British intelligence system which used a range of native sources in a variety of manners, the fact is that by the 20th century they has established a fairly

complex, complete ring of [often native] agents that extended from Constantinople and the Caucasus, through northern Persia, crossing Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush, and marching right into the Pamirs into Chinese Central Asia all the way to Gilgit. This physical capability was matched by an official reorganization of the Intelligence Division—whose D Branch organization included Russia, Persia, all of Central Asia to include Afghanistan, and through India all the way to Burma. The Great War was to continue through the Russian Revolution and the 1947 end of British colonial rule in India.³

Whether identified as **pundits, newswriters, daks, munshi, approvers, intelligencers, chapattis, spies, assets, sources, or politicals**, it is clear that the use of native sources and recruited assets by the British in the Great Game of the 19th century was instrumental in Great Britain's knowledge, or intelligence, operations. The message of success indicates that a similar use of native information networks is advisable for the New Great Game in the 21st century, as numerous parallels exist.⁴

Historical Parallels and Asia Today: Info Ops in the 4th Gen Great Game

It is simple to draw parallels of Central Asia's past with its current and likely future state. This section shall paint a picture of: 1) the continued importance of the region as a strategic crossroads; 2) the importance of understanding 4th Generation Warfare in the context of the region, and; 3) the New Great Game in Central Asia—all of which provide numerous lessons learned for the 21st century operator [presented in the concluding section].

Central Asia as Strategic Crossroads

Central Asia is as important as ever, if for different reasons. First, it serves as a geographic bridge for many of the world's non-state belligerents. In that capacity it links the Middle East's key actors of concern—Iraq and Afghanistan—with other key 4th Generation War belligerents in the Far East, such as Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Second, it serves as a nexus of power and struggle. This time, unlike the Great Game between British and Russian interest, the power struggles are among non-state actors (comfortably ensconced in the historically lawless yet strategic heart of the region in Afghanistan), the Russians, the Chinese, the North Americans and its closest allies, Pakistan, an India. Making it worse, several of the state actors possess nuclear arms, possess historic animosities toward each other, but with new non-state belligerents thrown into the mix (who all suspect seek nuclear capability as well). Terror reigns. Oil and other resources define potential

conflicts. Ethnic minimization, if not cleansing, is rampant. The region remains fragmented, and loyal to sub-nation influences. This dynamic region continues as a strategic crossroads.



At the Crossroads of 4th Gen Warfare

Understanding 4th Generation Warfare

A fourth generation of warfare emerged in the post-World War II era. As former Great Power colonies began struggles for independence, they quickly discovered that they could not sustain their fight against bombers, tanks, and automatic and indirect fire weaponry. Instead, they came to rely on secrecy, confusion, guerrilla tactics, and eventually the tactic of terror to reach their desired end-state. This approach quickly **blurred the lines** between: 1) state and non-state belligerents; 2) war and politics, at a level even Clausewitz didn't address; 3) soldier and civilian interface; 4) the field of war, that is a clear division between battlefield and areas of safety; 5) state and non-state actors and each's importance, with the decline of influence of the nation-state in many cases, and; 6) the most complex blurring of demarcations between peace and conflict. At the root of 4th Generation Warfare is the concept it occurs in any conflict between a major nation-state participant who must deal with a non-state actor—often a grouping of violent ideologically-based groups or networks (sometimes built on family ties that bind; at other times built on a charismatic leader; and, in the most difficult cases, built on religion). While many limit their mindset to exploration of the new FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, expanding that tactics, techniques, and procedures manual into a larger framework (4th Generation War) is a logical next step in understanding and succeeding in our first great clash of the 21st century.⁵

The *characteristics* of 4th Generation Warfare are equally simple to map. First, a stateless entity fights a State. Second, the stateless actor does not attempt to actually overthrow rule, in most cases, or defeat its stronger state-actor adversary. Rather, it seeks to disorganize, confuse, and delegitimize the state with whom it is in conflict. That means that the more powerful [and rich] state actor must expend all time, people, money, political, and economic resources--often in a belligerent, high-handed manner. This leads to the third set of characteristics. Fourth Generation Warfare consists of three elements. They are not the tactical, operational, and strategic elements--which serve to define the first three generations of warfare. Rather they are physical, mental, and moral. The *moral component of 4th Generation War* is by far the most important. Even so, one can grasp that it is one which creates the most difficult challenges to the state actor. The fourth characteristic is that the traditional centers

Intelligence Inflation: A Case Study

As the on-the-ground source of information, one is only as good as one's word. When one's word is questioned, or when information is intentionally inflated to prompt a desired course of action, everyone suffers. The danger and damage of incorrect, inflated intelligence product is nowhere better exemplified than in the case of the British Secret Intelligence Service's report, augmented by the serving Prime Minister's staff that both prompted and late justified British involvement in Iraq in 2003.

In September 2002, a document prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, with a forward by Prime Minister Tony Blair, surfaced that indicated: 1) Iraq had a continuing program to produce WMD, and 2) that Iraq's WMD weapons could be launched within 45 minutes (the latter claim was made in a February 2003 document).

Ultimately, problems with these documents. arose. First, the former document's source materials were proven forgeries. Second, the latter document was an altered [at 10 Downing Street] version of a previous JIC assessment.

As these documents were proven to be less-than-accurate, the back-benchers in Parliament complained that they had voted for war based on the faulty intelligence estimate [engineered it appeared by the office of the Prime Minister].

Later, the problem spiraled, as US President Bush used some of the reports' information in his February 2003 State of the Union speech. The inaccuracies later led to a humiliating public apology by CIA Director George Tenet.

Adding fuel to the fire, US Ambassador to Iraq and Niger, Joseph Wilson, tasked with researching the authenticity of the source documents, reported that he had warned the US administration that they were fakes prior to their inclusion in the State of the Union Address.

As the intelligence fiasco bonfire grew, The British SIS director, Richard Dearlove, reportedly told reporters in confidence that the report was "probably wrong." When the Prime Minister's office said they had a witness who had advised them on the poor quality of the original JIC document--which they then recommended altering--the problem bordered on scandal. When that witness then committed suicide, political crisis loomed. Judge Lord Hutton then began an investigation of the suicide, and would include an examination of how and why the first version of the government's dossier had been altered.

Hutton concluded that Downing Street, Alastair Campbell specifically, had indeed altered the intelligence.

The result? The Joint Intelligence Committee was sullied. The Chief, SIS's products (labeled "CX") were called into question. The British ruling party was called into question. The US use of the flawed data led to distrust of the American call for war.

When intelligence is altered to meet pre-determined assessment or analytic goals, the result will quite often be the same.

of gravity disappear in 4th Generation War. That makes for a difficult definition of martial and the following diplomatic success in this type of war. That then translates into situations in which the state's decision-makers are hamstrung with unachievable goals too costly for the desired benefit or outcome.

One can complete the picture of what 4th Generation Warfare is by looking at its common *elements*. These include:

- Long-term conflicts
- Complex conflicts
- Non-state--often transnational--base
- Perceived to attack a non-state culture
- Highly-sophisticated PSYOP and media manipulation
- Cultural intelligence is essential to win long-term
- Sometimes low-intensity, with actors from all networks
- Networks used most effectively by the non-state actors include political, economic, social, and martial

- Non-combatants are embedded, and create awesome tactical dilemmas for the soldier on-the-ground
- Places the state actor at significant moral risk.
- How one acts after the battle is won is as important as what one did to win it.
- 4th Generation War marks a return to the way wars were fought pre-State--and mark a continuing crisis of the State with no end in sight.

While many senior leaders have yet to embrace this Fourth Generation concept, it offers greater hope of understanding our recent failures [and fewer successes] in the war on terror than other explanations. Understanding the 4th Generation Warfare model lies at the heart of the 21st century's New Great Game in Central Asia. ⁶

The 21st Century Great Game in Central Asia

The Great Game continues in Central and South Asia. Whereas the "Great Game" as we know it consisted of a 19th and early 20th century competition between the Russians and England, the New Great Game involves those players plus Turkey, Iran, China, India, and Pakistan. Most importantly for this audience, the 21st century Great Game involves the newest-comer, the United States--who first arrived in a significant manner on this geographic stage after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continues there today in the region's role in and nexus for the post-9/11 war on terror. Today's Great Game includes aspects of counter-terror, oil and gas access and construction, and marginalization of some ethnic groups.

The *New Great Game's goals* are disparate and competitive. First, the Islamic revolution's use of the region as a religious and geographic stronghold forms the underlying basis for the interest by other nations. Second, that moves naturally into the United States and its allies' goals--the use of the region for forward-basing for the war on terror. Third, the rise of regional independence finds common interest in the several newer countries that have emerged in this century. Kyrgyzstan since 2000 is typical. It first sought assistance from the United States; when the US did little to help the nation--based on the failure of human rights and democratization efforts in the country--they turned to Russia. At present, both major powers have a toe hold in Kyrgyzstan, with air bases, and a balanced approach to both the US and Russia.

Uzbekistan followed a similar route. When the West attacked the policies of the Uzbek government, the country turned to Russia, India, and China. Both Russia



The New Great Game in South Asia

and China currently seek basing rights in the country. Uzbekistan survives independently by steadfastly refusing to depend on any single state as a supplier, investor, or export consumer.

Kazakhstan has similarly balanced its contacts. The Great Game players in that country include Israel, Europe, Japan, and South Korea. It is interesting to note that Kazakhstan publicly noted its moderate Islamist state status, and its support to Israel and its right to exist, a dangerous and surprising balancing act for any Central Asian nation. At the same time, Kazakhstan is in the middle of strong competition from Europe, China, and India for its relatively secure energy resources.

Tajikistan is similarly a stage for the 21st century Great Game. It has allowed Russia military basing, China investment in its telecommunications company, and Indian basing rights as well. The United States has performed war on terror operations, including strikes in Pakistan, using Tajikistan as a platform. The nation is carefully balancing the interests of China, Russia, and India in its policies.

Turkmenistan is also involved in the regional Game. But it has taken an entirely different route. It has openly declared itself as neutral. Even so, it has allowed the use of its airspace since 2001 for the war on terror in Afghanistan. Practically speaking, this was probably to allow Saparmurat Niyazov to continue his reign [prior to his death] using a cult of personality and direct suppression of any form of dissent. While carefully managing Russian penetration, it has allowed the development of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, which will provide that resource to China, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Austria. Japan and Italy both have petroleum interests in Turkmenistan. ⁷

The worrisome view of the region as the heart of global terrorism forms a pillar in the great states' interest in the region as the century opens. Harking back to the buffer state argument of the first Great Game, reflections of that Game continue with the New Great Game, as China makes continuing noise about the US attempting to encircle China to isolate them; sounds familiar. At the center of these efforts are numerous nation-state actors who use a combination of political, economic, and cultural projects to penetrate into the region. Much of the penetration is made possible by careful intelligence and information operations, for interests much greater than purely military ones, which also reflects the purposes of the initial Great Game. As the reader can readily discern, the region remains poised as a strategically significant region for the 21st century's New Great Game.

Lessons for Human Collection Operators: Effective Information Operations in the New Great Game


Intelligence can play a crucial role in defence decision making, which is literally a life or death affair.

—David Owen

The current special operations or foreign area operator has many roles—warrior principal among them. But these men and women are ideally placed—and suited by temperament, aptitude, and training—as front-line “strategic scouts” as information operations, dirty-boot collectors. This article indicates, from centuries of experience, both global and regional as it applies to the war on terror, several key lessons for current operators in the information collection role.⁸

First, as Washington's quote from 1777 and the more recent quote by David Owen clearly indicate, **timely, accurate information is key**. Some information—that most will be more likely to obtain—is tactical; however, it is not outside the realm of possibility that the individual warfighter on the dirtiest, sharpest point of the spear may at times uncover information of strategic value. Regardless of the primary role assigned these personnel, one must always recognize the potential for the collection of information as a mission by-product. This information is only of value when it is collected early and reported in a timely manner. The ability of the most forward-employed forces to collect information that no one else can get to must not be under-valued. So, no matter what one's orders clearly stipulate as the “mission,” never forget the positive function of every person as an on-the-ground intelligence siphon.

Second, the importance of this article lies in the fact that it depends on the picture of the past, and how that is relevant to the present. That means the past is replete with precedents. Precedents of culture. Precedents of



Richard Dearlove, MI-6 Chief, 1999-2003

family, clan, tribe. Precedents of language. Precedents of routes used by merchants or the military to traverse a country or region. Precedents of strategic country associations. Precedents of warfighting groups' alliances or animosity. Precedents of diplomacy. In short, **remember the precedents**—they may enhance or limit one's endeavors. Understanding them, and applying that understanding to assist one in unraveling the often-conflicting threads of information one must sift through is a tool of immense value—and one embedded in the psyche and preparation of all special operators and other foreign area specialists, regardless of the brass each wears. This paper is largely designed to assist the reader in learning the precedents in Central Asia and learning from those situations.

Third—**Prepare, Prepare, Prepare!** Preparation—language, culture, history, diplomacy, economic affairs, and more—all of the threads that form the fabric of cloth one paints current information on—is your strongest weapon in the fight on terror. Nowhere is preparation so apparent than in the young soldier who can speak directly to a local tribal leader, who understands his inherent distrust of outsiders, who can relate to historical differences or ties that bind or separate to local to/from each other. The problem with preparation is apparent; it cannot be accomplished overnight. Preparation for country and regional expertise involves a lifetime of work. That preparation was and remains instrumental in the lessons of the past—SOE and other British intelligence and martial entities, the OSS and the CIA, Army Special Forces, and the Foreign Area Officer corps all rest on that common concept of the absolutely undeniable need for prepared regional specialists, able to communicate at the lowest level to the success of our military endeavors. One cannot put this preparation off for even a day. It is not a mission detractor; it is the key to mission success in your chosen field of duty. **“Knowledge”** of area was a repeated theme of the

intelligence services in South Asia, as detailed in the third section.

Fourth, *be “In the Know.”* As one gets to know the people, one will begin to see them, as Jere VanDyk says, as “...normal, religious men, fighting for the only things they knew: their families, their villages, their culture, their country, and their religion.” As one starts any new deployment, whether directed to or not, one must conduct assessments--area assessment, state of intelligence assessment, and most importantly a targeting assessment. The “knowledge” component is essential to the proper targeting aspect of the human information collection mission. It alone allows the operator to target from two contrasting perspectives: 1) the target audience of potential individuals or organizations collected against, and; 2) the target audience of potential human sources one can use to reach out--using one’s native sources as bridges to effective information collection operations.

Fifth, in one’s preparation it is important to see one’s potential *human contacts as bridges*. These sources are bridges:

- To places you can’t get to without assuming unreasonable risk;
- To people you cannot access in those places you cannot reach;
- To events outside of your cultural circle; and,
- To ideas outside of your understanding without proper historical, cultural, regional-centric interpretation by the source.

Remember, harkening back to the third lesson, that the beauty of a local source is that his preparation almost always come to the collector ready-made. As such, these local sources are perfectly formed, pre-made access points. Never lose sight of the human asset as a bridge to access; understanding; and, most importantly, information--when you are a stranger in a strange land, as one will often be as a SOF or FAO operative.

Sixth, in order to build these bridges, the present day operator must always *man the moral high ground*. Acting as one would expect to be treated if roles were reversed is central to this requirement. Attempt to be, in so far a mission allows, of the people. Attempt to be embedded in the people; live with them, share their experiences, their hardships. That allows one to be a part of the solution, not a part of the problem. It will

IN THE KNOW

- *Know the Land.*
- *Know the History.*
- *Know the People.*
- *Know the Language.*

help curb the temptation for conflict escalation on a daily basis.

“The US does not apologize,” [said one young Marine captain in 2001.] What he did not realize was that US bombings of civilians, kicking down village doors, breaking the most sacred taboo in Afghanistan, the sanctity of a man’s home, ransacking it, frisking women, putting hoods over men and taking them away in handcuffs, humiliating them, destroying their pride; all for being Taliban suspects; for believing as they have always believed, and their fathers before them, only created enemies.

That is escalation at its simplest. But, the concept of de-escalation works. Ask the local beat cop, the London “Bobby,” the Marine in the CAP Program, the successful counter-intelligence or human source operative. Being a part means always “doing as we say,” a sure fire method to assume moral ascendancy. That leads people from all walks of [local] life to interact with the operator, clearly the best method to get early, accurate information of value.

Seventh, *test your sources*. They may have partial information; it may be incomplete or false. It may even have been fabricated to please you. Numerous examples from the British experience in Central Asia demonstrate that they knew that the reliability and veracity of sources varied greatly, and that ensuring that the information received is not only timely, but is accurate.



Ahmed Shah
Mahsoud, Modern Native Asset

Finally, a caution and the most important single lesson learned, from the author’s perspective.

Tell the Truth as you see it—

your greatest singular responsibility. Some will fault your information. If you have had a chance to place that information in context (perhaps in the applicable portion of a Draft Intelligence Information Report),

they will fault your initial analysis. Some will fault your collection techniques, your strategy, your sources. In short, others will find fault. One's best defense is to prepare to be a good listener, a listener who understands what he is hearing (see the third lesson), and then tell it like it is to the best of your ability given your preparatory understanding. When collectors, analysts, and their leaders (whether they are intelligence professionals or others engaged in the informal process of information collection) break that rule—as we observed in the case of the British experience with Iraqi WMD as a pretext for war—the results are catastrophic, both disheartening to the public and useless to decision-makers as they foster distrust in all intelligence efforts. Don't do that; do not fall into that trap. One's best defense is simple. Use your brain, call it like you see it with unvarnished honesty and leave it to the others to add to the broader picture. Being honestly wrong is forgivable; deception in information reporting, whether for individual or corporate gain, will be neither forgiven nor forgotten.

CONCLUSIONS

The lessons learned from our staunch, near-permanent allies, the British, in the area of intelligence—and particularly those lessons hard-won in South Asia—are particularly relevant to the current American SOF and FAO operator. The prudent 4th Generation warfighter will consider these lessons and perhaps internalize those identified as worthy of application in our 21st century's 4th Generation Warfare fight against terror.

About the Author:

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Endnotes:

¹For the reader desiring more detail on British intelligence operations, two excellent starting points include Nigel West's *MI5: British Security Service Operations, 1909-1945* (Stein & Day, New York, 1982) and *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1909-1945* (Random House, New York, 1983). For relevant, related

understanding—albeit not focused on the relevant theater—West's *At Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Chiefs of Britain's Intelligence Agency, MI6* (Greenhill Books, London, 2006) offers insights into both the leaders and key factors and cases which shaped the British intelligence services in the 20th century.

² See endnote iv for a summary of Caldwell's *Small War* as one of this author's recommended self-study guide of essential small wars and insurgency references, which supplements the careful reader of 2007's new FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.

³ A separate discussion of the early 20th century Great Game is included in the paper's earlier section, MI5 and MI6 in the Great Game.

⁴ For the reader desiring more detail on British Intelligence operations in South Asia, an excellent starting point is Robert Johnson's *Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757-1947* (Greenhill Books, London, 2006). This article's third section borrows significantly on historical case study details from this cited, remarkable, seminal work.

⁵ The author's article in the *Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal* (Volume X, Issue 1, December 2007) "Insurgency and the Role of the 21st Century Special Operator: An Introductory Study Guide", provides a recommended reading list, ideal as a background preparation enabler for the operator wishing to extend his expertise for the war on terror.

⁶ See William Lind's "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" *Marine Corps Gazette*, 1989 to enhance your understanding of this martial paradigm.

⁷ For further details, the author suggests Lutz Kleveman's *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia* (Grove Press, 2004).

⁸ Although the article refers specifically to the Special Operations Forces or Foreign Area Officer, the fact is that any person involved in the homeland security efforts of our nation can apply the lessons learned contained in the paper.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Col Monte Dunard, USMCR
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CAPT Patrick Lorge, USN
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INTRODUCTION

Strategic communication has been recently been decried as one of the shortcomings in the Long War, but few people really understand what strategic communication is or how it is intertwined with National interest, National instruments of power, and particularly military operations. This document will use several case studies to form a common basis for discussion and inform the audience on how strategic communication must be planned for and integrated into the operational design and planning.

Strategic communication is just that: “strategic.” It is the enduring messages from the President. There are three categories of military activities through which strategic messages are transmitted: information operations (IO), public affairs (PA) and defense support of public diplomacy (DSPD).

This paper will briefly outline the information environment (using excerpts from key, applicable doctrine), place the context in irregular warfare and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that today’s military frequently encounters, and provide three case studies to provide discussion for how to plan and integrate strategic communication into operational design.

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The definition of strategic communication within the Department of Defense (DOD) is as follows:

Strategic Communication: Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government (USG) interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02, pg 515)

Instruments of National Power. The US National Security Strategy (NSS) is a critical means by which the President conveys strategic communication on National defense. To ensure the NSS message is communicated coherently and consistently to our allies, coalition partners, adversaries, and the world audience, the information instrument of National power must be integrated and synchronized with the other instruments of national power — diplomatic, military, and economic. Effective strategic communication is vital. Effective communication demands consideration of the intended audiences.

These last two essential points on how the strategic communication message may be received can best be summarized in a quote by Sun Tzu: “It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles.” “Know your enemy” today should be expanded to cross-cultural understanding. Recognizing, understanding, and knowing the cultural information environments is key because it may shape how the strategic communication message is conveyed. The US cultural view of the information environment is not universally shared, and thus what may appear to be effective strategic communication messages from a US perspective may not resonate in other cultures. Thus the US must improve all aspects of communication from a non US perspective to include international intelligence sharing which will enhance security.

Current Joint Guidance

Strategic communication is a natural extension of strategic direction, and supports the President’s strategic guidance, the SecDef’s National Defense Strategy, and the CJCS’s National Military Strategy. Strategic communication planning and execution focus capabilities that apply information as an instrument of national power to create, strengthen, or preserve an information environment favorable to US national interests. Strategic communication planning establishes unity of US themes and messages, emphasizes success, accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on US operations, and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals. This is an interagency effort, which provides an opportunity to advance US regional

and global partnerships. Coordination, approval, and implementation of an SC strategy and specific information objectives, audiences, themes, and actions will be developed and synchronized with other US agencies and approved by SecDef.

Joint operation planning must include appropriate SC components and ensure collaboration with the Department of State's (DOS) diplomatic missions. Combatant Commanders (COCOMS) consider strategic communication during peacetime security cooperation planning, and incorporate themes, messages, and other relevant factors in their security cooperation plans (SCP).

The predominant military activities that promote SC themes and messages are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

PA has a role in all aspects of DOD's missions and functions. Communication of operational matters to internal and external audiences is one part of PA's function. In performing duties as one of the primary spokesmen, the public affairs officer's interaction with the IO staff enables PA activities to be coordinated and deconflicted with IO. While audiences and intent differ, both PA and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences. Many of the nation's adversaries' leaders rely on limiting their population's knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces' messages to these populations. There also is a mutually supporting relationship between the military's PA and DSPD efforts and similar PA and PD activities conducted by US embassies and other agencies.

Synchronized planning of PA, DSPD, and IO is essential for effective SC. Interagency efforts provide and promote international support for nations in the region and provide an opportunity to advance our regional and global partnerships. COCOMS should ensure that their IO, PA, and DSPD planning is consistent with overall USG SC objectives. Since PA and IO both ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences, their activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid credibility losses for both the joint force and PA spokesmen.

Implementation of a strategic communication strategy requires multiple assets and associated activities to deliver themes and messages. These can include US and international public diplomacy means such as senior communicators and figures at home and abroad, respective US and other foreign embassies in the participating nations, public affairs activities, and specific marketing initiatives. (JP 5-0, Chapter II)

Importance of Information Operations in Military Operations

Information Operations coordinates and synchronizes the employment of the five core capabilities in support of the combatant commander's objectives or to prevent the adversary from achieving his desired objectives. History indicates that the speed and accuracy of information available to military commanders is the significant factor in determining the outcome on the battlefield. IO enables the accuracy and timeliness of information required by US military commanders by defending our systems from exploitation by adversaries. IO is used to deny adversaries access to their C2 information and other supporting automated infrastructures. (JP 3-13, Information Operations)

Counter Insurgency Historical Perspective

Galula opens this chapter in his book on counterinsurgency operations with this comment on "propaganda."

Contact with the population. This particular operation, contact with the population, is actually the first confrontation between the two camps [insurgents and counter insurgent] for power over the population. The future attitude of the population, hence the probable outcome of the war, is at stake. The counterinsurgent cannot afford to lose this battle. (David Galula, pg. 116)

He uses a different term to convey the same intent as modern day strategic communication by influencing the population with psychological information warfare to gain the "attitude" or change in behavior desired. His writings are at the unit level and only offer suggestions on how to ensure the insurgents understand the actions of the counterinsurgent forces, this is in effect IO and PA or as he calls it propaganda. So the concepts we have in our joint doctrine are not new or innovative, they have been used and proven successful in past

conflicts. The following sections from the US Army and US Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual takes the writing of Galula and expands on his work and provides a very good overview the current thinking for using the tools available at the unit level to ensure the national message matches with the actions on the ground.

Mobilization and Message

In the early stages of an insurgency, a movement may be tempted to go to almost any extremes to attract followers. To mobilize their base of support, insurgent groups use a combination of propaganda and intimidation, and they may overreach in both. Effective counterinsurgents use information operations (IO) to exploit inconsistencies in the insurgents' message as well as their excessive use of force or intimidation. The insurgent cause itself may also be vulnerability. Counterinsurgents may be able to "capture" an insurgency's cause and exploit it. For example, an insurgent ideology based on an extremist interpretation of a holy text can be countered by appealing to a moderate interpretation of the same text. When a credible religious or other respected leader passes this kind of message, the counteraction is even more effective.

US forces start with a built-in challenge because of their reputation for accomplishment, what some call the "man on the moon syndrome." This refers to the expressed disbelief that a nation able to put a man on the moon cannot quickly restore basic services. US agencies trying to fan enthusiasm for their efforts should avoid making unrealistic promises. In some cultures, failure to deliver promised results is automatically interpreted as deliberate deception, rather than good intentions gone awry. In other cultures, exorbitant promises are normal and people do not expect them to be kept. Effective counterinsurgents understand local norms; they use locally tailored approaches to control expectations. Managing expectations also involves demonstrating economic and political progress to show the populace how life is improving. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN operations. In the end, victory comes, in large measure, by convincing the populace that their life will be better under the host nation (HN) government than under an insurgent regime.

Both counterinsurgents and the HN government ensure that their deeds match their words. They also

understand that any action has an information reaction. Counterinsurgents and the HN government carefully consider that impact on the many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. They work actively to shape responses that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences must be consistent. In the global information environment, people in the area of operations (AO) can access the Internet and satellite television to determine the messages counterinsurgents are sending to the international community and the US public. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines COIN efforts. (COIN FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, pg 1-24)

Consistency of articulated messages and actions applies not only to COIN, but the full range of military operations.

CASE STUDY

Abu Ghurayb Prison: Strategic Communication Failure

The 2002 NSS, current at the time of the Abu Ghurayb prison abuse incident, notes in the chapter on Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity, "America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property." These are the stated values and beliefs from the 2002 NSS and form part of our national strategic message on human rights and human dignity.

Abu Ghurayb : Strategic message versus actions on the ground.

Global Security's chronology of events leading up to the Abu Ghurayb Prison abuse has the following key events listed. This short chronology and case study are not intended to cover the entire event, but to offer a few examples of low or tactical-level actions profoundly affecting strategic communication. The full report can be found at the Global Security website or the Brigadier General Taguba report and other resources easily found on the internet and listed in the bibliography.

The following are examples of information and events concerning Presidential or Administration strategic communication shaping, specifically regarding the Geneva Convention and its pertinence to the Global War

on Terror (GWOT) detainees, handling of detainees, and what defines trauma.

- 9 January 2002 - US Department of Justice lawyers send a memo to the Pentagon arguing that the Geneva conventions do not apply to the war in Afghanistan, or to captured members of Al-Qaeda or the Taliban.
- 25 January 2002 - White House legal counsel Alberto Gonzales sends a memo to President Bush, advising him to declare the Taliban and Al Qaeda outside of the Geneva conventions.
- 1 August 2002 - US Department of Justice lawyers tell the CIA that only severe physical injury and/or long-term psychological trauma constitute trauma.
- March 2003 - The Washington Post alleges that a team of Bush administration lawyers concluded in a March 2003 legal memorandum that President Bush was not bound by either an international treaty prohibiting torture or by a federal anti-torture law because he had the authority as commander in chief to approve any technique needed to protect the nation's security.
- 12 May 2003 - Four soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion abused detainees at the Theater Internment Facility at Camp Bucca, Iraq following a transport mission from Talil Air Base.
- 8 June 2003 - US Army Criminal Investigation Division report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (Global Security website)

These preceded the major abuse incidents that were brought out into the press in January 2004.

The Abu Ghurayb incident came to light in January 2004 when photographs of US Soldiers from the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade, showing Soldiers and Iraqi prisoners in humiliating situations, appeared in the press worldwide. One example of the abuses that took place preceding the public revelations is exemplified by the photographic image of a female US Army PFC from the 372d MP Battalion (Bn) date stamped "24 Oct" with a naked Iraqi prisoner tethered with a leash to his neck in the Abu Ghurayb prison. Another example is a photograph – from the subsequent US Army investigative report led by BG Tuguba – identified as "11:01 p.m., Nov. 4, 2003. Detainee with bag over head, standing on box with wires attached." In the Tuguba Report, the female US Army SPC from the 372nd MP Company, in her sworn statement regarding the incident where a detainee was photographed standing atop a box

with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, said "that her job was to keep detainees awake."

These incidents did not become publicly known or reported officially until 13 January 2004 when a soldier from the 372nd MP Bn reported the prisoner abuse. BG Tuguba was assigned on 31 Jan 2004 to conduct an investigation into the reported abuse. His report completed on 3 March 2004 clearly outlined the abuse and those responsible.

Global Security writes on the Abu Ghurayb prisoner abuses, in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, "As a result of the ensuing scandal, President Bush gave two interviews to Alhurra Television and Al Arabiya Television on 5 May 2004. The following day, during a press conference with Jordan's King Abdullah, he related how he had told King Abdullah how he "was sorry for the humiliation suffered by the Iraqi prisoners, and the humiliation suffered by their families. [He told him he] was equally sorry that people who have been seeing those pictures didn't understand the true nature and heart of America." (The full account of this report is available at the website listed in the bibliography @ reference K.)

On 7 May 2004 the Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld testified to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. The following is taken from Mr. Rumsfeld's opening comments and lays the foundation for what actions were taken by not only the prison guards but by the DOD as well.

I feel terrible about what happened to these Iraqi detainees. They are human beings. They were in US custody. Our country had an obligation to treat them right. We didn't do that. That was wrong. To those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of US armed forces, I offer my deepest apology. It was un-American. And it was inconsistent with the values of our nation.

Mr. Rumsfeld went on to note,

Let me be clear. I failed to identify the catastrophic damage that the allegations of abuse could do to our operations in the theater, to the safety of our troops in the field, the cause to which we are committed. When these allegations first surfaced, I failed to recognize how important it was to elevate a matter of such gravity to the highest

levels, including leaders in Congress. Nor did we anticipate that a classified investigation report that had not yet been delivered to the senior levels of the Department would be given to the media. That was my failing.

On 24 May 2004 President Bush announced in a speech that,

A new Iraq will also need a humane, well-supervised prison system. Under the dictator, prisons like Abu Ghraib were symbols of death and torture. That same prison became a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values. America will fund the construction of a modern, maximum security prison. When that prison is completed, detainees at Abu Ghraib will be relocated. Then, with the approval of the Iraqi government, we will demolish the Abu Ghraib prison, as a fitting symbol of Iraq's new beginning.

Abu Ghurayb Summary

The fact that actions on the ground by a few members of the military had significant strategic impacts on how the US is viewed not only in the Arab world but by our allies and the citizens of the US is an example of how strategic communication might be affected at a low or tactical level. In this case there were mixed messages at the National level on human dignity, what laws have to be followed, and what defines torture. The President ultimately went to several Arab media outlets and to Jordan to restate the strategic message and contain the damage that was caused by several individuals at Abu Ghurayb as did Secretary Rumsfeld when he went before Congress to testify on the issue.

While there are clear indications of strategic communication missteps on the ground, those missteps may have started with a mixed strategic message from the administration on the limits on treatment of detainees.

Strategic Communication Success .

2d BCT in OIF, 2005: Operationalizing Strategic Communication at the Tactical Level

The situation of the Army's 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Armored Division in Baghdad, Iraq in

support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) during 2005, as recounted in May 2006 by the commanding officer for the period, COL Ralph O. Baker, illustrates the challenges at the tactical level of operationalizing strategic communication. For context, the 2d BCT consisted of eight battalions, and some 5,000 Soldiers; and, its area of operations (AO) was two of Baghdad's nine major districts with an aggregate population of 700,000-1 million people. (Baker, pg 13)

While the recounting was in terms of IO, at the time a concept and functional area more mature and widely socialized than strategic communication, many aspects would be more accurately categorized today under strategic communication. In that vein is the "Conduct Information Operations" portion of chapter 5 of Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, published later in 2006, and at about the same time that strategic communication imperatives from the Quadrennial Defense Review were becoming widely familiar.

Based on 2d BCT's well-documented experience in Iraq, there are three broad aspects at the tactical level for translating strategic communication into action: audiences and their frames of reference, tailoring themes and messages, and synchronizing strategic communication supporting activities.

Even in the unlikely circumstance of a homogeneous primary target population, there are at least two audiences: the primary target population and friendly forces – each with its distinctive frame of reference. The former must be considered in careful detail because often there are many demographically diverse subsets within what may appear from a strategic level as a singular, broad target population in a given AO. In the case of the 2d BCT in Baghdad, within its AO the target population had four distinct demographic groups, "that produced a lot of different ethnic, cultural, and religious dynamics." Further, there were "three broad categories cutting across the demographics: those who would never accept the Coalition's presences in Iraq...; those who readily accepted the Coalition's presence...; and the vast majority who were undecided." Counterinsurgency settings like the 2d BCT's are typically characterized by a silent majority that must be swayed to be successful. Then within the diversity of the target audience and that perhaps is the silent majority, "you must identify and target respected community members" within whom to inculcate the messages, those who have credibility with

and wield influence upon the broader primary target population, and thus may most effectively and rapidly propagate the messages. Perhaps the less intuitively obvious audience is own or friendly forces. Why are they an audience? First, they are the instruments of the strategic communication messages' conveyance at the most personal, if not most powerful level. Thus, friendly forces must understand the messages and associated intent from the strategic, National level in order to act in a consistent and supportive way. Second, in today's world of ubiquitous and nearly instantaneous news media coverage, even in the remotest and most information technology challenged regions, friendly forces will be bombarded with news media coverage and interpretation of events.

Another vital demographic, one that my commanders and I found we had inadvertently taken for granted and failed to effectively address, was our own Soldiers. Most news that Soldiers typically received came from watching CNN, the BBC, or Fox News. Soldiers were getting the same inaccurate, slanted news that the American public gets. With a significant amount of negative news being broadcast into their living quarters on a daily basis, it was difficult for Soldiers to realize they were having a positive impact on our area of operations. (Baker, pg 15)

Friendly forces, the instruments of National power most personally delivering or implanting strategic communication themes and messages, left to discern the themes and messages *ex post facto* from news media interpretations of actions (theoretically inextricably linked to themes and messages) as their only source of understanding themes and messages may arrive at many, varied, and incongruent conclusions about what the strategic themes and messages are vis-à-vis actions (i.e., "say-do" discontinuity). Moreover, given feedback that may not be wholly accurate or is slanted, and given that feedback generally affects future actions, it follows that the likelihood for unintended divergence of future actions from strategic communication themes and messages is heightened if the only source of understanding is the media. Thus, deliberate effort should be made to deliver the strategic messages to those delivering it constantly, incrementally through their daily interactions with the primary target audience.

A second major aspect of operationalizing strategic communication is a logical extension of distinctive target audiences and respective frames of reference:

tailored themes and messages.

To be effective, you must tailor themes and messages to specific audiences. IO planners at commands above the division level appeared to look at the Iraqis as a single homogeneous population that would be receptive to centrally developed, all-purpose, general themes and messages... In many cases, the guidance and products we received were clearly developed for a high-level diplomatic audience and were inappropriate or ineffective for the diverse populations clustered within our battalion [sic – brigade] AO. (Baker, pg 16)

This observation by COL Baker was couched in terms of IO – at the time the term *du jour* for not only IO but some of what is now more broadly under the rubric "strategic communication" – logically applies to strategic communication. First, tailored themes and messages – that is, more so than what emanates from the strategic level of National leadership – may be necessary to strike a chord and resonate with distinct population subsets in tactical AOs, or to be responsive to changing situations or the enemy. Second, tailoring may be needed in order to strike a chord with friendly forces who must internalize the messages in a way that reliably elicits actions in the specific tactical environment – one that may be very complex and challenging – that are supportive of and congruent with the strategic messages.

The third major aspect of effecting strategic communication at the tactical level is synchronizing strategic communication's supporting activities. The major supporting activities of strategic communication are IO, defense support of public diplomacy (DSPD), and public affairs (JP 3-13). IO are actions focusing on degrading or altering enemy human and automated decision making while protecting that of friendly forces. Public diplomacy (PD) at the tactical level is simply the interactions of friendly forces with the enemy and surrounding populations – i.e., everything they say and do is in some measure PD. PA deals with the news media. So, surreptitious actions to degrade or alter enemy decision making, open actions by main forces, and engagement of the media must all synergistically serve strategic communication. Why? The implication is that the "messages" of actions must be consistent with the articulated messages. There must be credibility that what we say we will do gets done – whether it is "getting the citizens in your AO to have trust and confidence in you" or showing the enemy that words are not empty

and unsupported. As COL Bakers asserted "...any chance of success with information operations was specifically tied to immediate, visible actions..." (Baker, pg 19) and that applies to PD as well – the two are intertwined. Regarding the final supporting PD activity of strategic communication, public affairs, as COL Baker asserted "you have no influence with the press if you do not talk to them" and "Not talking to the press is the equivalent of ceding the initiative" to the enemy. (Baker, pg 18) Of particular focus must be "the engagement of foreign and international media at the earliest opportunity..." as a hedge against the enemy who is likely unconstrained from engaging the press at will – honestly or otherwise – and thereby agilely exploiting sensational events. (Baker, pg 17)

2d BCT's experience in Iraq in 2005 serves as a primer on operationalizing strategic communication at the tactical level, and the practical tactical considerations that those who formulate strategic communication should take into account in formulating strategic communication objectives and messages. While the strategic message to win the hearts and minds was there, the operational and tactical message was left up to the commander to determine. COL Baker took great initiative in formulating and implementing his plan, the commanders in adjacent units may not have had the understanding and breath of knowledge particularly the "art" of strategic communication that COL Baker exhibited on this line of operation.

Pakistan Earthquake: Unintended Consequences

At 0850 Pakistan Standard Time on 8 October 2005 approximately 26 kilometers below the surface of the earth, the Indian subcontinent and Eurasian tectonic plates released somewhere between 3.6 - 7 megatons of energy causing a 7.6 - 7.8 earth quake on the Richter scale, focused in the region of Kashmir (http://jclahr.com/alaska/aeic/magnitude/energy_calc.html and <http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/10m.html>). Nearly 75,000 people were killed and over 100,000 were injured, primarily in Pakistan. Entire towns and villages were destroyed; hundreds of thousands of buildings were decimated, as was the transportation infrastructure, as a result of the initial earthquake and aftershocks, and landslides. Many countries pledged aid; however, it was the US military that made perhaps the most striking impact not only to rescue efforts but the GWOT.

A 1,000-man Humanitarian Coordination Center

deployed to the area bringing heavy lift helicopters, medical care, and Seabees, along with dozens of humanitarian non-governmental organizations. A local imam denounced the US during a sermon and was booed by the followers who noted "where the aid was coming from." (<http://www.pakquake2005.com/article.php>). Perhaps the most dramatic result of this operation was the impact it had on Pakistani public opinion. According to an AC Nielson poll, in May 2005, 23% of Pakistanis disapproved of Usama Bin Ladin (UBL), and had a favorable opinion of the US while 48% had a very unfavorable opinion of the US; in November 2005, disapproval of UBL had risen to 41%, favorable opinion of the US had risen to 46% and unfavorable opinion of the US decreased to 28%. Though largely unreported in western media, US actions in earthquake relief were well-reported at least in Pakistan.

While this example is perhaps one of unintended consequences it is useful for study. The US did not approach this relief effort with strategic communication in mind; it did what the US often does, move forces, and people to areas of devastation and begins to help. However because of the proximity to a major engagement, those who saw this movement of force were expecting something else. The Pakistanis had rarely seen this side of the US; Americans were helping put together broken families, build shelters, schools, and infrastructure. These actions eloquently illustrated American ideals and the GWOT strategic communication messages more loudly and more succinctly than any deliberate strategic communication in the previous two years.

The lessons to be gleaned regarding strategic communication are: leverage the interaction of forces at the tactical level – the "strategic corporals," and the media must come along of its own accord. Work with the various media through the actions of tactical forces relative to a situation or population, and the media's observations of that can be powerful in carrying strategic communication messages.

SUMMARY

The strategic communication message comes from the President through the NSS. It should be the overarching mechanism for synchronizing operational design to translate the articulated message into actions, and shape actions to be consistent with the words. Operational design links the National interest and strategic objectives to the tactical environment which

has the key functions of IO, PA, and DSPD.

Strategic communication resonates in the information environment. Information is an instrument of National power which must be integrated, collaborated, and synchronized with the other instruments of National power—diplomatic, military, and economic. Thus, joint operations planning must establish unity of US themes and messages with the other USG Departments and Agencies. This synergy allows for understanding the global attitudes and cultures, engaging in dialogue of ideas, and influences public opinion to meet the desired end state.

Influencing the population in a counterinsurgency environment with IO is critical in achieving credibility for the strategic communication message which extends through the full range of military operations. The case study of the 2d BCT in OIF, 2005, around the Baghdad area is an example of successfully operationalizing strategic communication at the tactical level. As the 2d BCT Commander, COL Baker took a proactive stance to engage his AO with effective IO, PA, and PD. This was a case where actions spoke louder than words. The same can be said for the Pakistani earthquake humanitarian relief effort during the same year. Unfortunately, the mixed strategic message from the administration coupled with misguided actions of a few “strategic corporals” during the Abu Ghurayb Prison incident can cause strategic communication failure which resulted in the President trying to do damage control to the Arab media.

Therefore, America’s positive or negative image in world opinion is shaped by strategic communication. It is incumbent upon joint operations planners to ensure strategic communication is translated from the strategic level to the tactical level through operational design. But, it is even more critical that our words and actions are consistent at all levels of United States Government from the President down to the “strategic corporal.”

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Key Terms:

Strategic Communication (SC). Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02.)

Public Affairs (PA). Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department Of Defense. (JP 1-02)

Information Operations (IO). The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic

warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Public Diplomacy. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. (JP 1-02)

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Guardsmen and Jundis: A Historical Comparison of the USMC's Experience of "Native Troops" in Nicaragua, 1927-33 and Iraq, 2004-2008

Major Erich H. Wagner, USMC

The Marine Corps' advisory mission in Iraq is not new, but rather an old task revisited. The Corps has had a very successful history of raising, training, and fighting alongside indigenous troops, from the shores of Tripoli to the jungles of Vietnam and Nicaragua, to the deserts of Al Anbar. Today, the New Iraqi Army and police forces are a key component in defeating the insurgency America is fighting in the land of the Tigris and Euphrates. Leathernecks of today might well turn for guidance – if not solace – to the experience of their predecessors with native troops in the five-year struggle against the legendary rebel Augusto Caesar Sandino in the jungles of Nicaragua during the 1920s and 1930s. US Marines under such legendary Captains as Lewis "Chesty" Puller, Merritt Edson, and Evans Carlson did, with great success, lead native "security forces" in combating the guerillas in the last of America's "Banana Wars" in Nicaragua in the early 20th Century. These "small wars" were what we would today term counter-insurgency operations.¹ The Marine Corps responded to this conflict with an effective and, at the time, relatively untested American experience of raising local troops to fight alongside them. Because of the paucity of Leathernecks in Nicaragua, the Marines had to couple their leaders to some type of local element. This campaign provides lessons in a number of areas. It has its most direct application to current and future efforts to develop other nations' security forces, most notably, but by no means exclusively, in today's Iraq. It also exemplifies the problems of combining military and constabulary functions and the challenges to recasting another nation's civic and communal environment in a like manner to another. It also highlights the complication of making policies reliable and enduring, and the restrictions on exporting both policy and morals.

Too often in military history, valuable lessons from previous campaigns go unheeded by combatants simply because the protagonists are unaware of their existence. By the time conflict arrives, it is too late to apply many of history's admonitions. "We write it, but then we never have time to read it," one perceptive Marine officer recently said regarding after action reports. This

study will address the cultural lessons learned by the Marine Corps while advising native troops in Nicaragua during the Second Nicaraguan Intervention (1927-1933; the "First" refers to the intervention of 1912) and compare and contrast these with similar lessons learned by Marine advisors of Iraqis during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). In describing the cultural aspects of the advisor experiences in both campaigns, I am in no way suggesting that the scales of the operations are equivalent. The immensity of the task of training (in coordination with the US Army and Coalition Forces) a self-sustaining, indigenous army and police of over ten divisions in Iraq is a far more challenging task than the fielding of a 2,556-man constabulary² in Nicaragua. Likewise, in the short term, it is obviously easier to win hearts and minds in some places (e.g., Kurdistan) than in others (e.g., the Sunni Triangle). The relevance, however, is not in a comparison of the immensities of the undertaking, but rather in the lessons that lurk in the methods of the enterprise; the lone jundi (soldier)³ of the Iraqi Security Forces, like the guardsman of the locally raised Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional, was still trained individual by individual, mentored by the same quality Leatherneck, a foreign demigod, of whom he demanded cultural sensitivity, tactical proficiency, caring, and courage.

Many of the lessons learned by "Old Corps" Marines in training foreign military units in Nicaragua can be applied to Marine advisors in Iraq today and in future scenarios. Leading soldiers from different nationalities always presents distinctive problems; leading them against their own countrymen presents many more. The guerrilla fights on his own turf. Although he may be advised – or even led – by foreigners, most of his numbers are from the country in which he operates. The guerrilla survives and succeeds by his dependence upon the populace and their support of his actions. If the locals perceive him as an outsider, troublesome or impotent, this support wanes. The counterinsurgency force is also subject to similar perceptions, and must avoid a negative stigma if it is to deprive the enemy of his civilian underpinning. This is a principle reason

why an indigenous corps should be deployed against guerrillas whenever possible.

"In the advisory effort, the indigenous military achieves competency by benefiting from the greater expertise of the advisor and by learning from its own mistakes. In the case of foreign officers actually exercising command, these officers implant standard operating procedures in the native force. Once learned and accepted, these procedures tend to become permanent and enable the native military to develop into a competent organization."⁴ It is paramount, however, that the teacher exhibit cultural understanding of the student in order for this endeavor to be successful, and for mutual respect to be engendered.

The Advisors: Guardia Officers and Military Transition Teams (MiTT)

Guardia Officers

A memorandum sent by President Diaz to President Coolidge on 15 May 1927, stated, in part that "the function of preserving law and order throughout the country shall be assumed by a National Constabulary to be organized under the instruction and, so far as possible, the direction and command of American officers now in active service and detailed to this duty by the President of the United States."⁵ Marine officers and senior enlisted men (some were as junior as corporals) were appointed by the president under an act of Congress to serve with the Guardia, originally selected from volunteers among Marines forces already stationed in Nicaragua, but at some later date, "volunteers" were chosen from the entire body of the Corps.⁶ In Nicaragua, Marine personnel were "loaned" to the Guardia, advanced one paygrade, and paid a stipend in addition to their regular pay.⁷ Even with this incentive, there were not enough volunteers, and selected non-commissioned officers were brevetted to lieutenant to make up for the shortages. "Duty with the Guardia looked different than the regular Marine Corps," one officer wrote, "and I believed I could be of some help, as volunteers for the outfit were not too plentiful."⁸ Captain Evans Carlson noted that "preference being given those who spoke Spanish or who had had previous duty of this general type."⁹ Other than that, the Marine Corps seems not to have established any rigid qualifications for personnel being assigned to the Guard nor have developed any training program for the future Guardia officers prior to their deployments.¹⁰

The Corps, then as today, was stretched too thin, with over two-thirds of its complement being stationed outside the United States. It was "on the job training" for Nicaraguan advisors.¹¹

If not the majority, then a significant minority of the Marine Guardia officers had prior experience in either Haiti or Santo Domingo, but it was not necessarily the case with junior officers and the rank and file.¹² Nor had they received any special jungle training: the Marine Corps assumed that every Marine per se was a jungle fighter, and that every company commander was endowed as such with the innate ability to lead patrols in such an environment.¹³ In his recent work on the subject, Dr. Charles Neimeyer, director of the Marine Corps Historical Division, observes that most of the junior Marines were "catapulted into combat without any training other than that provided in boot camp."¹⁴ Not only did the Marine Corps fail to provide any training particular to their assignment as new Guard officers (language, traditions, and Nicaraguan history) prior to their deployment, the Guardia Nacional was unable to provide them any when they arrived "in country."¹⁵

[The Marine Corps] did not make an attempt to even provide a minimum indoctrination period of, say, a month indicated that familiarization with Nicaragua, Nicaraguans, and problems unique to training an indigenous force had a very low priority. . . .for those who had not had previous exposure to working with native troops, the Corps or the Guard should have made whatever sacrifice was required to at least provide some minimum training in this area.¹⁶

General Vernon McGee, a veteran of the Nicaraguan intervention as a junior officer, records that "failure to provide for proper indoctrination cost us many casualties and was largely responsible for ...early reverses."¹⁷ Although headquarters judged the performance of its American personnel (commissioned and noncommissioned) to be excellent, many of the enlisted serving as lieutenants had to be replaced.¹⁸ Few officers over the rank of major ventured far away from the principal cities of Ocotal or Matagalpa; and few of the majors were in physical shape to withstand the rigors of campaigning in tropic lands.¹⁹ While the vast majority of Marine officers are in physical shape today, the scenario above demonstrates the importance of properly screening potential advisors who are slated to the rigors of leading Iraqi troops on an advisor team, and how the failure to properly screen candidates had negative consequences in Nicaragua.

In 1930, General Douglas C. McDougal, commander of the Guardia for a period, suggested to the Commandant of the Marine Corps the following qualifications for noncommissioned officers requesting to serve in Nicaragua: (1) completion of a satisfactory personal interview with the man's commanding officer, (2) completion of one full enlistment in the Corps, (3) possess the equivalent of a high school education, (4) have some knowledge of Spanish, (5) be temperate in habits, (5) be capable of working independently without supervision, and (7) have an excellent leadership record. To what extent this was implemented is unknown, but the Spanish requirement was probably the most difficult of these necessities to fulfill.²⁰

Marine MiTTs in Iraq

The Marines assigned as Guardia National officers to the Nicaraguans were equivalent to today's "advisors" or Military Transition Teams.²¹ There are basically three sources that the Marine Corps use to fill out MiTT teams: (1) reservists, (2) active duty Marines who are on Inspector and Instructor (I&I) staffs for the reserve 4th Marine Division who have worked with reserves for a period of time, and (3) straight active-duty Marines sourced from the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). The process often appeared to be very much an ad hoc, frustrating procedure. This was a common complaint voiced by MiTT advisors in their after action reviews. As the large scope of the problem became apparent, and the need for teams increased, additional MiTTs were formed "out of hide" from units already deployed. These internal teams sometimes created challenges due to the allegiance to their parent unit. The MiTT teams usually consisted of about 10 men from the Marine Corps – and sometimes augments from the Army – who were assigned at various levels within Iraqi divisions. These teams were unique in that they actually lived with the Iraqi unit they trained. There would be a team at the division level, a team at each brigade, and a team at each battalion level; again, a mix of Army and Marines. Each division had one senior advisor and about 10 other Marines. The manning of these teams was varied, and often a hodge-podge of backgrounds.²² Sometimes "out of hide" transition team sourcing was problematic, and done in a manner not conducive to success. For example, the team that relieved 3/1/1 Iraqi Intervention Force MiTT in Rawah in December 2005 had been sourced literally piecemeal, and was comprised of one infantry captain, a disgruntled communication non-commissioned officer (NCO), and an assortment of Reverse Osmosis Purification Unit

(ROPU) specialists – unsuitable for the mission -- who had been together less than two weeks – not necessarily the "dream team" appropriate for advising and training a foreign infantry battalion in a combat zone.

Three criteria emerged as a basis for disqualifying a Marine for MiTT duty. Jewish Marines and atheists were judged to be less than ideal due to the inherent incompatibility with Islam, although several Marines speculated that atheists were only slightly more appropriate than Jews in the MiTT role and would compromise efforts at rapport only slightly less. Some Marines felt that religious beliefs or affiliation should not be a disqualifying factor. In my personal experience the Iraqis valued religious beliefs, and respected me more for them; I was personally told by an incredulous Iraqi Officer that he had heard one of my team members was an atheist. While religion was not routinely discussed, the ability to do so over chai proved of great value in building rapport. The final disqualifier was that most of the interviewees felt females would create too much of a distraction to function as a MiTT member.²³

Reserve Marines proved very good as advisors. They brought their civilian skill sets to the battle that in many ways dovetailed or made them more flexible than their active duty counterparts in working with the Iraqis on a number of issues. Obviously, active duties Marines possessed a wealth of knowledge, and were well practiced in the staff planning functions. Colonel Jody Osterman, head of a 60 man division transition team (TT), noted that sometimes the active duty MiTT members were not as adept at handling the pace of the Iraqi daily routines as "they are used to operating at a very high tempo and the Iraqis just don't operate [that way]."²⁴

The Clay

The Nicaraguan Guardsman

***"Never let them get your goat."
Maxim of the Guardia officers²⁵***

***"You must have a sense of humor to serve
in the Nicarabian [sic] Army."--Brigadier
General Robert Denig, USMC²⁶***

Both Iraqis and Nicaraguans have long, culturally-specific forms and traditions of violence that characterize each peoples. Reminiscences of Marines indicated that they considered Nicaraguan men a warrior class of sorts, ideally suited for molding into natural fighters.

The clay yanquis like Puller and Evans had to mold was described eloquently by Colonel H. C. Riesinger: “While the men of the country are, generally speaking, a warm-hearted and affectionate lot, they are also fearless, preferring death to loss of “face.” They were, however, untrained and unaccustomed to discipline.” The Marines were quick to learn that this clay, once dressed in Marine khaki, equipped with Uncle Sam’s accoutrements, their sombreros proudly bearing their national insignia, was like plastic, and could be easily molded by adept fingers into excellent, quality soldiers.²⁷ The Nicaraguans were also hotheads; many of the Guardia regulations were beyond their comprehension. “As a class,” Captain William Bales wrote in 1932, “they were generally inclined to be slow to yield to discipline, and are rather given to indulgence in alcoholic stimulants.”²⁸ Julian C. Smith, former Director of the Guardia Nacional, discussed the peculiar “racial psychology” of Nicaraguans: “the common people are little interested in principles,” are “densely ignorant [and] of phlegmatic temperment [sic], but capable of being aroused to acts of extreme violence . . . a state of war to them is a normal condition”²⁹ In his personal diary, Brigadier General Robert L. Denig, Northern Area Commander in Nicaragua from November 1929 to November 1930, wrote that “The people generally are hysterically nervous and shoot on sight. Life to them is cheap, murder in itself is nothing. . . [and they] are children . . . at heart.”³⁰

The Nicaraguan needed no driving force; when trust rested, he would follow in the face of almost certain fatality. The fidelity that the Marines cultivated amongst their Nicaraguans came after only proving themselves in some harrowing testing situations. While these Central Americans have a well-developed dolorous character evolved from lingering in the harsh, rugged reality of their daily existence, they also exhibited a robust sense of humor. Mischievous guardsmen would often try to provoke their new Marine officers in an effort to test their mettle. They considered anger a sign of weakness. The officer had to realize that his men would do anything for a laugh. This clay had lived a life only a step away from violent death, and their idea of a joke could be grisly. Sometimes a Marine officer’s life depended on his ability to nonchalantly respond to their jokes in a composed manner.³¹

As opposed to the clay MiTTs would encounter in OIF, the Nicaraguans were very capable of enduring pain and inured to hardship. It is interesting to note that the legendary Captain “Chesty” Puller preferred to enlist

Indians, who came in droves to join his infamous and widely regarded organization – the famed “Company M.” He preferred the Indians – some of the finest counterinsurgency warriors many of the Marines had ever encountered -- because they could “hike day after day under the most trying conditions and remain cheerful throughout.”³² Like their Iraqi counterpart, however, the Nicaraguan soldier had been used to receiving orders from nothing less than a colonel in the past. “Majors, captains, and lieutenants were as scarce as hen’s teeth in the old Nicaraguan armies, and sergeants and corporals were simply words under the old system.” The Nicaraguan *mozos* (young men) liked the Guardia not only because it provided them three meals a day, a uniform, a sense of purpose, and medical care, but because it allowed them to serve under the gringos, whose qualities they worshiped. The Marine became their guide, philosopher and friend, and, in most instances, the idol of his command – not dissimilar to the way Iraqi looked upon their MiTTs.

The Marines noticed other cultural characteristics of their Nicaraguan counterparts. They were, like the Iraqis today, very religious, with many Catholic holidays and festivals. They were extremely superstitious, and except for the Indians, a very humorous people.³³ Many of the Nicaraguans who came from the hills and rural areas of the country were able to follow trails and read signs of the jungles with uncanny skill.³⁴ They loved to drink and often got in trouble for it, a characteristic similar no doubt to their Marine mentors.

The Iraqi Jundi and Their Officers

“ . . . they’re not perfectionists.”
--Unidentified MiTT member³⁵

The Marines did not necessarily equate the Iraqi martial qualities with those of the Nicaraguans. Unlike the Nicaraguan, the Iraqi does not generally exhibit machismo characteristics, is quick to argue but slow to fight, has no sense of urgency when completing tasks, and operates with a very non-linear mindset.³⁶ The *jundi* was used to -- and expected -- harsh discipline, unlike a guardsman.³⁷ The average *jundi* was not as religious as the officers he served under. He was a dichotomy: fastidiously focused on a clean body for prayer to the point of using his valuable drinking water, but content to live amidst piles of trash and defecation. As opposed to the Nicaraguans whom the Marines

praised for their ability to endure pain, the Iraqis, both officer and enlisted, were quick to succumb to fatigue. Iraqis do not respond well when criticized or chastised in a public forum, and were usually focused on personal comfort over anything else. Most Iraqi Security Force (ISF) soldiers came from a backdrop of a chaotic environment, ruled for decades by a bloodthirsty tyrant, and most had little drive to work for their own betterment.

While the Sunni-Shia divide is centuries long, bitter, and painful, the incidents of that memory as a major problem from the advisor point of view differ. One advisor felt that “Talking with the average soldier, he’s just like [sic], ‘I hate insurgents, I don’t hate Sunnis or Shia; I don’t hate the Kurds or whatever. I just hate the....’ Well they definitely hate Jewish people.”³⁸ For the author’s experience, the battalion commander was Sunni, and the executive officer, Shia, and both worked well together. The religious composition of 3rd Battalion, 3d Brigade, of the Iraqi Intervention Force (3/I IIF), was a Shia-Sunni ratio of 51 percent/49 percent, and when queried about this, the battalion commander retorted, “I don’t even like to ask; it doesn’t matter.”³⁹ Other units and other advisors had vastly different experiences. Many noted that religious and tribal identity of individuals played a significant role in how billets were assigned and in who was promoted. The current of religious prejudice and bigotry in the Iraqi Army under Saddam continued to influence attitudes that the advisors had to come to terms with and fight against. They found some Iraqi soldiers accepted insurgents of their affiliation if it fell in line with their beliefs, and condemned those of the opposite.

The fundamental difference between the guardsman and the jundi was that the former felt he had to prove himself to the American advisor, whereas few of the later necessarily felt that same calling. Where the Nicaraguan would commit suicide if he felt he let down his officer, the Iraqi might be less inclined towards such goals of earning the admiration of “his Americans.” One MiTT instructor put it this way:

If they are on post with another Marine they are going to go to sleep. They’ll just blatantly . . . take off their boots and go to sleep. Because they know a Marine’s there.

Advisors did, however, realize that Iraqi soldiers had very competitive personalities and that this competitiveness could be leveraged at all levels of rank when it

was coupled with public praise. Advisors at all levels reported that instilling a sense in their counterpart that he was the best or had created the best unit was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Iraqi soldiers and officers were very responsive to tokens of esteem, be it unit coins, patches, or anything the advisors created or purchased.

The Iraqi military – as Arabic militaries in general – are a very class conscious society, unlike the Nicaraguans. Their force is officer-centric and officer-driven; they got everything first, and what was left went to those lower on the list, contrary to the manner and customs of the American advisors where the “troops” are the primary focus. The relationship between the Iraqi officers and the enlisted was one of friendship, a friendship mixed with dictatorship the higher up the chain of command one observes. The advisors were considered the “friends of all,” and would often face the unenviable position of having enlisted jundis “rat-out” their officers.

The average Iraqi soldier would enjoy talking about the old regime and what they did in it. Some of the best conversations were about their military history, US military history, families, pictures, music videos, religion, food, America, and the always enjoyable topic of women. Technology, -- cell phones, satellite dishes, and the Internet -- suppressed in the Saddam regime was enthralling to Iraqis, who were constantly obsessed with their cell phones and pictures of their children.

Importance of Cultural Awareness

“The highlight [of my tour] for me has just been immersion with the Iraqis . . . some of it you look back and you chuckle on – like a couple of days ago of having sheep brain for lunch, but eating the Iraqi food with them. Spending time with them and getting to know them personally and developing the personal relationships; understanding their culture better.”
–Colonel Jody Osterman, USMC

Building intercultural understanding is critical as an advisor. Due to the social and cultural divisions between Americans and foreign soldiers, it is paramount to bridge cultural gaps. Exercising patience and maintaining composure is essential, and one “bad apple” in the advisor team can cause immense problems. Maturity of team members to want to under-

stand foreign cultures is a necessity. Respecting and understanding the cultural environment enhances the prospect of a successful mission accomplishment and provides the foundation for building relationships when working with local nationals as a TT member. Just as it is said real-estate is about “location, location, location,” successfully training foreign armies is about “relationships, relationships, relationships.”

The Small Wars Manual – where many of the lessons of the “Banana Wars” were set down in the 1930s in perhaps the finest doctrine ever written regarding counterrevolutionary warfare -- addressed the importance of cultural awareness extensively. The publication discusses how to recognize cultural differences, understand an indigenous peoples’ motivation, and use their capabilities whenever possible. It instructs:

Some of the fundamental policies applicable to almost any situation are:

1. Social customs such as class distinctions, dress, and similar items should be recognized and receive due consideration.
2. Political affiliations or the appearance of political favoritism should be avoided; while a thorough knowledge of the political situation is essential a strict neutrality in such matters should be observed.
3. A respect for religious customs.

Indifference in all the above matters can only be regarded as a lack of tact.⁴⁰

Learning to interact with local populaces presents a major challenge for soldiers, leaders, and civilians. In the current counterinsurgency environment, warfighting is estimated as only twenty percent of the solution of the endeavor – winning the populace and turning it against the insurgent “home field advantage” is the remainder.

Cultural Awareness and Nicaragua

One of the leading political authorities on Latin America described the importance of cultural awareness for advisors of security forces in this region in a recent article:

In Latin America knowing that loyalty and subservience to the state is very different than loyalty and subservience to the government or the people is vital. The Latin tradition is that of the army of the conquistadores, not our militia tradition. Loyalty

goes to one’s immediate commander and then to the institution, not to the government or constitution. Understanding the lack of words for compromise, or accountability, the meaning of addressing a superior as *mi coronel*, knowing why, in Spanish for example, instead of being disappointed one is deceived or betrayed, understanding such concepts of *personalismo* (the tendency to give loyalty to an individual rather than an institution) are all keys to knowing both the possibilities and limits of potential influence.⁴¹

The American officers of the Guardia Nacional were “immediately confronted upon their assignment to duty in Nicaragua with the problem of personal adjustment to a situation requiring a sympathetic understanding of a people who had originated from different racial strains and who had developed under entirely different conditions of environment and who were animated by different ideals.”⁴² Marine Corps historian Keith Bickel points out that the Nicaragua campaign played a significant role in the transformation of the Marines into true small wars practitioners. Prior to the six-year campaign in Nicaragua, the Corps had made only halting attempts to incorporate COIN (counterinsurgency) and cultural warfighting lessons into doctrine and professional education. One general officer lamented this lack of preparation: “We received no training in (small wars) when we were ordered to these places... I arrived in Managua... and three days later I was out in bandit territory with a patrol, having received no instruction on the situation, the general intelligence situation, the methods to be employed, training.”⁴³

Captain Evans Carlson felt that the advisors to the Guardia were endowed with “intelligence and experience” and made special mention of “Chesty” Puller’s “understanding of Nicaraguan psychology.”⁴⁴ Puller’s total devotion to the Nicaraguans in his company, his understanding of their sensitivities, and the personal example he set earned him the respect and confidence of his men.

[The]... qualities of tact, judgment, and courage were necessary attributes of the officers who directed the operations in the field. They were dealing with men who spoke a different language, and whose psychological approach to the ordinary problems of life was quite different from that to which Marines were accustomed. ... [and] they were outnumbered, and ... stationed in a town as much as thirty miles from the nearest other garrison. Leadership of high order was called for, and in most cases it was forthcoming.⁴⁵

Officers assigned to Nicaraguan duty were rarely, if ever, given any prior orientation as to the culture, political situation, or even US policy goals in the nation. The failure of the Marine Corps to train its advisors in Nicaraguan values, attitudes, customs, sensitivities, language, etc., was accentuated because "... the US was coming into contact with a people who were by tradition sensitive and proud. The contact between them was the contact and clash of two highly different cultures which did not understand each other and which did not seek to understand each other."⁴⁶ Nicaraguan historian Richard Millett states that "this lack of preparation became clear from interviews with numerous Marines who had served with the Guardia."⁴⁷ Foreigners were normally held in high regard except and until they violated local customs.⁴⁸

Racial prejudices are innate in all human beings throughout history, but compared to today they were more generally accepted and ingrained in the first-third of the 20th century and emerged in such places as the Marines found themselves in the "Banana Wars." "It produced paternalism, a willingness to set much lower standards for and accept conduct by nationals of all ranks."⁴⁹ Sandino expert Michael Schroeder wrote that "For Major Julian C. Smith, who implicitly construed himself and the Marines as embodying 'Germanic' tendencies, coming to grips with the persistence of 'organized banditry' in Nicaragua despite 'so many tactical defeats and indecisive actions' required understanding the peculiar 'racial psychology' of 'the poorer classes of Nicaraguans.'"

As a result, all relationships between Marine officers and Nicaraguan enlisted men were not happy ones. Five Guardia officers were killed in eight mutinies during the campaign against Sandino. Any action appearing unjust might be taken as a personal affront and lead to gun play. In four of the eight cases, a perceived insult to the sensitivities of the Nicaraguan was either the only cause or a contributing factor. A Guardia sergeant mutinied and killed his officer after being refused a new pair of shoes in one instance; in another, a dispute over a clothing issue caused the entire garrison to revolt and kill its commander. One newly arrived officer was shot dead as he walked away after chewing out a sentry. Another Marine officer was murdered by his men when he refused them permission to go to a local dance, held by the townsfolk, claiming the invitation was only for him as an officer (who was himself a USMC sergeant in actuality), and not the troops. He

tried to explain to them that their enlisted status prohibited them from attending social functions with an officer. The Nicaraguan soldiers took this as a gross insult to their personal dignity, and shot him dead when he returned from the dance that night. Unlike the Iraqis, the idea of social class is repugnant to most Nicaraguans – especially those from small towns and rural areas.⁵⁰ To what extent the Marines' lack of training in the social, cultural, and value systems of the native Nicaraguans contributed to these mutinies is impossible to say, but it must be taken into consideration. One historian posited that "an awareness, provided by a formal training program, of the socio-cultural facets of Nicaraguan life may have averted affronts to Nicaraguan pride and adapted standard American disciplinary measures (such as reduction in rank) to the Nicaraguan life-style. This education might have reduced the number of mutinies by 50 percent."⁵¹

The point of relating these stories is not for dramatic value, but rather to prove the value of cultural awareness. In many countries these situations would never have arisen. In some places the caste system is firmly deep-seated in the traditions of the populace. Here, the American commander of indigenous troops might have to become more class-conscious than he is accustomed to. A familiarity with the traditions and mores of the men he leads can help a foreign advisor avoid fatal mistakes. But in his search for understanding, the advisor should always avoid going "native."

While Guardia officers became scholars of Nicaraguan cultural peccadilloes, this author is not suggesting that to be a successful advisor in the Middle East, future TTs must have an in-depth knowledge of Islam. Edward C. Stewart succinctly identified the principal anthropologic key that advisors all need to understand:

The need for the US advisor to understand his own cultural pattern, as well as that of the host country, does not mean that his insight must be explicit and articulate. His cultural understanding may often be implicit, as when an advisor gears his actions to existing cultural differences, even though he is not necessarily able to describe the relevant aspect of either his own or the foreign culture. In this circumstance, the advisor perceives the cultural disparities at some intuitive level and acts accordingly.⁵²

Cultural Awareness and Iraq

In 2004, the Marine Corps established the first center in the Department of Defense dedicated to training advisors before they deploy: the Security, Cooperation, Education, and Training Center (SCETC) aboard Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.⁵³ At SCETC, Marine Corps TTs are run through a three and a half week program on a wide range of classes to include things like personality profiling, reviewing TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) on how to run convoys, call for air support, emergency medical evacuations, etc., weapons familiarization classes for both America and Iraqi systems, and some cultural and basic language training. Colonel Osterman felt:

... that [the training] could do better in terms of the cultural training. I realize this is hard to come by but now we are building a base of people who have got more experience, particularly in MiTT teams over here. The Iraqis are nowhere near as sensitive as they are played out to be in terms of a lot of the cultural sensitivities. . . . They are pretty much similar to what we are. What needs to be described in more detail are things like the social aspects of sitting down to have chai and tea with them. There is a lot of work that gets done that way. There is a lot of just “cultural battle rhythm” more than cultural faux pas that needs to be focused on in terms of getting your job done.⁵⁴

Still, in the majority of cases, trainers arrive on scene without the requisite instructional, regional, cultural, or linguistic preparation, and often with insufficient logistical or material support. Osterman continues that it is paramount:

... to understand just kind of the way the Iraqi works – his daily routine. They really don’t get going until about 8:00 or 9:00 in the morning. They will work for a number of hours and then about 1300 or so, they pretty much shut down until 1700. Then they’ll have a meal and then they’ll work from 1800 on into 2200. So it is a different battle rhythm to what we are used to. They’ll take the siesta or nap in the middle of the day for several hours and that is pretty alien to a lot of Marines when you first show up....You have to realize that their weekend is not the same as our weekend. They celebrate it on Friday, usually just one day. Leave is very important to them and they are on about a one-third or two-thirds leave and work rotation on a macro sense. So there are a lot of things that inhibit your ability to get the work done. You need to under-

stand that ahead of time; otherwise you’re going to get very frustrated as you feel as though they are slacking off.⁵⁵

All of the Marine Corps MiTTs lived on the base with their Iraqi counterparts. This was very critical aspect of being a TT member. There were some advisor teams which tried not to live with their Iraqis -- some of the Iraqi Police advisors (for example, police transition teams (PiTT)) – rather attempted to live on a US forward operating base (FOB) and then commute daily to work, which was proven to be not the preferred method and definitely more dangerous. The most effective way was to live with the indigenous troops one leads, as the Guardia officers did. Unless the advisors are with those they lead 24-hours a day, they really do not get the feel for what is going on and the indigenous troops tend to pay a little less attention to their advisors. The trust of the Iraqi commander was only gained by eating dinner with him, playing dominos with him, and by spending personal time, even by watching Arabic videos with him and his soldiers. If an advisor was not willing to give his own personal time in an attempt to establish a bond, it would be more difficult to earn their trust, making training and operations difficult.⁵⁶ Colonel Juan Ayala believed “Iraqis value personal relationships above all else.”⁵⁷

Marine advisors were given or told to buy books to facilitate their understanding of their Muslim counterparts. *The Arab Mind*, by Raphael Patai, was routinely mentioned by advisors as one of the finest works to utilize,⁵⁸ although some noted that it was simply too long and that books recommended by the Marine Corps should be “small and easy to read.” Guidance received during culture training to avoid talking about religion and politics was, in the view of virtually every MiTT member, not only impossible, but counterproductive to rapport building with the partnered Muslims, whose entire *raison d’être* is their Islamic beliefs. The Marine advisors for 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division of the Iraqi Army noted the importance of not shying away from discussing religion with the Iraqis, a problem which seems to have been of less concern with the Catholic Nicaraguan guardsmen.

The MiTT stated emphatically that this strategy is impractical and counterproductive to building rapport with Iraqis. Marines need a strategy for discussing sensitive issues like religion and the politics of Israel.

One of the things they told us about was under all circumstances avoid talking about religion. Strike that out there. Have the Marines have a plan to talk about religion from the beginning because it's so embedded in their culture that you cannot get away from talking about religion. You have to know how to deal with it.⁵⁹

"[Discussing religion] was the biggest money makers for us. They seemed ... to appreciate that we talked to them about it. ... it was the best conversations that we had." Another said "Everything [that] we weren't supposed to talk about that we did talk about seemed to go over with flying colors."⁶⁰ One officer deemed the solution perhaps was "to arm Marines with knowledge of where the Bible and the Koran are similar or the same, and where they diverge. The Marine still has to make a decision on whether and how in depth he intends to engage in religious conversation, but by having this knowledge, it is a reasoned decision."⁶¹

Perhaps a scenario presented by one advisor most clearly represents the challenges Americans have when dealing with cultures as dissimilar as Islam and the West. One Iraqi characteristic fascinating to Marines was their ability to disregard what Americans would consider very important, and alternatively, their abhorrence at events Americans felt were insignificant. The following scenario represents the daily challenges of life as an advisor to the ISF and their polar opposite responses to big events:

The Americans will be like, "wow that's a big event" and the Iraqis are like, "oh wow" [interviewee's tone is that Iraqis would see little or no significance to the event]. Then you'll have a little event where the Americans are like "no problem" and the Iraqis think it's a big problem. Perfect example is, take two instances of fights between Americans and Iraqis ... jundis. There was a fight ... where a Marine broke a jundi's nose ... Pretty big deal to me, I thought, but they were like, "hey no problem, we'll just get the nose fixed. You'll fix the nose right." "Well yeah, no problem."

Then there's another fight a couple of months later ... where a Marine actually put his foot on the guys head. No one was hurt, so I was like no big deal. Huge deal. They pulled people off post; they were coming back down..... [I was telling them it's no problem because of the broken nose incident]. But putting the foot..... on the Iraqi sergeant's head was an insult to the entire battalion and to the battal-

ion commander personally and it was not going to stand. But breaking ... the other kid's nose, not a big deal. Little things like that came up time and time again of differing degrees. Each time they'd fool us.⁶²

Similar to the Nicaraguans if they did not respect their officers, the Iraqis would also refuse to work with instructors they did not hold in high regard.

An old Marine adage proclaims "The difficult we can do overnight; the impossible takes a little longer." Sapped by the midday sun in the hills of Nicaragua or blinded by sandstorms traversing the desert, Marine advisors often felt the impossible was bludgeoning them in the face. At times the most intricate part of being an advisor was not the protégées' tactical proficiency, but getting them to acknowledge and act on the commonly accepted goals. Patience and a sense of humor were frequently cited as indispensable assets for an advisor adapting and adjusting to the peculiarities of the job. Some instructors struggled to define and maintain their roles as mentors, advisors, and trainers. Iraqi officers themselves have repeatedly complained about the aloofness of some coalition trainers and units towards Iraqi soldiers and their disinterest in interacting meaningfully with them.⁶³ Clearly some interpreted the Iraqi attitude to be, "We know what we are doing, we have embraced TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) that we want to embrace and have rejected the rest, but will behave as if you have something new to teach and will accept you as a mentor as long as we have access to your support structure (QRF [quick reaction force], CAS [close air support], CASEVAC [casualty evacuation], intelligence, money, and materiel)."⁶⁴

Ensuring native forces conducted themselves appropriately was always a full-time endeavor, both in Nicaragua and Iraq. The Marines in Nicaragua faced the problem with the Voluntarios, one of the auxiliary forces of the Guardia Nacional composed of a motley group of native Indians and Nicaraguans ranging in age from 17 to 50 years who were prone to execute "bandits" or other persona non grata on the spot, in an attempt to settle old scores.⁶⁵ They were eventually disbanded. Stopping Iraqi forces from abusing detainees was a constant concern for US Marines and TTs. This is mentioned in numerous after action reports.⁶⁶ To be sure, the Iraqi army was prone to destruction of property and a pervasive cultural mindset of taking whatever they wanted, from wherever they wanted, especially if it was from a Sunni area. Iraqi soldiers

cursed at Sunnis and sometimes could be physically brutal.⁶⁷ When locals accused Iraqi soldiers of theft, it was usually discovered to be true.

Iraqi noncommissioned officers do not enjoy the trust or confidence of their officers. Norvelle B. De Atkine, in his fascinating article “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” discusses the missing or non-functional NCO corps reflected in most armies of the region. With few exceptions, NCOs are considered in the same low category as enlisted men and so do not serve as a bridge between jundis and officers. The old regime’s centralized philosophy of leadership, and their concern for allowing others to have influence creates an obstacle to implementing the American philosophy of decentralized leadership where ideas can arise from the bottom up. The consensus among advisors was that building the new army would require quickly grooming junior officers and NCOs who were willing to share power, which would require promoting talented officers ahead of their peers and move senior officers out of the military. Lack of NCOs continues to hamper the Iraqi Army in general as TTs try to instruct them in US doctrine. The officer centric-world of the Iraqi Army, where decisions could not be made independently, had a large impact on how advisors struggled to develop senior enlisted leadership. The great disconnect between the Iraqi officers and their enlisted is a cultural challenge difficult to overcome for an advisor on a nine-month tour. Sergeants are usually seen as just higher paid jundi. Jundis were given platoon sergeant jobs at the whim of the commander, who would alternate their billets when the mood struck him. This created a dysfunctional NCO corps, where neither the officers, nor the sergeants, nor the soldiers benefitted. Marine Senior NCOs would get very annoyed about this deficit in leadership and their painful attempts at correcting it.

The concept of planning was not well-engrained in the Iraqi Army, nor was there an inculcated mindset of direct obedience to superiors’ orders as there is in western militaries. “The Iraqi way . . . [was] just . . . a verbal thing with the battalion commander, and they would execute five minutes later The tribal culture makes it difficult for leaders to command soldiers. If a leader tells a soldier to do something the soldier does not want to, the soldier will complain to his family back home, and his family will give the leader’s family a hard time. The leader’s family will be hassled by the families of soldiers in that unit.” This made it nearly impossible

for leaders to enforce discipline and standards in their unit without endangering their families. Due to the patriarchal system, sometimes older soldiers would not take orders from younger soldiers. The problem was even worse when the soldiers and leaders were from the same family/tribe. One advisor described all levels of command in his battalion -- battalion to company and company to platoon -- as “dictatorships.” Despite this, the relationship of officers to enlisted was often described as “friendly.”

At every level, Iraqi forces in the past have operated in an information black hole, as the command, control, and communications (C3) triad was seen as a goal to obtain, not a functional necessity. The concept of horizontal communication, or vertical communication down the chain, is not intrinsic in Arab military organizations. A MiTT member experienced frustration and resistance from Iraqi officers when they wanted the battalion to pass information to jundi. The generic push-back Iraqi answer was along the lines of “the jundi aren’t educated. Don’t teach a class; it’s just a waste of time.”⁶⁸

Corruption permeated the daily TT-Iraqi existence, and was one of the most written and complained about problems in after action reports and journal articles. The problem reached to levels far beyond what the Marine officers of the Guardia experienced – which in itself was enormous. Corruption manifested itself in many ways: theft of uniforms, fuel, ammunition, garrison property – and was commonplace at all levels of command, from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to individual Iraqi soldier, theft of items and bribes was the status quo. A culture of bribery and the mindset of hoarding were engrained. Corruption has been inculcated for centuries in Iraq and the Arab world: for example, prior to the fall of Saddam making a U-turn in Baghdad required the bribing of policemen. It was one of the prevailing frustrations of Americans attempting to instill just the opposite habits, and it is estimated that corruption costs Iraq \$5.0 billion annually.⁶⁹ All advisors understood that the level of vice only increased the higher up the chain of command one went. Speaking of the Iraqi battalion commander, one Marine said, “I think . . . they’re all corrupt.”⁷⁰ One advisor recommended that MiTT teams do the impossible and predetermine what level of corruption they were going to accept prior to arrival in theater. The general consensus was that all Iraqis are crooked, some just more so than others, and that the only reason they

put up with the Americans was because they considered them “sugar daddies.”⁷¹

Translators

The importance of quality translators when raising native troops cannot be overemphasized.⁷² “Second only to an abundance of patience, interpreters are the single most vital asset to a MiTT.”⁷³ Few resources outweighed the value of having one translator for each company level advisor. Almost anything can be overcome with the ability to communicate. Captain Brian Cillessen recently wrote that “Due to the language barriers, leadership for the advisor is often less verbal and more visual, so setting the example and maintain[ing] integrity is imperative.”⁷⁴

The Language Problem in Nicaragua

In the beginning of the Nicaraguan occupation, despite the Marines’ recent interventions in the Philippines (1899-1903), Cuba (1906-1909, 1912, 1917-1922), Mexico (1914), Haiti (1915-1922), and the Dominican Republic (1912-1924), very few spoke Spanish or knew much about Latin society or culture. Over time this changed to a degree, as a number of prominent officers became nearly fluent in Spanish and learned much about Nicaraguan society and culture. Most Guardia officer however had to rely on interpreters or hand gestures to get their instructions across.⁷⁵ In December 1929, Major C.S. Baker wrote of the necessity of language abilities in the Nicaraguan campaign in a Marine Corps Gazette article. “The recent experience . . . in Nicaragua has indicated more forcefully than ever before that there should be in the Corps an adequate number of officers who read Spanish and speak it correctly and fluently. . . . Marine officers have frequently faced situations in other countries where knowledge of Spanish was of the greatest value.”⁷⁶ While he admits that it is “too much to demand that every officer should know Spanish well,” he astutely noted the necessity that “many of them . . . have a good working knowledge of the language.”⁷⁷ Following the Nicaragua II experience, the Marine Corps required every officer to take Spanish, or “bull cart Spanish” as the old-timers would call it.⁷⁸

In dealing with native citizens, officers were forced to rely on translators. “It was impossible in Nicaragua,” he continues, “to find one native interpreter who was

not a member of either the Conservative or Liberal party; and therefore in almost every case of a complaint, one side or the other felt that the matter had been misrepresent[ed] to the officer by a biased political interpreter!”⁷⁹ The Marine Corps officers and men were “at the mercy of their interpreters”⁸⁰ in Nicaragua as they currently are in Iraq. John Daniels describes the native interpreter in a 1940’s Gazette article on the Nicaraguan experience as that “ever dangerous individual, . . . [who] usually plays both ends against the middle for his own profit, yet leans heavily toward his own people...”⁸¹ Hardly any of the officers in Nicaragua had the ability to speak Spanish and carry on a real conversation with the indigenous people.

The events of the Nicaraguan campaign clearly indicate that the lack of Spanish-speaking officers in the Quartermaster Department cost the Marine Corps a great deal of money; a sum that would undoubtedly have defrayed the cost of giving many officers instruction in Spanish, other than the correspondence courses which are now the only form of training available. In Nicaragua almost all fresh foods were bought from natives. In the same manner horses, mules, bull carts, and equipage were hired or purchased. Practically all of these transactions were made through native interpreters-interpreters . . . who were seldom averse to getting a rake-off on every deal. Sellers were forced to increase the price a little to meet the demands of the interpreter. In fact there were cases in which investigation showed that the interpreter himself suggested that the merchant raise his price so that he, the merchant, would not only be able to pay the interpreter’s “commission” but have an additional profit for himself. I am convinced that the prices of certain commodities were advanced and upheld through the efforts of the very interpreters whom we were paying to help us. A competent force of officers who could speak Spanish would have been able to hold prices to a reasonable level, eliminate the graft, and save the wages of the interpreters.⁸²

Linguistic and cultural ignorance remained major obstacles to effective intelligence acquisition and analysis until the final Marine withdrawal. The language barrier severely impeded the Marines’ ability to evaluate the quality of intelligence at its point of origin. Of the most prominent analysts—Lieutenant Larson, Majors Schmidt and Salzman, Colonels Watson and Hunt—none seem to have become fluent in Spanish.⁸³ One recent historian notes that “Many translations of captured rebel correspondence, intercepted letters, and published newspaper accounts were of very poor qual-

ity. This changed to a degree later in the wars, as some officers learned the language, more skilled translators were assigned, and native Guardia assumed responsibility for field and desk operations.”⁸⁴

The Language Problem in Iraq

“If you asked me, ‘what’s the one thing I could do for you?’ I would not say I need another type of weapon or I need a better vehicle or I need a better this; what I need is language! Give me language and I can progress a lot further than we’ve progressed.”
***--Unidentified Colonel, MiTT Leader;
7th Division Iraqi Army.***⁸⁵

TTs assessed language education as the preeminent requirement for pre-deployment training, and characterized the schooling received for the most part as “ineffective.”⁸⁶ Training often consisted of a set of twelve self-study compact discs, which the vast majority of Marines felt was completely useless.⁸⁷ Dictionaries with words spelled in Arabic, Iraqi Arabic, preferably with phonetic spellings, were often carried by MiTTs, so that the Marine could point to the idea he was attempting to communicate.

Translators were one of the causes of the greatest dissension in American units, and presented a plethora of problems. Due to the massive necessity of Arabic speakers for the Coalition Forces in Iraq, the American contract companies often hired lower quality translators due to an insufficient pool of adequate ones. While the translators wanted to be treated as “American soldiers,” many Marines lacked the savvy and rapport to create that bond, and wanted instead to treat them as they would their junior Marines, which proved very unsuccessful. Sometimes, however, the translators were just lazy troublemakers. Some units provided Marine uniforms for their translators which went far to foster the “team” spirit amongst them, although TT members felt that they did not deserve to wear the hal-lowed Marine Corps uniform.

One common problem faced by Marines in Iraq was that the translators were from parts of the Arabic speaking world outside of the area of operations. For example, Kurdish translators from Mosul spoke differently than Shiite translators from Basra; Iraqis of American descent spoke with different dialects than Sunnis from Ramana. One Shiite translator told the author that

he could hardly understand the rural dialect of the Al Anbar inhabitants, a situation that obviously proved challenging when attempting to interrogate or deal with routine patrol problems. Sergeant Matt Massie, a MiTT member with 3/1/1 IIF, wrote,

I had a relationship with a local imam who saw lots of Americans patrol past his house each day without giving them a second glance. Without exception, when I was in his neighborhood, he would come and find me. He may have wanted something from me or he may just have wanted to say hello, but I am convinced that he remembered me because I made the effort to speak his language.

He continued,

The Iraqi officers in my company distrusted one of these translators, and I could see an enormous difference in the way they behaved when this particular interpreter was working for me. Only after I switched linguists did I learn that they thought him a liar and preferred not to discuss operational issues with him. Iraqis working for the coalition also express a preference for anonymity. An Iraqi officer works with interpreters, civilians, his soldiers, and other officers, but his advisor is the one person who he is sure will not turn him over to an insurgent. Breaking the language barrier will form relationships that your fellow advisors who rely on translators will never enjoy.⁸⁸

The after action report from 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines in October 2006 identified the importance of quality interpreters. “Quality interpreters are the critical element to a successful conversation with the local populace and the Iraqi Army.”⁸⁹ Another report suggests that “rather than hiring more interpreters, the Iraqis or the Coalition should have incentive pay for soldiers who speak English; many IAF [Iraqi Armed Forces] soldiers spoke English better than the interpreters, and were easier to work [with].”⁹⁰

Training the Indigenous Forces

Marines envisioned that training goals for the Guardia during the initial two years would be accomplished by brigading it in the field with Marine units, affording the guardsmen the opportunity to learn through emulation as well as through the instruction given by their officers.⁹¹ “Parris Island training methods were not appropriate in Nicaragua; threats of courts-martial could not move a balky patrol on a lonely jungle train

or subdue a mutinous garrison in an isolated village. The National Guard officer could draw little strength from military institutions; the effectiveness of his leadership – and his life – depended upon the force of his own personality. The authoritarian leader was as hopelessly miscast in Nicaragua as he was in Iraq. Effective leadership depended on persuasion. Guardia officers, Colonel H. C. Reisinger wrote, “gambled their lives on their personalities.”⁹² The propitious Marine Guardia officer had the qualities of “fearlessness, common sense, a knowledge of human nature, an enduring patience and good humor, and a working fluency in the Spanish tongue.”⁹³ Reisinger added the important ingredient of “sympathy.”⁹⁴ Officers who exhibited such traits won the inspiration of his men which led them to extraordinary acts of heroism. The fealty was engendered by a tradition of caudillismo, based on the combined principles of loyalty to place and chieftain, honor, and leadership in battle.

Facing the exact problem fellow Marines would face in Iraq 75 years later, the Guardia Marine officers had little, if any, background raising police forces. While most of the Marines assigned had some previous experience in training troops, the unique requirement of law enforcement was altogether different. “Language and cultural barriers,” wrote Millett, “were also greater in this sensitive area, leading to a host of problems and, at times, rather ingenious solutions hardly imagined by the statesmen and generals who drew up the original Guardia agreements.”⁹⁵ Some of the Herculean tasks the police advisors had to surmount included a culture inundated with graft and administrative organizational disabilities; a propensity of the police to lock up people they had grudges against; lack of any established daily routine; basic weapons mishandling and the shooting of innocent bystanders; fratricide from bayonets and innocents being shot (leading the advisors to arm them with clubs and pistols), to simple lack of knowledge of right and wrong. Policemen were on the payroll who did not actually exist, and their salary was going into the pockets of the police director.⁹⁶ (In 2006, Lieutenant General Dempsey, US Army, testified that there are “between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization and untrained by us.”⁹⁷ Some MiTTs resorted to physically overseeing the disbursement of pay to the officers of men of the different units.) The assumption of police duties also complicated training procedures, since the same training did not fit a recruit to carry out both police and

combat duties – hence the difference between constabularies and distinct national army and police forces as are being developed in Iraq.⁹⁸

Leadership trumps everything in warfare. Its timeless qualities are as important for advisors amongst their native troops as when leading Marines. Captain Puller’s guardsmen worshiped him. Successful relationships between officers and men – whether of different nationalities or not – are built on mutual respect. To be a leader, one must share the same hardships, discomforts, and tribulations as those who are led. This is especially true when the leader and his men are of different nationalities. In such cases enemy propaganda is aimed at convincing the native soldier that he is the lackey of foreigners. By their personal example, Marine Guardia officers did much to counter this misinformation. In his seminal work on the campaign, Dr. Neill Macaulay wrote of the American officers that:

They shared with Nicaraguan enlisted men the hardships and dangers of life on the trail and, more often than not, formed bonds of comradeship with the native soldiers. Together they trudged through sweltering valleys, endured torrential downpours, forded swirling rivers, inched their way up precipitous mountainsides, and shivered through the nights in rain -- or sweat soaked clothing -- lying in hammocks rocked by tropical breezes that could seem as cold as an arctic blast. They ate the same food: rice and black beans, supplemented by whatever fruit and meat they could procure en route. Officers and men shared the same jokes, were bitten alike by mosquitoes, ticks, and fleas. Americans as well as Nicaraguans could succumb to Sandinista bullets, drowning, or malaria; in the jungle the prick of a thorn or the bite of an insect could lead to a crippling infection.⁹⁹

Michael Schroeder notes the degree to which, during the war, sheer hatred of the Sandinistas also provided a kind of “glue” that bound together the soldiers and officers of the Guardia -- it was less a sense of “duty” or professionalism than it was hatred for the “bandoleros” (i.e., Sandinistas). The same was true of the Sandinistas, of course -- hatred of the enemy ran extremely deep and became the principal unifying factor for each side.¹⁰⁰ While in some aspects the common sense of hatred did exist for the Transition Teams (TT) and their Iraqi soldiers to the extent that many Iraqis felt terrorists were making a mockery of their religion, it was nowhere to the extent exhibited in Nicaragua.

Iraq

Unlike in the Guardia experience where Marines were in command of units, MiTT members had to advise without authority to give orders. It is more difficult to accomplish tasks without executive powers. Conviction often comes when the indigenous force recognizes that a particular technique is a correct one, and if “such a procedure is too alien, for whatever reason it will not survive beyond the termination of the foreign tutelage.”¹⁰¹ The learning process takes place through the realization that the methods proffered by the foreign trainers is valuable, and this occurs only when the advisor is able to communicate this in a manner conducive and acceptable to the ethno-cultural consciousness of those he is tasked to instruct. This realization “is the result of acting on the advice and discovering that it is a satisfactory way of performing the task, or by trying other methods, finding that they fail, and finally accepting the advisor’s suggestion.”¹⁰²

Keeping the Main Thing the Main Thing

“Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion.” --T.E. Lawrence, “Lawrence of Arabia”¹⁰³

“...the trick is to make the Iraqis win the battle.” --Colonel Joseph Osterman, USMC¹⁰⁴

T.E. Lawrence, the renowned English liaison of the Arab Revolt, possessed a savvy, and exhibited patience, rapport, and understanding of the Arab mind. He succinctly left sage advice for those who would follow in his footsteps in the future. “It is their war,” he wrote in 1917, “and you are to help them, not to win it for them.” Although most American advisors were not conscious of it, they brought US Marine approaches developed to optimize US military organizations, systems, doctrine, and equipment that were often not appropriate for solving the problems faced by the host nation, particularly in a COIN environment. In fact,

many were counterproductive. They had not learned that an “advisor must abandon the idea that his way is always best, and try to fit in and listen rather than provide advice by the book.”¹⁰⁵ A historian and long-time student of American culture noted in Vietnam that:

the understandable and irresistible bias of the American military is to train other nations’ military organizations as our clones. . . . Counterinsurgency, political war, required discipline and clarity to avoid using artillery and bombs. The American[s] . . . would never relinquish . . . technological superiority.¹⁰⁶

Cultural understanding of others begins with cultural self-knowledge. American capabilities and limitations need to be explicitly defined, just as those of the host nation. Marines are rightly arrogant beings, who flaunt a rightful pride of their abilities, history, and successes – that spirit, however, must be “checked at the door” when training non-Marines. Marine TT officers in Iraq constantly have to assuage their junior advisors in a tone reminiscent of Lawrence of old: “We aren’t trying to make the jundi Marines. We’re trying to make them good enough to survive without us.”¹⁰⁷ Perhaps the best guidance for future advisors is to recognize the inherent differences between Iraqis and Americans came when an interviewee noted: “. . . they’re not going to be Marines, they never will be, but hey, if there’s no more IEDs [improvised explosive devices] on route ‘Boston’ because you’re doing whatever, that’s fine. The ends justify the means. . . .”¹⁰⁸ Refusing to recognize the limits of influence when training native forces only guarantees the final result of creating constabulary institutions in another culture will diverge even further from the rudimentary goals visualized.

Echoing the sentiments of T. E. Lawrence, Sergeant Massie, one of the few Marine advisors on my team who had actually read *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, believes that “whenever possible, allow your counterparts to fail.” Unless lives are at risk, “if they say they have addressed a problem, finished planning, or are prepared for whatever task, let events unfold. Do not be too hasty to jump in and fix things. Sometimes they will learn a lesson better if they are embarrassed first, then corrected.”¹⁰⁹ He found that the officers would seek his advice at a later time if they believed it would prevent them from feeling “embarrassed” in the future – “losing face” being one of the most feared human emotions in Muslim society for a male. The best lessons are always learned when pride is at stake. The

cultural constraints of honor and pride often precluded many Iraqis from accepting any type of direct advice. Guardia instructors found that the Nicaraguan soldiers “seemed excessively sensitive to criticism, sometimes preferring death to embarrassment. The officer who insulted or humiliated a Guardsman was courting violent death; the attack did not always come immediately, but it usually came suddenly – after a brooding resentment had been transformed into a murderous compulsion.”¹¹⁰

Maintaining a proper balance of “push-pull” for an advisor is challenging, and human nature must be considered. Colonel Osterman stated,

Iraqis. . . will let you do their job all day long if you do it. So as a result, you’ve got to get them to the point where they have the education and they have adequate resources to get the job done, and then you’ve got to assume a certain amount of risk by essentially forcing them to do it. Once you stop doing it for them, it may not always be exactly like you think it should be, but they’ll find the Iraqi way to get it done and it will usually come out fine. So the bottom line is don’t let them talk you into doing all of their work for them because they’ll let you do it all day long.¹¹¹

The TT’s role is to teach, coach, and mentor the Iraqis as well as fight alongside them in combat, but more in the capacity of breaching, fire support, quick-fire support, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capabilities. The trick was to make the Iraqis win the battle themselves. A veteran advisor and Marine major offered my team astute advice before deploying that we utilized often: “A 60 percent Iraqi solution is always better than a 100 percent American solution.”

Conclusion and Recommendations

In the past decade the Corps has continually deployed Marines to Central and South America and western Europe to train foreign militaries. The prognosis of a “long war” working with host nation forces and allies in a counterinsurgency environment means that the likelihood of advisory duty for many US military personnel is almost a certainty. The advisory mission will be the main effort of US operations in Iraq for many years,¹¹² while Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated in September 2008 that the biggest challenge in Afghanistan is building reliable and capable Afghan

security forces. Marines will continue to be subjected to a plethora of unconventional tasks in an environment where they are expected to display patience, exert leadership and foster rapport. The Commandant of the Marine Corps in his recent “Long Wars Concept Pamphlet” states that “the Marine Corps will be developing additional forces specifically trained and equipped to provide security assistance (SA) to selected partner nations.”¹¹³ Marine advisors will undoubtedly continue to adapt, but hopefully a historical understanding of the successful traits of leading indigenous troops in the past will help them avoid pitfalls in the future.

As Major Baker said regarding the need for a language capacity in 1929 regarding the Marine Corps’ mission in Central America, it is evident today that the Corps will be engaged in the Middle East for a long time to come, and has a similar language necessity. As a result, the Corps must focus on developing an organic Arabic language capacity. Recent articles in professional publications within the Marine Corps attest that this is understood and being addressed.¹¹⁴ As of mid-2006, every Marine lieutenant graduating The Basic Officer’s Course (TBS) will be assigned a region of the world to study; this study will be supported with appropriate language and cultural material, and follow them throughout their career.

While different environments evolve different social structures, the underlying elements of human nature are the same the world over. All clay demands quality leadership and inspiration to be led. Commands must screen all Marines being considered for assignment to an advisory team, and be highly selective based on their professional competency and – more importantly – their personality traits. The Marine Corps needs to employ screening teams at bases worldwide to provide assessments of potential advisors. The Small Wars Manual advised:

the officers of the constabulary should be models of leadership, inspiration, and an example to their troops. Members of the United States forces serving with the constabulary must possess good judgment and extreme patience, coupled with tact, firmness, justice, and control. Firmness without adequate means of support may degenerate into bluff. Tact alone may be interpreted as weakness.¹¹⁵

An advisor may have less combat experience than his host nation counterpart or may need to advise a soldier who is senior to him by several paygrades. The for-

eign advisor is an unofficial diplomat (at the tactical level), and it is essential that he relate to the host nation soldiers professionally, personally, and culturally. Technical skills must not be valued above human skills. One Major cautioned that most typical Marine officers are “type A . . . by the book, letter of the law, dot every ‘I’ [and] cross every ‘T’ type of mentality” – and that is not going to work “because your counterparts aren’t going to respond to that.”¹¹⁶ In his advice for choosing advisors, historian Robert Ramsey advises that:

Careful selection and screening of advisory personnel is required. Not everybody can or should do advisory duty. Former advisors acknowledge this; studies reinforce it. This means “to have a valid set of selection criteria that works, the military has to formulate a hard set of required skills for advisor duty. It should . . . then test them to ensure some level of proficiency.” “Good Marines do not invariably make good advisors . . . [for many] lacked the patience to work with a culture that places little emphasis on qualities that we regard as . . . indispensable to military life. . . . The ‘drill instructor’ type of instruction is not generally effective in training indigenous soldiers.” Those soldiers considered the best and most experienced are not always well suited for advisory duty; often the normal approach is also not well suited.¹¹⁷

Another MiTT officer, answering who was unfit to be an advisor, simply said, “the average staff NCO for example, the average staff sergeant you’re taking from a rifle company.”¹¹⁸ The danger of an incompatible Marine for the job is succinctly observed by one MiTT leader when he stated “A guy who’s difficult . . . makes it difficult for the entire MiTT team as well, [and] . . . can sabotage the relationship with the Iraqis.”¹¹⁹

As the Marine Corps sought former advisors for the mission of raising the Guardia in Nicaragua, so too today should the Marine Corps seek prior advisors to do follow-on tours for Foreign Internal Development (FID) missions. Advising is akin to mastering other arts in life – the more one practices, the more proficient he becomes. The knowledge those advisors have of the “human terrain system” – the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people – is a valuable inherent resource that the Corps needs to exploit. I recommend an additional military occupational specialty (MOS) should be created in order to help identify such Marines throughout the system for subsequent postings abroad. The Corps has recently

established Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG), an organization to coordinate, form, train, and equip Marine Corps advisor and training teams for current and projected operations. The MCTAG was created to fill future needs to young officers advising a host nation military or host nation security forces with regard to training, organization, and record book tracking. This is a step in the correct direction, but now the decision needs to be made as to what types of Marines are going to compose this organization – professional advisors whose sole function in the Marine Corps is FID, or Leathernecks with backgrounds in the Fleet who bring resident knowledge to those they train, or a combination of the two. Further, is this function going to be oriented in the future to special operations-type capabilities, or is it going to be an enduring responsibility? Finally, are the same set of advisors going to be equally as efficient when employed in combat scenarios such as Nicaragua and Iraq, or does it require Marines with different skill sets to those who will train indigenous forces in non-kinetic environments?

The American military is esteemed throughout the world, and the Marine Corps legend transcends cultural boundaries. The title “Marine” engenders respect and fear the world over.

Just the presence of an American can inspire a native unit with confidence. Without being arrogant or boastful, Americans serving with foreign armies should take full advantage of their country’s military reputation. The American’s foreign accent and mannerisms are associated with his country’s greatness and add a touch of mystery that commands respect. When the American slavishly imitates the natives he loses this respect.¹²⁰

The innate reverence that comes with the wearing of the digital desert uniform and the title “Marine” can be used to open the door of the initial relationship between transition team members and co-partnered indigenous peoples.

The Marine-led Guardia in the Nicaraguan experience suggests that a relatively small commitment of American combat leaders can bolster a friendly army to the point where it can at least withstand a determined guerrilla campaign. It showed US Marines furnish fine examples of how to lead indigenous troops in counter-guerrilla warfare. Little groups of Marines, coupled with local security forces, conducting dispersive security patrols and humanitarian operations in traditional

areas of terrorist sanctuaries, pay huge dividends. One seasoned insurgent scholar believes that in this 4th-Generation arc of chaos, “well-trained, small groups of warriors with linguistic skills and cultural knowledge” -- coupled with indigenous forces led by advisors, who lead through strength of personality -- “have long-term salience in this Long War.”¹²¹ The Marine Corps, with over 100 years of lessons in raising indigenous forces, have no excuse, when advising, for not advising well.

About the Author

Erich Wagner is a Major in the US Marine Corps and a graduate of the US Naval Academy and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In the past decade as an infantry officer he has served in defense of the American Embassy in Panama, trained foreign personnel in Croatia, Australia, Argentina, Korea, Japan, Curacao, and most recently, Iraq. He is currently a Congressional Liaison for the Marine Corps.

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Endnotes:

¹ Charles Neimeyer, "Combat in Nicaragua," Marine Corps Gazette, April 2008, 71.

² For the entirety of this document, the term "constabulary" refers to a body that performs military and police units, as the word was used originally by the authors of Small Wars Manual.

³ The correct Arabic plural form for jundi is junood; that said, most Americans use the singular form to denote the plural, calling them jundis, and the usage has some currency. This became the subject of a somewhat amusing game, in which advisors would substitute "jundi" into various American sayings, as in "he had a jundi-in-the-headlight look" or "the heart stirs more to rouse a lion that start a jundi." The more general term for military is "askeri" which is both singular and plural. For the purposes of this paper, I will utilize the commonly accepted form of jundi in singular and plural contexts, as is commonly done in the interviews cited.

⁴ Brent Leigh Gravatt, "The Marines and the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 1927-1932" (Masters of Arts Thesis, Duke University, 1973), 146.

⁵ Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the US Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family, 61.

⁶ Richard Millett, "The History of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua," 1925-1965 (High Wycomb, England: University Microfilms, 1966) 172.; also see Gravatt, 103.

⁷ The Marines insisted that officers detailed to the Guardia receive a salary from the Nicaraguan government in addition to their regular Marine pay. Officers received a salary from the Nicaraguan government corresponding to their rank in the Guardia.

Nicaraguan salaries were lower than those in the Marine Corps, but since most Americans held a rank in the Guardia one or more grades above their rank in the Corps, this extra compensation often amounted to nearly double pay. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, 62.

⁸ Dick Camp, ed., Leatherneck Legends: Conversations with the Marine Corps' Old Breed (St. Paul, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2006) 72.

⁹ Evans Carlson, "The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua," Marine Corps Gazette, Aug 1937, 9.

¹⁰ Gravatt, 103.

¹¹ Gravatt, 103-104.

¹² Bickel, 167; Vernon E. McGee, "Guerrilla Lessons from Nicaragua." Marine Corps Gazette, June, 1965, 36. Unfortunately, the Marines with backgrounds in Haiti probably had some French ability, but this obviously did no good in Nicaragua.

¹³ McGee, 36.

¹⁴ Neimeyer, "The US Marine Corps in Nicaragua," (paper presented at International Security Studies Program luncheon, The Fletcher School, Somerville, MA, September 2007).

¹⁵ Gravatt, 105.

¹⁶ Gravatt, 153-154.

¹⁷ Neimeyer, "Combat in Nicaragua," 76.

¹⁸ Gravatt, 106.

¹⁹ Ibid, 36.

²⁰ Gravatt, 104.

²¹ Also similar to the Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) of Vietnam. It is interesting to note that only once in my research did I come across the term "advisor" being used by a Guardia Marine do refer to himself.

²² For example, 1st Iraqi Division, was sourced by the 4th Marine Division. Each Division was a little bit different, Col Joseph Osterman, senior advisor for this division, had a Division level team, four Brigade teams, and 12 Battalion teams. The mix on those was eight Marine Corps teams and nine Army teams.

These teams were a mix of Army Reservists and Marine Corps a 50/50 mix of both active and reserve Marines, however, most all were sourced primarily from 4th Marine Division – the Marine Corps Reserve Division. The active duty personnel are mostly from Inspector-Instructor (I&I) staffs.

²³ Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) 30 November 2006, 9.

²⁴ Osterman, 17.

²⁵ Neill Macaulay, “Leading Native Troops,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1963, 32.

²⁶ Denig, 58.

²⁷ Note that the Small Wars Manual actually discusses the value and importance of properly uniforming the native soldier. In the American Civil War, for example, Union officers noticed tremendous difference amongst their black soldiers when they received their “blue” Union uniforms.

²⁸ Bales, 18.

²⁹ Julian C. Smith, et al., “A Review of the Organization and Operations of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,” (Quantico: VA, 1933), 13 ff.

³⁰ Denig, 21, 71.

³¹ Macaulay, “Leading Native Troops”, 34.

³² George B. Clark, “With the Old Corps in Nicaragua,” (Novato: Presidio Press, 2001) 117; 154.

³³ Denig 45.

³⁴ Smith, 39.

³⁵ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 82.

³⁶ In his anthropological analysis of the Arab character and psychology, Raphael Patai’s “The Arab Mind” describes many of these characteristics that Marine advisors identified.

³⁷ Numerous times advisors witnessed beatings of jundi by their officers.

³⁸ The quote above was made in the context of a discussion about the composition of the Iraqi military in which an interviewee gave his perspective of the viewpoint of an Iraqi in a battalion composed of predominately Shia, in an area (Fallujah) populated by predominately Sunni and the inherent tension that should be expected. Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 43.

³⁹ Discussion between author and Lieutenant Colonel

Yaser Aziz, 3rd Battalion, 1st Brigade, Iraqi Intervention Force, 2005.

⁴⁰ US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, 1-19.

⁴¹ Richard Millett, “The Limits of Influence: Training the Guardias in Latin America,” N.d., www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/detoy/detoy281to329.pdf, (20 February 2008) 282.

⁴² Smith, 50.

⁴³ Bickel, 144.

⁴⁴ Carlson, 16.

⁴⁵ Carlson, 10.

⁴⁶ Lejeune Cummins, “Quijote on a Burro: Sandino and the Marines, A Study in the Formulation of Foreign Policy” (Mexico, D.F.: La Impresora Azteca, 1958), 74.

⁴⁷ Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty*, 82.

⁴⁸ Clark, 155.

⁴⁹ Millett, “The Limits of Influence: Training the Guardias in Latin America,” 283.

⁵⁰ Macaulay, “Leading Native Troops”, 34.

⁵¹ Gravatt, 107.

⁵² Robert D. Ramsey, “Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present,” (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press: 2006), <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA456573&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, 29; (2 April 2008).

⁵³ The US Army began, in 2005, training advisory teams at several locations, to include Fort Carson, CO, Fort Hood, TX, and Camp Shelby, MS. In March 2006, US Army Forces Command decided to consolidate transition team training at Fort Riley, KA.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁵ Osterman, 7-8. Note that the officers and men of the New Iraqi Army were supposed to be 21 days on and 7 days off per month, as was custom. But the Iraqis pushed it more toward 20 days and 10 days off, especially in Al-Anbar and it takes travel time to get them back to a safe location for leave. This was one of the most frustrating endeavors for the MiTT members, as securing US transportation for a one quarter of a battalion every 10 days in a combat environment. Helicopters were the means of choice, but extremely difficult to get, and often the movement of the Iraqis to leave resulted in a long convoy, sometimes over fifteen hours in duration.

⁵⁶ Call Report, 9.

⁵⁷ Juan Ayala, “Reflections: Advisor duty is mentally taxing and intensely personal,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2008, 52.

⁵⁸ Robert Massie, "Advice for Advisors," Marine Corps Gazette, July 2007, 43.

⁵⁹ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 15.

⁶⁰ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 15.

⁶¹ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 15.

⁶² Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 70-71.

⁶³ Eric Schmitt, "US Needs More Time to Train and Equip Iraqis," New York Times, May 24, 2004.

⁶⁴ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) 30 November 2006.

⁶⁵ Neimeyer, "US Marine Corps in Nicaragua," 17; Herman H. Hanneken, "A Discussion of the Voluntario Troops in Nicaragua," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1942, 252.

⁶⁶ The author experienced this concern many times. See also the 1stDiv IIF SitRep, 21-22 August 2006 report.

⁶⁷ Malkasian.

⁶⁸ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 45.

⁶⁹ DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p.6. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (30 Apr 2007), 99.

⁷⁰ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 30.

⁷¹ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 31.

⁷² It is interesting to note that in the Victorian experience of raising native constabularies the British

officers in the Indian Army were expected to learn to speak the languages of their men, who tended to be recruited from primarily Hindi speaking areas.

⁷³ Erich H. Wagner, "After Action Report AA from 3/1/1 IIF MTT", February 2006, 2.

⁷⁴ Brian G. Cillessen, "Marine Advisors", Marine Corps Gazette, February, 2007.

⁷⁵ Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty*, 71.

⁷⁶ C.S. Baker, "The Spanish Language and the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1929, 254.

⁷⁷ Baker, 254.

⁷⁸ Ivan Musicant, "The Banana Wars: A History of the United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama," New York: Macmillan, 1990, 360. Note, Baker attests to the fact that in 1929, "Marine officers of certain ranks are now required to take a correspondence course in either French or Spanish," 257.

⁷⁹ Baker, 255.

⁸⁰ Baker, 255.

⁸¹ John. A. Daniels, "Don't Plan These Battles," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1941, 20.

⁸² Baker, 255.

⁸³ Michael Schroeder, "Intelligence Capacities of the US Military in the Sandino Rebellion, Las Segovias, Nicaragua, 1927-1932: Successes, Failures, Lessons," <http://www.sandinorebellion.com/mjs/mjs-intel.htm>, (Feb 22, 2008).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ MiTT Team Leader; 7th Division Iraqi Army, interviewed by Mr. Robert Markiewicz, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning Quantico, VA, 19 June 2006.

⁸⁶ Final Report Military Transition Team, Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, (CAOCL), 30 November 2006.

⁸⁷ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 18.

⁸⁸ Massie, 44.

⁸⁹ Task Force 3d Battalion, 3d Marine (TF 3/3) After Action Review for Combat Operations in Iraq (1 Oct 06), 5.

⁹⁰ Call Report, 11.

⁹¹ Carlson, 10. Bickel, 170.

- ⁹² Macaulay, "Leading Native Troops," 35.
- ⁹³ Neill Macaulay, "The Sandino Affair," (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), 174.
- ⁹⁴ H.C. Reisinger, "La Palabra del Gringo! Leadership of the Nicaraguan Nation Guard." Proceedings. February, 1935: 215.
- ⁹⁵ Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty*, 72.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 72, quoting problems as described by the first Marine to serve as Managua's Chief of Police.
- ⁹⁷ DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), "O&I Hearing, The Development of the Iraqi Security Forces," 31.
- ⁹⁸ Millett, "Guardians of the Dynasty," 74. See also Carter Malkasian's "A Thin Blue Line in the Sand" for challenges facing the PiTTs (Police Transition Teams) in Iraq.
- ⁹⁹ Macaulay, "The Sandino Affair," 175.
- ¹⁰⁰ Michael J. Schroeder, email message to author, 5 March 2008.
- ¹⁰¹ Gravatt, 146.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 144.
- ¹⁰³ T.E. Lawrence, "The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence," *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917.
- ¹⁰⁴ Osterman, 10.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ramsey, 123.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁷ Osterman, 45.
- ¹⁰⁸ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 39.
- ¹⁰⁹ Massie, 45.
- ¹¹⁰ Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair*, 174.
- ¹¹¹ Osterman, 19.
- ¹¹² "It looks like years, not months, will be the measure of progress." Lt. Gen. James Dubik, chief trainer, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, said "Iraqi defense officials do not expect to take over internal security until as late as 2012, and will not be able to defend Iraq's borders until 2018." Charles J. Hanley, "Clashes highlight Iraq army's woes: Self-sufficiency as distant as ever in war's 6th year; 2008 dropped as target," *Associated Press*, 30 March 2008.
- ¹¹³ US Marine Corps, "Send in the Marines, A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept To Meet An Uncertain Security Environment: Long War Information Packet," 2008, 24.
- ¹¹⁴ See Kirsten A. Holmstead, "II MEF Marines Go To War Armed with Arabic," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (March 2005) and Barbara Ferguson, "US Marines Arming Themselves With Arabic," *Arab News*, (29 December 2004). For thoughtful and insightful recommendations and discussion on the language issue, see Military Transition Team, Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division's Final Report for 30 Sep 2006.
- ¹¹⁵ US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, 12-23.
- ¹¹⁶ Ford C. Phillips, interview with Chris Wilk, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 9 May 2007.
- ¹¹⁷ Robert D. Ramsey, "Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador," *Global War of Terrorism Occasional Paper 18* (Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 114.
- ¹¹⁸ Unidentified advisor, Military Transition Team Iraqi Army 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), 30 November 2006, 65.
- ¹¹⁹ MiTT Team Leader; 7th Division Iraqi Army, interviewed by Mr. Robert Markiewicz, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning Quantico, VA, 19 June 2006.
- ¹²⁰ Macaulay, "Leading Foreign Troops," 34.
- ¹²¹ Robert Cassidy, "Regular and Irregular Indigenous Forces for a Long Irregular War," *RUSI 152*, no. 1, (2007): 47.

Command Senior Enlisted Leaders in Asia-Pacific Work to Strengthen US Joint Operations and Partner Nation Militaries

Phillip L. Wirtz, Joint Center for Operational Analysis

In June 2004, SgtMaj Bill Kinney became US Pacific Command's (USPACOM) first command senior enlisted leader (CSEL).¹ In his earliest days on the job, there was no formal welcome at USPACOM's Hawaii headquarters—no office, no computer, and no phone. As the command group's sole enlisted member, he was to advise the four-star commander on all enlisted matters for an area that covers more than half of the earth's surface, and includes the six largest armed forces in the world.² However, no one in the command knew much about what his role would be, much less what a typical Marine sergeant major did.

Until November 2002, in 28 years of service, Kinney had never met an Army command sergeant major or Air Force command chief master sergeant. Only after deploying with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to Kuwait in the buildup to the Iraq invasion would he come to know and rely on a joint team of senior enlisted leaders to accomplish a mission.

During that time, the Marine Corps' resupply chain struggled to keep up with the demand for tracked and light armored vehicles. Since the Army had ample experience in deploying and sustaining high levels of equipment, SgtMaj Kinney approached Coalition Forces Land Component Command Sergeant Major (CSM) John Sparks for assistance. CSM Sparks in turn used his connections to help Kinney and the Corps coordinate a better supply chain.

Kinney's joint and combined³ experiences in Iraq gave him an edge for his selection as USPACOM CSEL. Even after securing the position, though, he did not know exactly what his role would be. So upon arrival, Kinney immediately started writing his own job description.⁴ USPACOM ADM Thomas Fargo approved it, and the sergeant major began "advertising" the CSEL position to the rest of the USPACOM staff. He needed their support more than they needed his.

SgtMaj Kinney spread the word first within USPACOM headquarters, setting up in-calls with staff members. Although his exposure to combatant commands was

limited, he did have the benefit of being a "soldier of the sea" in the historically Navy-centric USPACOM headquarters, with past experience working directly with Navy senior petty officers.

Next, Kinney focused outward to the command's vast area of responsibility (AOR) to establish a chain of communication with USPACOM's Service component, subordinate unified command, and joint task force (JTF) senior enlisted leaders. He again started by clarifying his role and explaining its benefit to the unified joint effort. As the senior enlisted leaders learned about their relation to the new USPACOM CSEL, Kinney discovered just how complex and many their responsibilities were.

Managing Multiple Responsibilities in USPACOM's Service Components, Subunified Commands, and Joint Task Forces

Like other combatant commands, USPACOM has four Service components: US Army Pacific, US Marine Forces Pacific, US Pacific Fleet, and US Pacific Air Forces. Under these four components are 11 Service subcomponents.

USPACOM has four subunified commands—US Forces, Japan; US Forces, Korea; Special Operations Command Pacific; and Alaskan Command. Each of these commands has one or more Service components.

Finally, there are various JTFs and other supporting units, including JTF-510 (crisis response/rapid deployment), Joint Interagency Task Force–West, Joint POW/MIA [Prisoners of War/Missing in Action] Accounting Command, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, and Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Studies.

Before coming to USPACOM, Kinney attended Keystone, the residence course for new CSEs now cosponsored by National Defense University and US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Although he had learned much about the joint environment, he found USPACOM operational structures to be very different

from those often highlighted in US Central Command's (USCENTCOM) AOR.

First, most USPACOM JTFs are not “enduring” but rather are meant to be stood up in a moment's notice for a variety of contingencies, including crisis response, humanitarian assistance, and homeland defense. One example is JTF-536 (later designated Combined Support Force-536), which USPACOM built around the core of III MEF and sent to Thailand in response to the December 2004 tsunami.⁵

Another key difference from USCENTCOM is that senior enlisted leaders of USPACOM's Service components, subunified commands, and JTFs, like their commanders, wear at least two “hats”—one for their Service and one or more for joint organizations.

For example, one can look at Robert Moore, Command Chief Master Sergeant (CCMSgt) of the Eleventh Air Force, to get an idea of these multiple roles and their demands.⁶ Under USPACOM, CCMSgt Moore is CSEL of Alaskan Command, which prepares military forces for theater and expedites deployment of forces from and through Alaska. Within Alaskan Command, JTF-Alaska serves to protect critical infrastructure and coordinates military assistance to civil authorities. Even though JTF-Alaska is part of USPACOM's Alaskan Command, it is operationally controlled by US Northern Command because of its focus on homeland defense. In addition, Moore is the Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Regional CSEL.

So Moore supports a numbered air force, two combatant commands, and a binational command (NORAD), whose chain of command includes not only the President of the United States but also Canada's prime minister. The command chief also coordinates with two US Coast Guard districts attached to JTF-Alaska.

Another example of a USPACOM senior enlisted leader with many roles beyond “organize, train, and equip” is CSM Barry Wheeler. Succeeded by CSM Robert Winzenreid in February 2008, Wheeler was the CSEL of US Forces Korea (USFK), as well as Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command.⁷ His Service role was the Command Sergeant Major of the Eighth Army. However, the Commander of the Eighth Army

is the *deputy commander* of USFK. Thus, Wheeler worked directly for two commanders of USFK.

As Combined Forces Command CSEL, Wheeler assisted in developing the Republic of Korea (ROK) noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. With the US-ROK alliance being strong and mature, and the ROK armed forces fully supportive of enlisted corps professionalism, Wheeler focused most of his effort on ROK's NCO professional development courses. Overall, the distribution of Wheeler's time depended on demand—that is, a majority of his time was committed



SgtMaj Kinney meets with the senior enlisted leader of the Republic of Korea armed forces to promote international enlisted leadership development.

to the Eighth Army because Eighth Army Soldiers made up more than three-quarters of the assigned forces in Korea.

Partnering with Other Nations' Enlisted Forces

As PACOM CSEL, SgtMaj Kinney focused much of his effort on establishing relationships with other militaries in USPACOM's AOR through the development of the Partner Nations Enlisted Leadership Development program. He was the command's representative to those Asian-Pacific countries requesting assistance in developing enlisted personnel.

In this capacity, for example, when the USPACOM commander⁸ traveled to meet with India's Minister of Defense, Kinney would attend those meetings as well.

His presence proved significant if the commander raised an enlisted issue. The rest of the time, the sergeant major would detach from the staff and visit with that country's senior enlisted leaders, seeing what technical and leadership issues they had, and finding out how the US military could help.

The program's efforts received crucial recognition when enlisted leadership development language was incorporated into the Defense Security Cooperation Guidance. This new emphasis on enlisted capacity-building not only helps grow trust and cooperation in the region but also directs Service members to work with other US Services and government departments in carrying out the nation's strategic objectives.⁹

A New PACOM CSEL Arrives

Today, the USPACOM CSEL position has strengthened its roots and continues to demonstrate its relevancy and importance to the command. In June 2007, retiring SgtMaj Kinney was replaced by CCMSgt Jim Roy.

Having served many tours in the Pacific, and just prior as the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) CSEL, Roy was well positioned to step into the strategic USPACOM role.¹⁰

Because the command's AOR is so vast, and its headquarters far from the continental United States, traveling takes up a large part of the USPACOM CSEL's schedule. In response to this demand, USPACOM added a senior enlisted leader to focus internally on the headquarters. This frees Roy to circulate the USPACOM AOR while allowing the new E-9, currently an Army sergeant major, to focus on such issues as joint enlisted education and training within USPACOM. Both Roy and the headquarters sergeant major attend staff meetings and work directly with the commander, deputy commander, and chief of staff. The two senior enlisted leaders coordinate daily to cover the widest view of enlisted operations and provide the best information to the command group.¹¹

When in the AOR, Roy takes the opportunity to clarify the commander's intent to the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen at the tactical level. He explains how the troops are relevant to the theater and, in turn, how issues such as international security assistance and cooperation at operational and strategic levels affect their local missions.

Roy continues the partnership program and builds on his experience with USFJ, during which time, for example, the subunified command assisted the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force in establishing a command sergeants major program. The command chief helps to further the partnerships with such nations as Singapore and the Philippines. At the same time, he engages with nontraditional partners, such as the People's Liberation Army of China, in an effort to further diplomacy and promote transparency. In June 2008, Roy and a delegation of senior enlisted leaders representing all the Services visited with Chinese NCOs for five days; this fall, USPACOM will host a reciprocal visit.¹²



CCMSgt Roy is welcomed by the 179th Infantry, People's Liberation Army, in Nanjing, China, during his delegation's visit with Chinese NCOs.

SgtMaj (Ret.) Kinney now works as the International NCO/Petty Officer Leadership Development Coordinator for Lockheed Martin's International Training Team. CCMSgt Moore continues to serve with the Eleventh Air Force and Alaskan Command.

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Mr. Phillip Wirtz is a technical writer/editor who teams with the Joint Center for Operational Analysis senior enlisted leader to gather and disseminate interviews for the CSEL Historical Leadership Perspectives Program.

Endnotes:

¹ Information on SgtMaj Kinney comes from his interview with Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) SGM R. Todd Priest, 26 January 2007.

² (1) The People's Republic of China, (2) the United States, (3) Russia, (4) India, (5) North Korea, and (6) South Korea. US Pacific Command, "PACOM Fact Sheet," webpage, <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml>

³ I MEF had a British armor division attached to it.

⁴ SgtMaj Kinney's job description included the following responsibilities:

- Establishing and maintaining lines of communication with the senior enlisted leaders of allied nation's militaries within the USPACOM AOR, as set forth in the theater security cooperation plan (and specifically with countries that play a major role in the Global War on Terrorism).
- Serving as the program manager and champion of the Partner Nations Enlisted Leadership Development program.
- Providing assessments and recommendations to the commander and headquarters staff of USPACOM on the Partner Nations Enlisted Leadership Development strategy and program.
- Maintaining lines of communication with the senior enlisted leaders of the component commands from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and subordinate unified commands.

- Visiting USPACOM service components, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces throughout the AOR on a regular basis and providing feedback from a "boots on the ground" perspective on training and readiness to the commander and headquarters staff of USPACOM.
- Assessing the tactical proficiency of deployed organizations and providing to those units and organizations a CSEL's strategic and operational perspective on crucial capabilities and combat readiness of the enlisted force.
- Communicating with the CSELs of the regional and functional combatant commands.

⁵ US Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "U.S. Military Support to Tsunami Relief Efforts," 28 December 2004, <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8090>.

⁶ Information on CCMSgt Moore comes from his email to the author, 31 October 2007.

⁷ Information on CSM Wheeler comes from his email to the author, 2 November 2007.

⁸ Kinney served under four PACOM commanders (in chronological order): ADM Fargo, ADM William Fallon, Lt Gen Daniel Leaf (acting), and ADM Timothy Keating.

⁹ See, for example, US Navy, US Marine Corps, and US Coast Guard, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, October 2007.

¹⁰ Information on CCMSgt Roy comes from his interview with the author, 8 February 2008.

¹¹ Other combatant commands such as USCENTCOM and US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) have taken similar initiatives.

¹² Jim Garamone, "Enlisted Delegation Visits Chinese Counterparts," American Forces Press Service, 11 July 2008, <http://www.defenselink.mil/News/newsarticle.aspx?id=50476>.

Marine Air Ground Task Force Command and Control and Joint Interoperability: A Portfolio Approach to Delivering Capability to the Warfighter

Marty Westphal, Executive Director for the C2 Integration Division

“Commanders and staffs, small unit leaders, individuals, and automated systems all perform command and control. Some forms of command and control deal with military science, while others involve the employment of military forces, through strategy, operations or tactics. Both are necessary, usually in some combination. The latter, however, is the highest form of command and control. It is at this level that leadership, the human component of command and control, has its fullest play.”
-- *FORCenet: A Functional Concept for Command and Control in the 21st Century*

Command and control (C2) is the union of the art and science of war. C2 integration enables commanders to exert their leadership and influence throughout the battlespace and to assess the outcome of that exertion. Both “command” – the human component - and “control” – the scientific and technical component - must be developed in balance and harmonized to deliver holistic capabilities to the warfighter.

We must resist the temptation and allure of technological advances, and the complexity oft times associated with these, as the sole solution to the “Department’s unified C2 capability.”

Simplicity must be a metric in C2 capability development. By so doing, we will enable commander-centric operations, anytime, anywhere, at every echelon, thus increasing combat capability and mission effectiveness. This objective is only attainable through the collaboration and coordination of joint and service C2 capability development.

The art and science of war ...

C2 is the function that binds all other warfighting functions and enables commanders to extend their influence throughout the battlespace. As a warfighting force, the joint force commander, with Department of

Defense (DOD) assets, possesses unparalleled capability to expend lethal effects. The successful strike against the terrorist al-Zarqawi is an excellent example of our ability to successfully track and hit a high-value target.

The command and control, or decision-making processes, such as adherence to tight rules of engagement, timely estimation of potential collateral damage, and fires coordination, are as critical to mission success as the sensors and weapons that prosecute the attack.

Ultimately, the complete doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) C2 capability supports the commander’s ability to determine and achieve desired effects across the battlespace — throughout the range of military operations.

Joint command and control – JC2

American armed forces have fought within their domains for most of their history. The Army fought on land, the Navy was the sole combatant at sea, and air warfare was born as a component of the ground fight. However, in the two World Wars that dominated the 20th century, it became clear that “deconflicting” service domains was no longer practical to maximize combat strength and effectiveness.

In post World War II conflicts, coordinated operations became the new standard; operations were planned to achieve common objectives across the services. Today, the norm is joint operations. It is unconceivable that a single service would conduct operations independently.

The cost and complexity of warfighting will only continue to increase, particularly as this nation strives to maintain its technological and training superiority. Consequently, joint, interdependent operations represent the only solution and will rely on the integrated operations and support of all the services and multinational partners. Joint integration must start with joint

command and control (JC2) capability determination and prioritization to establish the convergence points for service capability and requirements development, resource allocation, and acquisition.

MAGTF C2

The Marine Corps doctrinally defines command and control as "... the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken." The basic elements of the C2 system are people, information, and the command and control support structure. The Marine Corps' approach to command and control warfighting functional capability development is known as MAGTF C2, or Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control.

The MAGTF is comprised of four main elements: Aviation Combat Element (ACE), Ground Combat Element (GCE), Combat Logistics Element (CLE), and the Command Element (CE). The Supporting Establishment (SE), Marine Corps bases and stations, is also referred to as the fifth MAGTF element. The elements of the MAGTF are similar to the functional elements of a joint task force (JTF).

But the C2 integration of the various elements within the MAGTF posed a challenge. The unique information requirements of each element had to be addressed individually while providing the MAGTF commander the ability to access information from all, as well as that of the supporting establishment across the enterprise.

The initial objective of MAGTF C2 was to "harmonize" the capabilities associated with each MAGTF element to provide "... an end-to-end, fully integrated, cross-functional set of command and control capabilities that include forward deployed as well as reach-back functions" – as directed by the Marine Requirements Oversight Council.

The Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) was given the task of making MAGTF C2 a reality and instituted a capability portfolio management approach to achieve this objective. A four-phased approach was adopted. In the first phase, "critical capabilities" were identified, as well as dependencies to other capabilities. A gap and seam analysis was undertaken using a system of systems approach that examined operational architecture mission threads, future warfighting concepts, and current doctrine. The critical capabilities were then

aligned over time in the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP).

The second phase validated integrated architecture artifacts, using operational, systems and technical views mapping to known and approved joint and coalition, Naval, and other service C2 required capabilities and programs of record.

The third phase entailed developing recommendations and gaining subsequent way ahead approval by senior Marine leadership with follow on preparation of required Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documentation.

The fourth phase involved capability fielding, monitoring, life-cycle maintenance, and assessment. The results of the assessment are then fed back into the process creating an iterative cycle. The cycle would be repeated every two years in coordination with program objective memorandum (POM) development, which would allow adjustments and priority setting by senior leadership based on available resources.

This approach became the basis for Marine C2 capability portfolio management (CPM). MAGTF C2 evolved becoming a strategy to harmonize all aspects of C2 concepts, requirements, training, and doctrine. It became an integrating process to provide governance and resource prioritization for the C2, communications, and networking communities to ensure that the Marine Corps meets the objectives of the strategy across the enterprise.

MAGTF C2 is a system of systems that will provide common, modular, and scalable material solutions from the lowest tactical level across the MAGTF at all echelons with reach-back capability across the enterprise.

MAGTF C2 CPM and Implementation

Capability portfolio management was initiated for POM-08 development in 2006. The purpose of capability portfolio management is to coordinate and synchronize Marine Capability Integration and Development; Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE); and acquisition to deliver a complete DOTMLPF capability to warfighters.

This approach required an examination of all current C2 capabilities under development (including

programs of record under acquisition), from a holistic, end-to-end DOTMLPF perspective. Once the examination was completed, a coordinated strategy and vision had to be developed to guide capability development, harmonize and prioritize efforts, and to address cradle-to-grave issues as legacy systems ended service life and new systems entered.

Organizational changes within the Combat Development Command occurred to support the new approach. Extensive and continual coordination is crucial between the various Marine Corps deputy commandants responsible for advocating for the MAGTF elements; the Marine Corps Systems Command; the Headquarters Marine Corps directorates for intelligence, command and control, communications, and computer systems; and (C4)/chief information officers (CIO) sponsors.

MAGTF command and control harmonization under capability portfolio management covers C2 and communications capabilities and supporting systems required for “control” functionality.

The Marine Corps PPBE process validates and resources leadership decisions relative to implementation. The CPM process also requires monitoring and integration with other systems and capabilities, such as the Net-Enabled Command Capability (NECC), to ensure joint integration, alignment, and convergence.

Ultimately, the primary objective of capability portfolio management is to provide vertical and horizontal DOTMLPF coordination and synchronization across the capability development, budgeting, and acquisition processes, as well as existing legacy programs of record.

The major programs of record that comprise the MAGTF C2 portfolio were defined, approved by Marine leadership, and documented with Marine Corps Systems Command responsibility for acquisition.

Defining programs was needed to coordinate the fielding of new capabilities and retiring legacy programs across the MAGTF, and to determine the development and prioritization of capability sets.

MAGTF C2 CONOPS

The MAGTF C2 concept of operations (CONOPS) documents the C2 capability requirements for the Marine Corps over a seven-year period. The

CONOPS contains the strategic vision for command and control and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration’s C2 intent to enable the synchronization of Marine Corps and DOD capability development, resourcing, and acquisition processes.

The purpose of the MAGTF command and control CONOPS is to provide the methodology and structure for implementing C2 CPM within the Marine Corps to provide the warfighter with scalable, modular reach back as well as a deployed, turnkey C2 solution needed on the battlefield today and into the future. The CONOPS defines the means for the Marine Corps to migrate from the legacy, stove-piped systems that currently support C2 to a holistic solution of people, processes, and technology that support operational needs.

The MAGTF C2 CONOPS describes steps on the path to achieving the MAGTF C2 vision. It contains a “500 Day Plan” to align C2 capability development with the resource process while providing the flexibility to adapt and spiral-in new technologies over the seven-year duration. It lays the foundation for developing and fielding C2 capabilities that will complement the scalable, task-organized nature of the MAGTF and enhance the capabilities of expeditionary maneuver warfare by achieving net-centricity, implementing Naval FORCEnet, and reflecting the principles of the JC2 and net-centric functional concepts, which recognize the importance of collaboration between experts and decision makers across echelons and functions.

The CONOPS recognizes and addresses the foundational approach to warfighting and C2 articulated in the capstone Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP) “Warfighting” and “Command and Control.” Marines accept uncertainty in battle, recognize warfare is a clash of wills between opponents, and that mission orders and an understanding of commander’s intent are critical to mission accomplishment.

The objective of Marine C2 development is to “unleash the initiative and aggressiveness of subordinates to cope with unforeseen problems and exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities...at its fundamental level, Marine command and control leverages technology to provide increased agility and faster more effective decision making.”

MAGTF C2 CPM Implementation

- Covers C2 Communications Capabilities and Systems

- Validated and resourced by the Marine Corps PPBE process
- Approved by Warfighting Investment Program Evaluation Board (PEB)
- Requires monitoring and integration with other systems and capabilities
 - Programs of record validated and resourced across other PEBs
 - Ensure joint integration, alignment, and convergence
- Approximately 50 plus programs of record funded in the FYDP
 - Capability sets (CAPSETS) with required end-to-end components
 - Identified from the various families of systems

MAGTF C2 Integrated Capabilities

The MAGTF combat operations center is the focal point of C2 capability and a priority for capability portfolio management. In accordance with the MAGTF C2 CONOPS, “all MAGTF combat operation centers (COC) will possess a ‘common’ command and control and communication systems infrastructure.”

Individual commanders will still have the ability to configure and display information within their individual COCs to support their decision-making processes. However, the infrastructure, built upon common, modular, interoperable, and scalable components will not change across the command, ground combat, aviation combat, and logistics combat elements of the MAGTF.

Also key are common procedures based on comprehensive, robust individual and unit training. CAPSETS were developed to deliver integrated MAGTF C2 capabilities across MAGTF echelons. A capability set is defined as a grouping of services or capabilities into an operational set of capabilities that is required to support the organizational structure of the MAGTF. It is a “fieldable” increment of capabilities that supports one or more organizational nodes or operational facilities.

MAGTF C2 CAPSETS address the need to support the operational command and control requirements specific to the expeditionary needs of the MAGTF. They represent the primary method to provide an end-to-end, fieldable capability that is tailored to a specific organizational node within the MAGTF, including

specific functional requirements. The following is a more detailed explanation of CAPSETS.

- CAPSET I is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)-level combat operation center, or I MEF COC used during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
- CAPSET II is the MEF’s major subordinate command-level (MSC-level) COC, such as the Marine Aircraft Wing.
- CAPSET III is the regimental, air group, and logistic group-level COC.
- CAPSET IV is the battalion and squadron-level COC.
- CAPSET V is the term for C2 requirements below the battalion and squadron-level COC and represents the integration of requirements down to the individual Marine.

Common, modular and scalable CAPSETS will alleviate the need for continual training on disparate systems, as well as reducing maintenance, repair, and replacement part costs; and supports the ability to “fix forward.” CAPSETS provide a simplified, intuitive user interface to decrease the training required on the system. Training and Education Command (TECOM), the Marine Corps schoolhouse, will receive CAPSETS so that Marines are trained, capable, and confident in the C2 environment before going to the operating forces.

Lessons learned from CAPSETS in theater now enable spiral-in DOTMLPF improvements gleaned from the Marines in combat with an emphasis on enhancing CAPSETS capabilities while reducing training requirements. CAPSETS under development are being designed to be deployable at and from the sea for use by Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU).

What MAGTF C2 Will Deliver

MAGTF command and control is not about technology, it is about supporting commanders and decision makers melding the art and science of C2. War remains a human challenge requiring human solutions. MAGTF C2 is command-centric and focuses on the warfighters serving their information needs in support of decision-making across all MAGTF elements. MAGTF C2 provides capabilities founded on approved joint and Marine Corps warfighting concepts and doctrine, enabled by operational architectures.

MAGTF C2 identifies and connects Marine-unique and specific warfighting capabilities and requirements to Naval and joint initiatives and charts a path to a Marine net-centric capability in the future that is “born joint.”

MAGTF C2 capabilities will:

- Link people and information
- Be integrated with joint and coalition forces
- Allow dispersed forces to coordinate all warfighting functions
- Facilitate decentralized decision-making
- Enhance situational awareness at all echelons
- Provide access to theater and national assets
- Provide ability to disseminate information throughout the force and with mission partners
- Support integrated collaborative planning efforts
- Function in any environment – afloat, ashore, or on the move

MAGTF C2 Endstate: “A born Joint, common, scalable, modular MAGTF C2 capability, seamlessly employable on the land and at sea, that enhances the lethality and effectiveness of the MAGTF across the range of military operations through better decision-making, collaboration, and shared understanding.”

Achieving these MAGTF C2 capabilities requires a strong partnership with the designated Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager (JC2 CPM), U.S. Joint Forces Command.

There are many challenges to realizing MAGTF C2. The JC2 CPM, by addressing C2 challenges common to the entire joint force, including information assurance, data strategy implementation, service oriented architecture (SOA) and net-centric services development, and interoperability with our allies, coalition, and agency partners, will lend support to MAGTF C2 development.

Joint command and control developers must also consider the human dimension of conflict, examine and develop nontechnical approaches and solutions as vigorously and aggressively as technological solutions, and “red team” all potential solution sets by constantly scrutinizing and examining vulnerabilities from a joint force perspective.

“The Department must develop a unified C2 capability that can integrate selected information, allowing decision makers at all levels to act in a timely

manner...” – Defense Strategic Planning Guidance for FY 2006-2011

By so doing, JC2 capabilities portfolio management enables the services to focus on addressing those unique requirements associated with tactical engagements at the edge, such as enabling integrated communications and situational awareness to the squad, thus freeing small unit leaders and Marines to more effectively “shoot, move, and communicate.”

The ultimate objective of MAGTF C2 is to provide a holistic, end-to-end, turnkey command and control capability to execute commander’s intent, facilitate implicit communications, visualize battlespace “reality,” promote initiative, enable centralized command and decentralized control, and ultimately accomplish the mission while proliferating decision-makers throughout the battlespace.

Marine Corps Combat Development Command
www.mccdc.usmc.mil

For more information, contact Mr. Marty Westphal, executive director for the C2 Integration Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. He can be reached at marty.westphal@usmc.mil.

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THE CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF MILITARY CHAPLAINS: ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION¹

Colonel (MD) Martin Hershkowitz
Chaplain [Captain (MD)] Chesky Tenenbaum

THE CHAPLAIN

The Office of the Chief Chaplain of the U.S. Army has published the mission of the military chaplain to be:

Provide Religious support to America's Army across the full spectrum of operations. We do this by assisting the Commander in ensuring the right to free exercise of religion and by providing spiritual, moral, and ethical leadership for the Army

Requirements to become a Chaplain are not complex for a minister of a recognized denomination or faith group (ULC Seminary, 2005):

- You must obtain an ecclesiastical endorsement from your faith group. This endorsement should certify that you are:
 - a. A clergy person in your denomination or faith group.
 - b. Qualified spiritually, morally, intellectually and emotionally to serve as a Chaplain in the Army.
 - c. Sensitive to religious pluralism and able to provide for the free exercise of religion by all military personnel, their family members and civilians who work for the Army.
- Educationally, you must:
 - a. Possess a baccalaureate degree of not less than 120 semester hours.
 - b. Possess a master's degree in divinity or a graduate degree in theological studies, which includes at least 72 hours.
 - Be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.
 - Be able to receive a favorable background check.
 - Pass a physical exam.

In addition to conducting services, they provide personal counseling, lead suicide prevention and

post-traumatic stress group seminars and take the lead as cultural educator (The Associated Press, 2007). Chaplain (Captain) Paul Douglas said that even non-religious soldiers sought him out for counseling and to serve as their advocate in dealing with superiors.

THE CHAPLAIN SHORTAGE

The military is currently experiencing a critical shortage of Chaplains both in deployed units and in the Reserve Forces at home. According to Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Randall Dolinger, spokesman for the Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains, the military is short by about 520 chaplains, with 80 Regular Army vacancies and 440 openings in the National Guard (NG) and Reserves (Altamirano, 2007; Groening, 2007). He further states that the Army NG shortage is at 40-percent of their manning requirements (Syed, 2007; News as History, 2006). With more NG units being deployed, the shortage of NG Chaplains will become more critical (The Associated Press, 2007).

Further complicating matters, when a minister contemplates becoming a NG or Reserve chaplain, a different form of problem exists. This minister becomes a part time chaplain while remaining a full time civilian minister. In effect, the chaplain now has two congregations. Chaplain Dolinger points out that NG Chaplain candidates are told that they only need to serve one weekend a month, but "...ministers are usually pretty busy then — that's prime time. You can guarantee if a person comes into the reserves, in time they're going to be deployed" (Altamirano, 2007).

Although there is nothing in the literature to substantiate this, when a NG unit is deployed

their command activates as many chaplains as they can to ensure that most units in the field have access to a chaplain. According to Lieutenant Colonel Maginnis “When we send a unit to Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere in the world, we like to have at the battalion level ... at least one chaplain.” (Groening, 2007). In effect, this further reduces the number of chaplains remaining to minister to nondeployed units and family members. Maginnis further notes that to compensate for this “... we have local pastors that are serving as chaplains for units that are National Guard or Reserves from their local area...”

THE JEWISH CHAPLAIN SHORTAGE

The Jewish Chaplain shortage in the military seems to be at least as severe as that for the general military chaplain force, perhaps greater (Temple Emanuel, Beaumont, TX., 2005).² One group of rabbis who would be willing to serve are from the Chassidic (i.e., Pious) Jewish community; however, they cannot due to U.S. Army grooming regulations prohibiting facial hair (*Army Study Guide*, 2005).

The only known exceptions to this grooming standard are Chaplain (Colonel) Jacob Goldstein (Goldstein, 2007; Popper, 2005) and Colonel Gopal Khalsa (Khalsa, 2007), both in the U.S. Army Reserve. Under provisions of Army Regulation 600-20 (*Army Study Guide*, 2005) exceptions based on religious practices that were given to soldiers in or prior to 1 January 1986 remain in effect as long as the soldier remains otherwise qualified for retention.

The Chabad-Lubavitch Rabbi

Can the Chabad-Lubavitch Rabbi function as a Jewish Chaplain?

The Chabad-Lubavitch is a philosophy, a movement, and an organization.

Lubavitch means the “city of brotherly love.” The word “Chabad” is a Hebrew acronym for the three

intellectual faculties of: Chachmah - Wisdom; Binah - Comprehension; and Da’at - Knowledge. The movement’s system of Jewish religious philosophy teaches understanding and recognition of the Creator, the role and purpose of Creation, and the importance and unique mission of each Creature. This philosophy guides its members to refine and govern his and her every act and feeling through wisdom, comprehension and knowledge derived from the study of Torah.

Within the Lubavitch community the Rabbi of a Chabad Center and his wife hold the titles of “Shliach” and “Shlucha.” Where they serve, they bring with them certain qualities vitally essential to the mission: friendliness, affection, compassion, tolerance, self-sacrifice, utter devotion and selfless dedication. The Shliach of Chabad does not insist, he suggests; he does not criticize, he encourages; he does not preach down at people, he acts as a genuine equal and friend. Armed with these, as a Jewish Chaplain, he can immediately begin the work of providing spiritual and social support to the soldiers in his charge and, if needed, their families.

As a Jewish Chaplain the Chassidic Rabbi is prepared to:

- Conduct services for all Jewish military personnel assigned to his unit.
- Facilitate denominational and area religious services.
- Provide pastoral care and counseling for all soldiers and their families, if requested; such support is not based on religious dogma, it is driven by the heart.
- Perform hospital and home visits, as needed, for both the soldiers and their families.
- Serve as an advisor to the Commander on religious issues, morale and welfare, moral and ethical issues, and indigenous religions.
- Perform memorial services for all soldiers.
- Provide religious instruction for Jewish soldiers, each according to his or her need.

A POTENTIAL SOLUTION FOR THE JEWISH CHAPLAIN SHORTAGE

The goal is to convince the U.S. Army to provide waivers for beards worn by clergy who are required by religious law and custom to retain their beards. This is not likely to happen simply by urging it on Army Command. What is needed is an approach within the military that demonstrates the value of a Chassidic Rabbi being commissioned and serving as a Chaplain. This approach should be applied in both directions, “bottom-up” as well as “top-down.” How then to maximize awareness of this potential in order to enhance the ranks of the military chaplaincy?

An Experiment

At the lowest level of the military echelon is the State Defense Force³ (SDF), a volunteer, unpaid military unit reporting to the Governor. The SDF reports to its Governor through the state Adjutant General and is authorized under United States Code Title 32 (32 U.S.C., § 109., 1955). The Governor may mobilize the SDF; however, it cannot be federalized, as occurs regularly with the NG. In most states that have a SDF unit (typically a brigade or division) it is a member of the State Military Department. The principal mission of the SDF is to support its NG and, when the NG is deployed, to assist in performing the NG’s homeland security mission, which includes mitigation of natural and manmade disasters. At present there are 22 SDF units (SGAUS, n.d.) plus three states that are in the process of seeking authorization to establish a SDF.

Although the SDF follows military rules and guidance, the leadership of many SDF units realize that it may necessary to provide an occasional waiver to those rules and guidance in order to accomplish their mission(s). The SDF also suffers from the shortage of Chaplains and to further complicate the situation they are often asked to provide temporary additional duty (TAD) to a SDF Chaplain in support of a NG unit in home quarters that no longer has one available due to a transfer

of their chaplain to a deploying unit (Groening, 2007).

These conditions led to an experiment, an example of the “bottom-up” approach, wherein the Maryland SDF (MDDF) was asked to consider commissioning as a chaplain Rabbi Chesky Tenenbaum, a Rabbi of the Chabad Lubavitch of Upper Montgomery County, Maryland. Chaplain [(Lieutenant Colonel (MD))] Charles Nalls, Command Chaplain of the MDDF expressed an interest in the possibility (Nalls, 2007). He consulted with Chaplain (Colonel) William Lee, Command Chaplain of the Maryland National Guard Joint Force Headquarters who agreed that a Jewish Chaplain would be desirable and that the MDNG could benefit by the chaplain being placed on TAD with some of its units. A decision was made to proceed and the interviewing and vetting process was initiated. The result was positive and Chaplain Nalls requested a waiver to the grooming standards to permit Rabbi Tenenbaum to be commissioned with his beard.

On 26 November 2007, Rabbi Tenenbaum was commissioned as Chaplain [(Captain (MD))] Chesky Tenenbaum into the MDDF (Hershkowitz, 2007; Greenberg, 2007; Kresge, 2007; Montes, 2007; Zaklikowski, 2007). This appointment is unique as it is the very first throughout the SDF. The experiment was a success.

Expanding the Experiment into a Program

The authors discussed the possibility of expanding the successful experiment to other SDF units around the country by capitalizing on the MDDF’s move to commission the first Chassidic Rabbi as a SDF Chaplain (Tenenbaum, 2007). The decision was to contact the Aleph-Institute, a Lubavitch Chabad affiliated national 501(c)(3) organization committed to providing spiritual and social guidance for individuals who are separated from family and friends, with the following missions (Aleph Institute, n.d.):

Providing critical social services to families in crisis

Addressing the pressing religious, educational, humanitarian and advocacy needs of individuals in institutional environments

Implementing solutions to significant issues relating to our criminal justice system, with an emphasis on families, faith-based rehabilitation and preventive ethics education.

In addition to these missions the Aleph Institute also has been recognized as an official Ecclesiastical Endorsing Agency by the U.S. Department of Defense to endorse Jewish Chaplains for the military (The Aleph Report, n.d.; Popper, 2006).

Rabbi Menachem Katz, Director of Programs for the Aleph Institute, concurred that the SDF Chaplain initiative would be of interest to the Institute and would support the effort to supply Jewish Chaplains to SDF units (Katz, 2007). Chaplain (Colonel) Sanford Dresin (USA-Ret), appointed Director of the Aleph Institute's Military Programs and Ecclesiastical Endorsing Agent in January 2006, would lead their part of the effort.

Next Steps

The following SDF units were selected for the next phase: California, Georgia, New York, Texas and Washington State. Following discussions with key individuals in each SDF unit all decided to pursue obtaining a Jewish Chaplain in the same manner as the MDDF. Given how many chaplains were desired and in what cities, the Aleph Institute prepared a list of Chabad Lubavitch Rabbis interested in performing community service in a military environment and had each rabbi contact the designated SDF point of contact to initiate the process in that state. The results to this date are:

- Georgia State Defense Force (GSDF), following the MDDF decision, held a swearing-in ceremony for Rabbi S. Zalman Lipskier on 2 December 2007, to be commissioned Chaplain [(Captain (GA))] upon completion of an officer's indoctrination course, which took place on 2 March 2008 (Sherman, 2008). The GSDF Commanding General, Brigadier General (GA) Michael McGuinn, personally conducted the recruitment and the state Adjutant General, Major General William Nesbitt granted the waiver to the grooming standard. General McGuinn has requested another candidate.
- Maryland Defense Force (MDDF) is interviewing a second Chassidic Rabbi as a candidate for a Chaplain's post.
- New York Guard (NYG) has vetted one Jewish Chaplain and has requested another candidate.
- Washington State Guard (WASG) has interviewed four Chassidic Rabbi candidates thus far and plans to continue until they get at least one candidate to commission.
- Texas State Guard (TXSG) has asked for up to four candidates to begin the interview process.
- California State Military Reserve (CASMR) is looking into the potential for commissioning a Jewish Chaplain.
- Learning about Maryland's and Georgia's decision to commission a Chassidic Rabbi and that other SDF units are in the process convinced the South Carolina State Guard (SCSG) to consider following their lead and has requested at least one candidate.
- Members of the Ohio Military Reserve (OHMR), Alaska State Defense Force and Alabama State Defense Force have suggested that their Command Chaplains learn about this potential for increasing their staff of Chaplains.

Clearly, America's SDF units have a need for Jewish Chaplains. In those states where the NG seeks their SDF's support, a TAD of a SDF Chaplain to their NG helps to satisfy the non-deployed NG's shortage of chaplains. It would not be a surprise to successfully complete this Program with most of the nation's SDF units having at least one Jewish Chaplain with a beard.

Plans For The Future

Assume that the success of the Program leads to many NG Brigades taking advantage of the availability of SDF bearded Jewish Chaplains to assist in resolving, at least in part, their shortage of Jewish Chaplains. The next step should be to petition the National Guard Bureau to consider a revised policy to permit a waiver of the facial hair grooming standard. Such a decision would also be welcomed by religious leaders of other groups, such as Moslems and Sikhs, who are also prevented from serving due to the facial hair grooming standard.

The U.S. Army Reserve offers another target of value, especially so since two senior officers currently serve with facial hair waivers, Chaplain (Colonel) Goldstein and Colonel Khalsa.

The SDF, in the past, had been resistant to bringing bearded Rabbis into their ranks. The need has finally overcome the concern, leading to Command waivers to permit Rabbis with beards to serve as Chaplains. There are already two such waivers in effect and seven more in some stage of the process. Likewise, some NG Brigades will now see bearded chaplains courtesy of their SDF unit. Hard work and the future will tell the story.

Endnotes:

¹ The authors are indebted to Chaplain (Colonel) Sanford Dresin (USA-Ret), Director of Military Programs for the Aleph Institute for advice and guidance on preparing this article.

² One of the authors remembers that in North Africa a Jewish Chaplain had to be flown in from Germany to conduct High Holy Day services (one for the New Year service and another for the Day of Atonement service). Although a local rabbi was authorized, few were competent in conversational English and their prayer books were in Hebrew, with French and Arabic translation.

³ According to the dictates of the state legislature, the State Defense Force may be otherwise named the State Guard, the State Military Reserve or the

State Guard Reserve; however, all are the same although their missions may differ in accordance with the vulnerability of the state to natural or manmade disasters.

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United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)

JCOA Products Summary

This is a list and description of JCOA products. All are, or soon will be, available on SIPRNET at <http://www.jfcom.smil.mil/jcoa>. Although some of the products listed below are classified, all of the descriptions herein are unclassified.

HOMELAND DEFENSE PRODUCTS

Hurricane Katrina National Response to Catastrophic Event –Applied Lessons for Consequence Management (2006)

The report and briefing focus on the national response to Hurricane Katrina by local, state, and federal agencies during the month between the storm's formation in the Atlantic Ocean and the post-hurricane stabilization of conditions in the Gulf Coast region. The report concentrates on response – as opposed to disaster mitigation or recovery – because the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in coping with domestic disasters lies primarily in providing civil authorities with response capabilities, not in providing assets for long-term recovery. This product is unclassified – For Official Use Only (FOUO).

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) –Applying the Lessons of Hurricane Katrina (2007)

A follow-on to the Hurricane Katrina report, this study develops a framework for analyzing incident management and highlights challenges that affect the level of unmet requirements in a catastrophe. It illustrates ways in which post-Katrina improvements can close the response gap. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

National Response to Biological Contagion: Lessons from Pandemic Planning (2006)

Future biotechnology advancements will make it easier for a wide range of adversaries – including terrorist organizations – to launch a biological attack. This product studies biological incidents and examines USNORTHCOM's role as the Global Synchronizer for Pandemic Influenza planning. The study goes beyond the example of Pandemic Influenza to inform decision makers and planners to help mitigate the effects of pandemic or similar biological threats. It identifies gaps and shortfalls in DOD's participation in the nation's preparation and response to a significant pandemic. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

HUMANATARIAN ASSISTANCE/ DISASTER RELIEF PRODUCTS

International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Operations - Annotated Brief (2007)

The HADR study analyzes four major Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief events: the Haiti Peacekeeping mission (2004), the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), the Pakistan Earthquake (2005), and the Guatemala Mudslides (2005). Analysis of these events revealed a number of common enabling capabilities that were critical for success in a HADR response. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Operation SECURE TOMORROW (Haiti) 5 March- 30 June 2004 (2005)

This study focuses on issues that concerned US Southern Command, Combined Joint Task Force-Haiti, and their staffs as US-led multinational forces

conducted a transition of military responsibility to the United Nations. The report describes these issues along with others developed through follow-on analyses of data and observations. It catalogs the team's important findings, places those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address shortcomings. This product is classified.

***GUATEMALA Disaster Relief
- US Response to Hurricane
Stan, Oct 2005 (2006)***

In October 2005 a team of JCOA observers, in conjunction with USSOUTHCOM, conducted a study of Joint Task Force (JTF)-Bravo's quick response in the initial phase of helping the Guatemalan government deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Stan. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

***Humanitarian Assistance - Disaster
Relief in Pakistan (2006)***

In October 2005 a devastating earthquake caused widespread destruction in northern Pakistan and adjacent areas. In response, USCENTCOM designated Expeditionary Support Group One as the Combined Disaster Assistance Command – Pakistan to assist the Pakistani government in recovery efforts. A team from JCOA observed and detailed the effectiveness of US forces in accomplishing the mission and strengthening the strategic ties which bind Pakistan and the US in the global war on terror. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

**OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM PRODUCTS**

Joint Tactical Environment (JTE) (2008)

The JTE study originated from a request by Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I) to USJFCOM to document the innovation in Iraq between air-weapons teams and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) during operations in Sadr City, Iraq. That task expanded to include other urban areas in Iraq and the critical command and control and airspace operations in those urban environments. Ultimately, the JTE mission documented innovation and best practices involving the integration of joint capabilities in urban operations. Specifically, the study was tasked to address four main pillars: command and control (C2);

fires; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and airspace from the joint perspective in an effort to better understand how units in environments such as Sadr City, Basrah, Mosul, and others, employed joint or non-organic capabilities for their specific operational environment. This product is classified.

***Iraq, March 2003 to May 2003:
Joint Combined Combat
Operations (JCCO) (2004)***

This study compiles operational insights gathered during major combat operations and assesses their impact on future joint warfighting at the operational level. It catalogs important findings, puts those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address them. This product is classified.

***OIF, May 2003 to June 2004:
Stabilization, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency
(SSTR) [Combined] (2006)***

The Joint Staff and JCOA collected lessons during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Each evaluated SSTR operations from the end of JCCO in May 2003 until the transition to Iraqi sovereignty on 28 June 2004. This publication combines the two efforts to allow the reader to review them in a single document, if desired. This product is classified.

***Transition to Sovereignty, June
2004 to December 2005, Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM (2007)***

This study examines OIF from June 2004 to December 2005. This period began when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transferred sovereignty to the newly elected Iraq government. During this period the insurgency gained momentum, as it became apparent that the capabilities of other elements of US Government (USG) could not be brought to bear on the situation because of the deteriorating security situation. This product is classified.

***Mosul Ops Intel Fusion [A Team
Approach: TF-Freedom] (2007)***

This is the story of Task Force (TF)-Freedom and how teamwork between those conducting operations and

those providing intelligence led to success. Task Force Freedom adapted to a severely degraded security situation by developing a streamlined targeting cycle, lowering the threshold of actionable intelligence, and enabling distributed execution –underpinned by shared awareness and purpose. This product is classified.

Emerging Solutions: Al Anbar Best Practice Study (2007)

This study examines how Al Anbar changed dramatically between autumn 2006 and spring 2007, from one of the most violent, anti-coalition insurgent strongholds to one where local tribal leaders partnered with coalition forces in an effort to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Violence dropped significantly. Reconstruction projects are underway, the economy is resurging, and normalcy is returning. This product is classified.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations (2007)

The COIN study examines the shift in focus from reconstruction operations in 2003 to COIN operations (supported by a “surge” of US troops) in 2007. It focuses on the following areas: 1) evolution of US coalition strategy in Iraq, 2) elements of the latest strategy, and 3) impact of implementation of the latest strategy. This product is available in classified and unclassified versions.

UK and US Friendly Fire in Recent Combat Operations (2006)

The Technical Cooperation Programme - a cooperative venture between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States - Joint Systems and Analysis Group established Action Group 13 on Fratricide Mitigation with an objective, among others, of collaborative sharing of records, analyses, and findings on friendly fire and fratricide. This report presents the results of an event-by-event collaborative comparison of friendly fire records between the UK and the US, covering three recent coalition warfighting operations: Operation DESERT STORM/Granby, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM/Herrick, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Telic. This product is unclassified.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

Communications Architecture and Bandwidth Analyses (2005)

The study characterizes the OIF communications architecture and bandwidth used by USCENTCOM in theatre, including: joint command centers; service component operational and tactical centers; and the last tactical mile, including global reach back. The study covered Joint Combined Combat Operations. It expresses bandwidths in terms of allocated data rate equivalent capacity and performance based on actual usage derived from historical logs. This product is classified.

Lessons-Learned on Modern Irregular Warfare (2005)

This study provides an executive-level lessons learned overview of modern irregular warfare operations. It focuses on the nature of insurgencies and countering insurgencies, while recognizing that terrorism and intimidation are popular tools for insurgents. This product is unclassified.

JCOA – Joint Health Service Operations - Medical Lessons Learned (2005)

The DOD medical community has had great success in the treatment of combat casualties in Iraq. Combat mortality, defined as a measurement of the percentage of all battle casualties that result in death (Killed in Action + Died of Wounds/Total Battle Casualties), is the lowest level in recorded warfare. Despite the success in the reduction of combat mortality among coalition combat casualties, DOD medical treatment facilities still face many difficult challenges. These medical support challenges are examined in the JCOA medical study. The product is classified.

Synchronizing Counter-IED Efforts in Iraq (2005)

This study examines the challenges of synchronizing and coordinating the activities of multiple entities working to counter an adversaries’ use of improvised explosive devices (IED). This product is classified.

Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (CTI) (2008)

MNF-I requested this study to capture, document, and validate ISR best practices and lessons learned to

improve ISR employment in support of COIN targeting in Iraq. JCOA collected data from almost all brigades, some battalions, and selected companies, in addition to higher echelon headquarters. Team members observed operations, conducted interviews, and collected data to document best practices important to success or failure in COIN targeting. While conducting this study it became clear that ISR support to COIN targeting had to be understood in relation to ISR support to the broader spectrum of COIN missions. This product is classified.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) PRODUCTS

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment (2006)

In October 2005, a team from the US Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and JCOA assessed PRT operations in Afghanistan as part of an effort to distill best practices. The goals of the assessment were to: 1) generate lessons to inform greater cooperation and coordination among various USG departments and agencies in conflict and post-conflict settings, 2) determine key lessons to inform the transition of PRTs to Internal Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and 3) analyze the PRT concept and various implementation approaches to determine their applicability to other current and future US peace and stability operations. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

JALLC Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Re-flagging: Lessons Learned from Stage 2 Expansion (2006)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked to: 1) Analyze the relief-in-place of a US PRT – either under NATO control or just prior to NATO assuming the control of the PRT – to another NATO or Non-NATO relieving nation, and 2) Use the PRT located in Herat, Afghanistan, as the case study to identify lessons to improve the relief-in place process. This product is classified.

Combined Security Transition Command –Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Police Reform Challenges (2008)

This study identifies and documents challenges associated with CSTC-A's organizing, training and equipping of the Afghanistan National Police forces and capture lessons learned associated with transitioning security responsibilities from coalition forces to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) during a counterinsurgency. Since April 2005, CSTC-A has been tasked to organize, train, and equip the Afghanistan National Police forces. CSTC-A's mission supports Security Sector Reform for Afghanistan, to counter internal and external threats and, ultimately, ensure the long term success of the Afghan government. This study is classified.

IRAQI PERSPECTIVE PROJECT PRODUCTS

The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) was a Secretary of Defense directed research project, sponsored by JCOA, and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP). This project examined the perspective of the former Iraqi regime's civilian and military leadership on issues of interest to the US military, using information gathered through interviews and reviews of captured documents. The goal of this project was to determine how US operations were viewed and understood by the enemy. The following products emerged from this project:

Mother of All Battles ((MOAB) Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (2008)

Events in this report on the 'Mother of All Battles,' as Saddam designated the 1991 war, are drawn from primary Iraqi sources, including government documents, videos, audiotapes, maps, and photographs captured by U.S. forces in 2003 from the regime's archives and never intended for outsiders eyes. The report is part of a JCOA research project to examine contemporary warfare from the point of view of the adversary's archives and senior leader interviews. Its purpose is to stimulate thoughtful analyses of currently accepted lessons of the first Gulf War. While not a comprehensive history, this balanced Iraqi perspective of events between 1990 and 1991 takes full advantage of unique access to material. This product is unclassified.

Iraqi Perspectives Project Book (2007)

This book presents a historical analysis of the forces and motivation that drove our opponent's decisions during Phase III (March 2003-May 2003) of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders, and by making extensive use of thousands of official Iraqi documents, it substantively examines Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process, revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insiders' points of view. This product is unclassified.

Toward an Operational-Level Understanding of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Report (2005)

This report is the classified report associated with the *Iraqi Perspectives Project Book*. In addition to providing the Iraqi view of combat operations from early preparation through the collapse of the regime during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, it also presents the Iraqi understanding of our capabilities and their efforts to exploit that understanding. A classified briefing and audio narrative slide show version is also available for this product. This product is classified.

Saddam and the Tribes - Regime Adaptation to Internal Challenges (2007)

This study explores the complex relationship between Saddam's regime and the tribes that lived under it between 1979 and 2003. This product explores the dynamics between tribe and state in dictatorial societies, and the ways in which tribal leadership can impact success or failure of central governance. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Saddam and Terrorism - Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents (2007)

This study uses captured former regime documents to examine the links and motivations behind Saddam Hussein's interactions with regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. This product is classified.

TERRORIST PERSPECTIVE PROJECT PRODUCTS

The Terrorist Perspective Project (TPP) examines the perspectives of the members of Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups which share its theology and world view, on issues of interest to the United States military, using primary source information principally gathered through open source and captured enemy documents. The goal of the project is to better "know the enemy" and to develop insights into enemy weaknesses and potential "Blue" strategies.

The Call to Global Islamic Jihad - The Jihad Manifesto (2008)

US intelligence has identified Abu Musab Al-Suri as the most important theorist of the global Islamic jihad, and considers his manifesto to be the definitive strategic document produced by al Qaida or any jihadi organization in more than a decade. But to Americans, his 1600-page manuscript largely consists of incomprehensible, impenetrable Islamic scholarship. This publication is a distillation of Al-Suri's Call to Global Islamic Resistance. This product is unclassified.

The Terrorist Perspective Project: Strategic and Operational Views of al Qaida and Associated Movements (2008)

This book synthesizes the perspectives of Osama bin Laden and his fellow Salafi jihadists on how to wage war on their enemies. This product is unclassified.

The Canons of Jihad: A Terrorists' Perspective of Warfare and Defeating America (2008)

Noting that the best way to understand Salafi jihadists is to ignore statements they release to the West in favor of examining what they say to each other, this book provides a definitive collection of the writings that intellectually underpin the jihad movement. This product is unclassified.

Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements: Phase 1 (2007)

This project approaches Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) as a movement rather than as a network, and tries to understand whether, and in what ways, its members think above the tactical level. Drawing on the enemy's own words both from open source materials and captured documents, it identifies seams and subjects of concern within the AQAM community. It explores the dichotomy between those members of AQAM who think instrumentally about their war and those who do not, and discuss topics such as the evolution of the enemy's political and military thought, enemy assessments of the United States, their comparative views of their media and our media, and their concerns about attracting people to the movement. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Voices of the Enemy Quotations from Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) (2007)

AQAM have been living in a state of war for more than four decades. Salafi jihadist leaders have developed a powerful narrative of history that appeals to and mobilizes their membership, though this narrative is based on questionable historical interpretations and future assumptions. Their strategists have learned that they will need to have a sound strategy and leaders who will ensure that such strategy is followed. The IDA study team used the enemy's own words from more than 250,000 documents from open and classified sources, including documents captured during OEF and OIF, to illustrate the enemy message for the reader. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements Phase 2 (2007)

This study draws upon words of AQAM found in captured documents and open-source pronouncements to describe a revolutionary movement which does not think of itself as a network. Intellectual leaders of AQAM are very concerned about the status of this movement, believing that the uncoordinated actions of its members repel the very Muslims that they need to attract. They are also concerned that they are losing the war of ideas and are isolated in an overwhelming hostile

media environment. In response, the movement's intellectual leadership engages in a vigorous process of analysis, self-criticism, and adaptation. Unfortunately for them, their ability to implement their adaptive policies is imperfect. This product is classified.

OTHER PRODUCTS

Techno-Guerrilla (2007)

This study explores the evolution of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. The Techno-Guerrilla is an asymmetric force with conventional techniques and capabilities that utilizes open source warfare ("Wiki Warfare") and systems disruption, as it seeks to create a transnational insurgency. The study examines the phenomenon of super-empowerment – which is defined as the point at which a small group of individuals can create social-network disruption to an entire society with global effect, aka the 9/11 Effect. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Super-Empowered Guerrilla (2008)

A follow-on to the JCOA *Techno-Guerrilla* (TG) and *National Response to Biological Contagion* (NRBC), *Super-Empowered Guerrilla* (SEG) examines the development of modern terrorist groups and the changes in the asymmetric threat. Work in *TG* and *NRBC* demonstrated the exponential increase in the operational and destructive capabilities of small terrorist groups. The threat continues to evolve. Alliances between state sponsors, terrorists groups, organized crime, and transnational gangs are expanding. Terrorist groups are becoming more sophisticated in their use of commercially available electronic and modern telecommunications networks. Their influence is spreading across the globe while our focus is on the Middle East. The study evaluates the emerging terrorist threat using a law enforcement model analyzing behavioral resolve, operational practicality, and technical feasibility. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Joint Lessons Learned: Kosovo Lessons Learned Brief (2004)

This is a combined study by NATO JALLC and USJFCOM Joint Center for Lessons Learned on operations in Kosovo and surrounding regions. This product is classified.

9-11 Commission Report/Global War on Terrorism Brief - Compare and Contrast (2005)

This briefing compares the purposes, approaches, and results of the 9-11 Commission Report to JCOA observations. This product is classified.

Second Lebanon War: Applied Lessons Learned (2008)

In 2006 the world watched as Israel responded to the 12 July killing of three Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and the kidnapping of two additional IDF soldiers by fighters of the Islamic Resistance, the military arm of Hizballah. Over the course of the next month, Israel struggled to use military force and diplomacy to achieve the goals set out by Prime Minister Olmert. When Israel did not achieve these goals through an aggressive air campaign and subsequent ground invasion of southern Lebanon, many observers began to question Israel's military capabilities. As one officer stated, "Israel has defeated larger Arab armies repeatedly since its creation in 1948. The IDF enjoyed a reputation of invincibility among its Arab neighbors, until last year." What happened? Why? And what are the implications for future conflicts? Many institutions, government agencies, and military services have studied the 2nd Lebanon War. None, however, have reported all the major findings in one holistic account. Using those previous studies as primary data sources, this JCOA study seeks to identify, synthesize, and present the lessons learned about the hybrid threat that seemed to emerge in the 2nd Lebanon War. This study is unclassified.

Georgia-Russia Conflict (2008)

This study, tasked by the Joint Staff and conducted in coordination with EUCOM and several USG agencies, examines the summer 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict in terms of background, conduct of the conflict, and the resulting regional/strategic implications. The analysis highlights direct military action in conventional approaches that at the same time used irregular approaches which shaped this conflict for well over a decade. The study offers an opportunity to see the strengths and weaknesses of a re-emergent Russia, as well as the impact of the evolving nature of hybrid warfare with its impact on policy, plans, and preparations for future conflict. This product is classified.

Notes

Notes

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U.S. Army War College **STRATEGIC LANDPOWER** *Essay Contest 2009*

The United States Army War College and the United States Army War College Foundation are pleased to announce the annual **STRATEGIC LANDPOWER** Essay Contest.



The topic of the essay must relate to “Perspectives on Stability Operations and Their Role in U.S. Landpower.”

Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those involved in the judging. The Army War College Foundation will award a prize of \$3000 to the author of the best essay, a prize of \$1500 to the second place winner, and \$500 to the third place winner.

For more information or for a copy of the essay contest rules, contact:
Dr. Michael R. Matheny, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242 (717) 245-3459, DSN 242-3459, michael.matheny@us.army.mil

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest Rules:

1. Essays must be original, not to exceed 5000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Dr. Michael R. Matheny, USAWC Strategic Landpower Essay Contest, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 17 February 2009.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author will assign a codename in addition to a title to the essay. This codename shall appear: (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title in lieu of the author's name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank/title, branch of service (if applicable), biographical sketch, social security number, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the codename. This envelope will not be opened until after the final selections are made and the identity of the essayist will not be known by the selection committee.
5. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 1/2"x11". Submit two complete copies. If prepared on a computer, please also submit the entry on an IBM compatible disk, indicating specific word-processing software used.
6. The award winners will be notified in early Spring 2009. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by 1 April 2009.
7. The author of the best essay will receive \$3000 from the U.S. Army War College Foundation. A separate prize of \$1500 will be awarded to the author of the second best essay and a prize of \$500 will be awarded to the author of the third place winner.

US Army War College *Strategic Landpower* Essay Contest

Disclaimer

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense, USJFCOM, the JCOA, or any other government agency. This product is not a doctrinal publication and is not staffed, but is the perception of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities, and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discussions, and impart information in an expeditious manner.

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